NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES
3 3433 07954755 4

CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN CULTURE

The Publishers Weekly

FEB 25 1914

(Shaw)

ZEE

CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN CULTURE

An Essay in Philosophy of Religion

CHARLES GRAY SHAW, B. D., Ph. D.

Professor of Philosophy and Butler Lecturer on Comparative Religion, New York University

CINCINNATI: JENNINGS AND GRAHAM
NEW YORK: EATON AND MAINS

403930

COPYRIGHT, 1902, BY
JENNINGS AND GRAHAM

To My Father.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

PAGE

The Intellectual Crisis in Christianity.—What is the Essence of Christianity?—Spirit of the Present.—Christianity and Modernity, - - - - - - - 11

CHAPTER I.

THE OUTER POSITION OF CHRISTIANITY: ANCIENT AND MODERN.

The Originality of the Christian Religion. Christian Civilization and Culture.—1. Ancient Nationalism. Classic Formalism. Frieze of the Parthenon and the Frescoes of the Sistine Chapel.—2. Negation of Paganism and the Affirmation of Christianity. Scholasticism and Science. The Renaissance—Its Christian Character. Mediæval and Modern. New Light upon the Renaissance.—3. Christianity's Emancipation of Religion. Religion, Science, and Philosophy. Religion *Supra*-logical and *Supra*-ethical, - - - - - - - 17

CHAPTER II.

THE INNER POSITION OF CHRISTIANITY: SELF-DIREMPTION OF THE MODERN SPIRIT.

1. The Self-sundering of the Human Spirit.—Effect of Modern Science. Conflicts in Modern Politics. Contrasts in Rights and Arts. Dualism in Logic and Ethics. Our Views of History and Humanity.—2. The Search for Genuine Religion. Discovery of Religious Sensitivity. Spontaneity of Religion.—3. The Problem of Positivism. The Threat of Socialism. Unity of Life in Christianity. Christianity's Hold upon the Modern, 45

CHAPTER III.

THE UNITY OF HISTORY AND RELIGION IN CHRISTIANITY.

PAGE

1. The Historical Form of Religion. Problem of the Enlightenment. Natural Religion and Its career. Destruction of Natural Religion. The Extra-historical View of the Present. Harnack and Herrmann.—2. The Essence of Religion. How Religion becomes Historical. Stages of Revelation.—3. Christianity's Historical Achievement. Catastrophic Nature of Christianity. The Christian Epoch, - - - - - - - - 68

CHAPTER IV.

THE UNITY OF ART AND HUMANITY IN CHRISTIANITY.

The Essence of and the Evidence for Christianity.—1. Christianity and Classicism. Christianity, not "naïve" but "sentimental." Christianity and the Artistic Life. The Tendency toward Redemption. Quality of Feeling in Christian Art.—2. The Significance of Christian Æsthetics. Inclination toward Mankind. Christ the Artist of Humanity. Projection into the Infinite. The Reasonableness of Immortality. The Approximation toward Eternity, - - - - - - - - - 88

CHAPTER V.

CHRISTIANITY AND ROMANTICISM.

The Modern Question of Culture. Rousseau and Fichte.—1. Orientalism Sensualism. Egyptian Mystery. The Classic Consciousness.—2. Christianity and Culture. The Attitude of Christ toward Nature. Alexandrian Æsthetics. Byzantine Methods. The Trouvére. Essence of Romanticism.—3. Modern Culture with Matthew Arnold and Rudolph Eucken. Culture as Problem. How Christianity establishes Culture, - 113

CHAPTER VI.

CHRISTIANITY AND TRANCENDENTALISM.

PAGE

The Conditions of Modern Speculation.—1. Empiricism and Rationalism. The Claims of Empiricism. What Experience Means. The Demands of Rationalism. Logic the Limit of Human Thinking? How Culture Influences. Truths of Culture.—2. Idealism and Materialism. The Program of Materialism. Materialism Self-destructive. Subjective Idealism. Its Fallacy.—3. The Christian View of the World. The Historical World of Humanity. The World of Spirits, - - 134

CHAPTER VII.

CHRISTIANITY THE CULMINATION OF RELIGION.

What is Christianity?—1. The "Eternal Gospel." Rational Christianity in Descartes. Christianity among the Deists. Mediævalism and Christianity in Kant.—2. The Essence of Christianity. The "Kingdom" as Goal. The "Kingdom" of the Father. Historical Form of Christianity.—3. Dual Form of Christianity. Evangel and Epistle. Person and Work of Christ. The Unity of the New Testament, - - - - - 155

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CRISIS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

Divisive Effect of Christianity.—1. The Transvaluation of Virtues. Dualism of Spirit and Matter. Man Sundered from the World. Freedom and Spiritual Life. Separation of Good and Bad. The Inwardness of Virtue. Pessimistic Setting of the *Metanoia*.—2. Destruction of Contemporary Morality. Ideal of Non-resentment. in Tâo ,Dhamma and Gospel. Tolstoi and Eucken on the Love of Enemies. The Fall of the Cardinal Virtues.—3. Establishment of Christian Values. The Psychological Essence of Value. Soul Values and World Values, - - - - - - - - - - - 180

CHAPTER IX.

CHRISTIANITY AND EGOISM.

PAGE

Christianity and the Self.—1. The Self in Modern Ethics. Attempted Reconciliation of Egoism and Altruism. Who is the Alter?—2. Social Interpretation of the Ego. The Humanity of Mankind. How Christ discovered Humanity. Christianity not Altruistic.—3. The Ego and Human Culture. Progress through Sympathy. Social Nature of Thought. Humanity and its Speculative Function. Sympathy and Eternal Life, - - 203

CHAPTER X.

CHRISTIANITY AND PESSIMISM.

Pessimism and Spiritual Life.—1. The "Eternal Recurrence" among the Chinese. Buddhist Pessimism. Why Religion inclines toward Pessimism. Pessimism and the Ideal. Christianity and Ideal Pain. Christianity and "*Ironie*."—2. How Christ discovered Sorrow. What is Happiness? Views of Aristotle, Augustine, and Butler. Sense of Death in Jesus and Sophocles.—3. Mutual Adjustment of Pessimism and Optimism. Their Common Root. Conditions of Current Pessimism. Christian Solution of Pessimism, - - 224

CHAPTER XI.

CHRIST JESUS AND ETERNAL LIFE.

Lateness of the Biography of Christ.—1. The Christ of the Gospels. Christology of the Enlightenment. The Christ of German Idealism.—2. Christ as Eternal Life. Testimony of Darwin and Herrmann. How Christ Transcends Time.—3. Moral and Metaphysical Views Insufficient. The Value of Christ. The Religious View of Christ. Christ an Object of Worship. How Christ effects the Soul, - - - - - - - - - 247

CHAPTER XII.

THE DEED OF CHRIST.

PAGE

What did Jesus do ?—1. Nature of Human Work. Sphere of Christ's Activity. Christ's Work a Religious One. The Mission and Call of Christ. How Christ made Positive Religion.—2. The Motives of Jesus. The Character of His Work. The Result of the Deed of Christ. Christ a World-spirit. The Ruler of the Ages, 270

CHAPTER XIII.

CURRENT INTEREST IN THE CRUCIFIXION.

1. The Crucifixion and Contemporary Research. The Setting of the Crucifixion. The Crucifixion as the Culmination of Christ's Career. The Three Parts of Christ's Mission. Secular and Sacerdotal Views.—2. Causes of the Crucifixion. Judean Antipathy. Roman Opposition. Destructive Nature of Christ's Work.—3. Christ's Sense of His Own Death. His Death-obedience. Fatherhood and Divine "Satisfaction." The Kingdom and "Moral Government." Faith in the Death of Christ, - - - - - - 287

INTRODUCTION.

If a crisis in the history of Christianity has been reached, it can be met only by considering the essence of Christianity, as well as by seeking to fathom the spirit of the age. Christianity must be regarded as giving humanity a new life, not merely an altered view of things; as creating a new form of activity, not as aligning a mere ideal. Modern life must likewise be treated in a conscious and convincing manner. The historical idea, which Christianity itself deduced, now appears in an all-important manner; by arousing us to modern self-consciousness, it leads us further to inquire to what extent and in what manner the age is still Christian. Is there a modern Christianity which is germane to our thinking life and our living thought? To answer such a question, indeed even to ask it, requires a sufficient conception of what an age, with its culture and civilization, with its ideals and duties, can really be. Still more difficult is this task of inquiry made when it is the present which looks us in the face. Do we heed the commandment

of Him who said, "Learn of Me?" Have we the "mind of Christ," and do we feel the *amor intellectualis Christi?*

Concerning the "essence" of Christianity, modern thought has had considerable to say; in general, its methods have been twofold. First, during the eighteenth century, when rationalism prevailed, the Gospel was taken out of the warm precinct of time and adjusted to the starless night of eternity. The problem was a new one to the modern man, and he could scarcely conceive of religion apart from a system of reason. During the nineteenth century, thought exchanged logic for psychology, and to such an extent that the truth of Christianity has ever been threatened with subjectivism. Then a Toland and a Tindal stripped Christianity of the temporal and mysterious and withdrew it from the realm of history; now, a Strauss and a Feuerbach clothe it with mythology and reduce it to experience. Here, Classicism, like that of Shaftesbury and Lessing, sought to reduce Christianity to formalism; there, the Romanticism of Schlegel and Novalis tend to regard it as full of sentiment and imagination. Here, a political advocate, like Rousseau, saw in free Chrisitanity the way toward a new State; there, a social leader like Tolstoi finds in the Gospel of non-resentment the path toward a new society.

"Are we still Christians?" The answer to

this striking question depends upon the manner in which we conceive of Christianity and modernity. Where Christianity is sacerdotal and modernity is secular, there can be little else than divergence; but when the essence of this religion and the heart of the age are reached, it will be found that they are one. We are Christian in spite of ourselves; our thought and our life when these are significant, our ideals and our duties when these are characteristic of our times, are animated with that inwardness of idealism which has come to us through Christianity. It remains for the age to realize in its entirety and to affirm in its integrity the continual drift of Christianity. The passing of the religion of Christ can not come while modern thought and life are what they now are, so that we need only ask, In what sense is modernity Christian?

Such an inquiry has respect to the future as well as to the present, so that we may wonder how long Christianity will remain in the world. Will the lamp of life lighted by the genial Christ soon grow dim? Some such question was raised by Schleiermacher more than a century ago, while he was writing his epoch-making "Discourses on Religion." Christianity, so it seemed to him, has a long future before it. True enough does this seem to be; but this is not sufficient, for Christianity ever possesses that which

is convincing, and it has about it an air of finality which seems impervious to time. Backward to the remote beginning of human consciousness, forward to the remotest future, Christ looks with royal mien, and it seems impossible to conceive of a religious system purer in its idealism, or more universal in its power. Christianity is the culmination of religion; it presents an ultimate goal.

Are we Christians yet? we may ask. Here is an important question overlooked by Strauss and Schleiermacher. Has modern life outlived Christianity by surmounting its ideals, by exhausting its possibilities? Rather let us say we are not yet abreast of the march of this form of religion, whose precincts are still those of an undiscovered country. Not as a withering aftermath, but as a whitening harvest, must Christianity be viewed; outside of Christianity nothing higher will arise, but within it newer forms will spring forth. A new era will be a Christian era; it will be modern thought indeed, conscious that Christ has created a new world-order and that He has left a deathless impression upon mankind.

To appreciate the time-situation, we must feel the drift of Christianity and be alive to our own modernness. Christianity is internal and historical in its nature, our age is marked by psychological and genetic principles, and these

must now be put to the service of describing the religion of Christ. We must separate the ancient from the modern, and distinguish the classic from the Christian; only then are we in a position to interpret modernity, its causes and effects. How strikingly appears the fact that Christianity creates the historical idea, and makes itself the center of the ages. When the present is related to the past, it will be seen that modernity is Christianity, so that the form of spiritual religion may be surveyed in the light of modern ideals. As a result, it will be found that romanticism and transcendentalism interpret Christianity, whose depth of humanity and religion they strive to reveal. In the same way, practical problems of life must be surveyed in the light of Christian values and modern goals, and our questions of egoism and pessimism discussed accordingly. The culmination of modern Christianity is to be found in the religious and artistic personality of Jesus Himself; His words and His works are the source of the genuine religion of humanity.

Christianity and Modern Culture.

Chapter I.

THE OUTER POSITION OF CHRISTIANITY: ANCIENT AND MODERN.

To see, as if for the first time, that in Christianity there is an original system with a characteristic tone is the privilege of our modern age. At last, we may have the mind of Christ, and in that mind, whose message has been growing until now it flowers as if anew, there was an art of thinking and of living which speaks in our modern culture. Many and marvelous are the particular elements which Christ contributes to subsequent ages; one thing among them seems to be the peculiar transcendentalism which He contributed to our thought and the corresponding Romanticism which He infused into our life. When we awaken to Christianity, we are aroused to our modernity. We see that our age differs in form and spirit from the antique, while it assumes a peculiar relation to itself; the cause of this difference is nothing else than Christianity which has related religion

to life and given life to art. Christianity is self-styled and its peculiar fruit is now being fathered by our modernity.

The twentieth century is as anxious to apply the spirit of religion as the nineteenth was to discover its essence. To-day, we are inquiring, "How may we meet upon a common religious basis?" just as the preceding age asked, "What is the common element in all worship?" One part of this double problem is practical, and seeks to find some catholic maxim for religious and ethical action; the other is speculative, and, accordingly, it aims to discover some category into which the varieties of religious opinions may fall. Men suffer from the lapse of strong motives; but they likewise languish for the want of clear ideas. What, then, can be more important than an examination of the present spirit of religious thought? Such a consideration will show that modern speculation has been able to evince the religious principle as a factor in human thinking, and, furthermore, that it has succeeded in evolving something like a consistent definition of religion itself. To show how this has come about is a task which can not be accomplished without taking hold of the history of the human spirit.

Civilization and culture make up the life of humanity; one relates the individual to society, the other reveals man's position in the world of

natural forms. As age differs from age in time, so does it also vary in significance; and, while mankind is one, the species of his life and the stages of his development are manifold. Thus it comes about that a vast period, like that of antiquity, will differ from our own age of *modernité* in a manner which is just as striking as the difference between ancient and modern tongues, while the divergence of thought of these divisions of history will be no less vast than the period of a thousand years which lies between them. Ancient culture and civilization reveal man ensconced in nature and enshrined in humanity; at home in the world, united with himself, feeling no longer for the transcendental, and suffering no surprise at the actual order of things, the ancient lived out a life of complacency which deepened into resignation. The modern has broken with the world, and has sundered his own spirit; he doubts the validity of nature, and questions the value of his natural life, from which he seeks deliverance. Skepticism and dogmatism, optimism and pessimism, materialism and idealism, stand for the several conflicts which the modern man has carried on with his own intellect. But it is just this catastrophic condition which acts as the cause of modern religious thought, and the upheavals of modern speculation have been able to reveal the existence of divine principle in human thought.

The new *modernité* has arisen in response to a decided tendency to know what spirit we are of. Are we still Christian, or are we pagan? This tendency now assumes a dual form, at once positive and negative. Toward the ancient world a strong negative reaction has set in with the result of creating an insurmountable barrier between Christianity and Paganism, bringing us to see that past and present have no consanguinity. On the other hand, a firm, positive impulse is working to show that mediæval and modern are parts of one philosophy. This movement is urged on, then, by a centrifugal force, which opposes the antique, and a centripetal impulse which draws the mediæval and modern toward a common center. The higher *modernité* is alien to Paganism and allied to Christianity. The alleged "darkness" of Scholasticism and the boasted "Enlightenment" of the scientist make up the light-and-shade of a newer and richer Christianity.

1. Take the ancient world first, with its civilization and its culture. Then prevailed a nationalistic form of civilization, which could not conceive of man's life apart from the State. Man was what Aristotle called a "political animal;" now he is a social spirit; then it was law, now it is rights; then it was nationalism, now it is internationalism. Completely hemmed in by his political environment, the ancient did not perceive the ethical ideals of right and duty,

or the political principles of rights and liberty, which are so trite among the moderns, and it was only when the Athenian State had begun to decline that the Stoics spoke of "humanity" and "world-citizenship."

Modern civilization is based upon a philosophy of rights which was derived from a theory of *jus naturale.* And this civilization has its glories in a theory of liberty and self-government, while it feels its shame in the constant tendency toward revolution and anarchy. Vast was the deed undertaken when Jesus Christ separated humanity from the body politic, and sublimely declared that His kingdom was not of this world, and vast has been the effect which this Syrian idealism has had upon Western thought. Extremes of this doctrine may indeed be found where men abuse the liberty in which they should stand fast. The modern is not ruled naturally, but by force of arms or of logic; his instinctive tendency leads him away from authority. On the speculative side this tendency has led the modern, in opposing right to law, to bring about a dualism in his own being—another feature of that upheaval which reveals the religious principle. For hereby is it seen, as if for the first time, that the profundity of man's nature can not be explained in terms of political government, any more than the vast range of human endeavor can be satisfied by any social work which man

may be called upon to do. It is the deed of deeds which he feels summoned to perform, and his will is satisfied only as it feels that it is doing the will of God. Here is where the Christian religion attracts the modern man, and it is here that the meaning of his life appears.

Ancient culture, when compared with modern, teaches the same lesson; for the art of Athens is quite different from that of Florence. The chisel of Phidias, when he carved the frieze of the Parthenon, was animated by a spirit very different from that of Angelo bending upward beneath the frescoes of the Sistine Chapel. In portraying the pan-Athenaic procession, the artist represents not only the quadrennial fête in honor of Athena, but the dominant spirit of the classic world. The figures assembled upon the walls of the temple are pictures of ease and power. On the western frieze fiery steeds and restless riders are preparing for the procession, which moves along the northern and southern walls. Here horsemen and charioteers, men leading beasts to sacrifice, and women bearing sacred vessels move on in the march, which is headed by stately maidens. As these approach, god and goddess turn their heads to greet them. The life is the life which is common to men and gods; the energy is the Aristotelian "energy of contemplation."

Vastly different is the spectacle upon the

ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. The prophets are restless, if not anxious; Jeremiah can not conceal his despair. Sibyls wait in expectation of that which hath not yet appeared. Majestic figures strive and contort themselves as though their souls were not easily contained. Sin is present, and in the very face of the divine. The Jehovah of Angelo is no Jupiter of Phidias. With vehemence He separates light from darkness, and sets about the work of human redemption, while His countenance seems to suggest that He shall see of the travail of His soul and be satisfied. It is plain that the spirit guiding the drawings of the Florentine was in no wise akin to that which presided over the designs of the Athenian.

The difference may be expressed, perhaps, by comparing the classic with romantic, immanent with transcendent, objective with subjective; but it is best brought out by observing that ancient and modern differ in ignoring and in emphasizing the presence of religion as a genuine fact in human life, and an essential factor in human thought. So long as the ancient was secure in the State, living its life and fulfilling its duties, just so long was there precluded from him any view of a spiritual order, where dissatisfied humanity hears the beatitude pronounced upon those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake. And as long as the pagan

found only fairness in actual nature, just so long was it impossible for him to feel aspiration after a life where "it doth not yet appear what we shall be." The repose of an Athenian god is only the logical outcome of such naïve conceptions in civilization and culture; the reaction of a Florentine prophet or sibyl is only natural when the artist has heard a voice saying, "Loose him, and let him go!"

It is the more fluid conception of humanity which prevails in the Christian religion. Form is no longer made the criterion of beauty and truth, for the essential standard of all things is to be found within. In the larger sense, the ancient measured all things by the physical; the modern inclines toward the psychical. The change from the outer to the inner standard, the opposition between the world and the soul were brought about by Chrisitanity as one of its superlative effects. He who would evince the "essence" of Christianity or would demonstrate its "truth" must assume a consistent method which is prescribed by this spiritual religion itself. It is the method of spiritual life which alone has value. Beautiful may be Hermione, standing in the majesty of marble; more than lovely is she as she descends in warm life from her pedestal. Thus differ in standard the realities and excellencies of pagan and Christian views.

2. The negation of Paganism is the affirmation of Christianity, and the passing of the antique heralds the incoming of the modern. To bring about such a changed conception of human history, it must be shown that, where the spirit of *modernité* differs from that of the ancient world, it further allies itself with the ideals of mediævalism. Then the historical position of Christianity becomes strategic; but to become aware of them one must have some vigorous conception of how periods in the history of human culture, whose lines of demarcation are at first imperceptible, finally deepen into great chasms which can not be bridged. There are thus evolved species of spiritual life which suffer no further transmutation. At the inception of Christianity there appeared as a vast problem the distinction between Jew and Gentile; at the present time, when philology investigates the development of Aryan and Semitic languages, when world-politics raises the "Eastern question," we draw a line of distinction between the Orient and the Occident. Within the pale of Christianity, the historical problem consists in adjusting Paganism to Christianity, mediævalism to modernism. Then the essence of Christianity appears in a new light. To-day we are wondering what our attitude toward the past periods in European history should be. Traditional methods, within and

without the Church, or its Protestant branch, have ever urged modern thought to admire the classical world in which we have no part and only tolerate the mediævalism from which our life and thought are descended. More critical insight now convinces us that, whatever be the view of the future, no longer may we maintain the methods which have prevailed.

Upon the philosophic side and in connection with the history of Scholasticism, the community of mediæval and modern may further be noted. As moderns, we are prone to regard individualism and empiricism, nature and freedom, as our own possession, the product of eighteenth-century rationalism. We glorify the Reformation in the same way that we exult in the Renaissance. Such views betray near-sightedness, and the history of philosophy, one of the glories of the nineteenth century, tends to correct this error. In the midst of the Carlovingian epoch, Scotus Erigena, a man almost modern and Hegelian, denies the doctrine of eternal punishment, while Abelard, whose sympathies were likewise with both ancient and modern, prefers Athenian philosophy to the teachings of the Old Testament. Duns Scotus, whom the Church refused to canonize, affirms individualism and voluntarism in anticipation of Fichte and Schopenhauer. According to Weber, "These submissive, devoted, and orthodox doc-

tors of the Church combined with their Christian convictions a freedom of thought, the like of which is but rarely met with in the Protestant theology of the seventeenth century." Scholasticism was the beginning of modern science; the conflicts over nominalism and realism, over intellectualism and voluntarism, more than anticipate our modern disputes about empiricism and rationalism, idealism and realism, while our Protestant denominations had their prototypes in the various Catholic orders which, like Franciscans and Dominicans, made of scholastic theology a kind of warfare between science and religion.

The inclusive spirit of Christianity and the larger sense of modernity appear, not only in the artistic ideal and the philosophic concept, but in the very terminology of speculation, and such is the bond of sympathy existing between mediæval and modern that words which are sounded as the very key-note of our present day find their origin in the Latin of the Middle Ages. Apuleius contributed *sensualis* and *religiositas;* Tertullian distinguishes between *corporalitas* and *incorporalitas.* From Augustine we derive the psychological *sensus interioris hominis.* Boethius, who like Schopenhauer sought consolation in philosophy, anticipates the pessimist in separating *affirmo* and *nego.* Avicenna antedates Leibnitz with the word *individualitas.* From Abelard comes *realiter;*

while somewhat later Duns Scotus added *realitas,* signifying that idea of reality which has marked the metaphysics of the nineteenth century. The scholastic distinction between *objective* and *subjective* was exactly the reverse of the modern in application, but, in its contrary meaning, it persists as late as Locke and Spinoza. *Abstractus* and *concretus* come from Gilbert de la Porée; while *a priori* and *a posteriori* are found in Albert of Saxon. To Scholasticism we must look for that separation of *qualitates primariæ et secundariæ* which is so thoroughly associated with the empiricism of Locke; while the latter's assumption, *nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu,* commanded assent in the days of the Dominicans. Finally, the very word *modernus,* which appears in Roger Bacon, traces back to the fifth century when it was used by the grammatical Priscian and his contemporary Cassiodorus! The history of philosophy thus tends to alter our traditional conception of modernity.

No better symptom of this changed condition can be observed than in connection with the Renaissance, toward which an entirely new view may now be entertained. It is not new facts but new standards which lead us to find the source of the Renaissance in the remote centuries of mediævalism, and to consider its spirit, although the latter was wanting in ethical soundness, as at heart Christian. Instead of regard-

ing the Renaissance as a happy revival of Hellenism which illumined the dark period preceding it and guided the modern back to nature, we would better adapt some more fundamental view of history, which, like Hegel's, divides the development of human culture into Orientalism with its sensuous symbolism, Paganism with its reconciliation of sense and spirit, and Romanticism with its Christian triumph of spirit over sense. The Renaissance may thus be viewed as a clear manifestation of the larger Romanticism which almost wholly hides the faint features of any Hellenic revival. There was Classicism then, but there was Classicism in the Enlightenment just as there is Classicism to-day, but the genuine modernism is romantic and Christian.

After the flowering of the romantic tendency, which took place a century ago, the significance of the Renaissance begins to dawn. During the nineteenth century, there were witnessed two movements which were calculated to put the modern more perfectly *en rapport* with the mediævalist, so that the denunciations of the Reformation, directed against the Catholic Church, and the enticements of the later Renaissance, which presented in awkward contrast the somber qualities of the fathers and schoolmen, need no longer cloud our modern spirit. These were Pre-Raphaelitism and Gothicism. Concerning the latter, it may be noted that, during

the Classicism of the Enlightenment, there prevailed the term "Gothicism" as something opprobrious. Evidence of this may be found clustered in some pages of Shaftesbury's "Characteristics" of 1711. The Gothic revival, which constructed living edifices of the scholastic type, and which has also reconstructed historical views, makes the older Gothicism appear most conspicuously out of place while affording rare insight into the animating spirit of an age whose alleged darkness was the glorious gloom of Amiens and Rheims. If the Gothic, so germane to the mediævalist, so like scholastic theology, was barbarous, as Walpole and Shaftesbury suggested, how could such an art appeal to the French who glorified it, or how could we find in Herder and Goethe the sources of its revival? The Gothic, even when it is not flamboyant, possesses a richness of adornment which should commend it to a modernism which is given to similar but less tasteful luxury. *Ars non facit saltus.* The Renaissance, with its wealth of life and desire, found nothing in the Gothic to repel it, but in a serene fashion, as the German Renaissance of Heidelberg will testify, passed from the pointed style to the forms of its own architecture.

Pre-Raphaelitism is of similar moment. It was only within a century that criticism began to set such value on the Sistine Madonna, and

within still more recent dates living art has expressed the desire to recede beyond Raphael to the art of the Quattrocento for its ideal. In the art which preceded the high Renaissance of Raphael, there was a certain fidelity to nature which appeals to our modern scientific ideals, and the discoveries of the nineteenth century remind one of the even more stupendous achievements in the fifteenth. History thus finds that the roots of modernism run deep into the soil of mediævalism, and the so-called beginning of our modern life is lost in the thousand years of mediæval Europe. The retrogression of the Renaissance is one of the historical signs of the times, and it is not only in a formal if not a pedantic spirit that we draw a sharp line of demarcation between Scholasticism and the Renaissance. Certainly we have outgrown the traditional idea that this latter movement was caused by the Revival of Learning, just as this was occasioned by the influx of scholars after the fall of Constantinople. These Eastern refugees may have brought the seed with them, but they found the ground ready to receive it. Furthermore, it was not Athenian culture which these scholars bore, but rather the ideals of methods of Christian art which for a millennium had had its home in the city of Constantinople. Byzantine was the character of the culture which was to reappear in Florence, and it was from the Eastern capital

that such thirteenth-century leaders as Cimabue and Giotto received their principles of mural decoration. It is with the founding rather than with the fall of Constantinople that we are to look for the genuine beginning of the Renaissance, whose foundations were laid in St. Sophia's of the sixth rather than St. Peter's of the sixteenth century.

If the Renaissance was an Hellenic revival, it was a failure, and that a very blind one; if it was a flowering of an indigenous culture, which had here and there as its signs antique learning, its place in history is more apparent. The Renaissance was at heart Christian; it contained no more paganism than the Catholic Church can exhibit, and flourished in Italy under the auspices of the Popes. In the north where it was less under the sway of the Church, it was no more pagan on that account, but even less so. The Renaissance in Germany, Holland, and Flanders, like the Renaissance in Florence, Venice, and Rome, was no exotic, no movement born out of due time, but a climax in the culture of Christianity, whose glories previous to this had been confined to Byzantine, Romanesque, and Gothic architecture.

Mediæval and modern, separated apparently by such movements as the Renaissance and the Reformation, evince more points of likeness than of difference. If Christianity survives in great

religious upheavals, why should it not be conceived of as continuing throughout the culture climax of the same historical period? The spirit of mediævalism and modernism is not wholly different. The lightness which was native to the Renaissance was not wanting in Scholasticism, while the somber pessimism of the Middle Ages was not shaken off when the Italians learned the principles of color-effect and perspective. Christianity is one; it has brought one great Renaissance which makes all things modern. Mediævalism had its light; the Renaissance its shade. Abelard was filled with gayety; Angelo with gloom; and well might they have exchanged seats in history. The art of Angelo might have decorated the thirteenth-century cathedral of Speier, and the history of Abelard and Heloise could have been made during the sixteenth century at Venice. The spirit of mediævalism was such as to admit of both romance and reverence, while that of the Renaissance did not prevent a mingling of austerity with audacity. Milton is mediæval; Dante is modern. "Dante's conception," says Ruskin, "is far more intense than Milton's, and, by himself, for a time, not to be escaped from; it is indeed a vision, and that one of the wildest that ever entranced a soul—a dream in which every grotesque type or phantasy of heathen tradition is renewed and adorned; and the destinies of the Christian Church, under

their most sacred symbols, become subordinated to the praise, and are only to be understood by the aid, of one dear Florentine maiden."

Such pictures tend to clear our apprehension of, and arouse our appreciation for, the Middle Age as the mean between the extreme formalism of antiquity and the equally advanced dynamism of *modernité*. The consciousness, which as modern still feels the sub-liminal effects of Scholasticism, awakens in the romantic movement of the nineteenth century. Romanticism was the aftermath of the Renaissance. As a cultural movement it had the effect of separating the modern from the ancient and of uniting it anew with the mediæval. Leaders in the romantic school were never able to overcome a certain touch of Romanism. We might look for Novalis among the Dominicans; Tieck and Wackenroder confess their adoration for the Virgin; while Frederick Schlegel consummates his brilliant career by becoming a Catholic. This period, let it never be forgotten, was strongly productive of theology, as the genial system of Schleiermacher well shows, and it is to the romantic element in his famous "Discourses" that we are indebted for our most valuable philosophy of religion. Romanticism, as the expression of a more internal Christianity, is more to us than the Renaissance. It taught Germany, if not all Europe with it, to pursue

the remote, the ultimate interest in human life. If it was sentimental, it was because its self-consciousness, guided by the genius of Fichte, was too subjective; but such an error was all the more instructive and nourishing. The close of the nineteenth century is signalized by the triumphs of Wagner's musical genius, which is again the triumph of the new-mediævalism, Wagner's *personæ dramatis* return to nature directly, needing no aid from classicism.

New light upon the Renaissance, whose psychological tone is very problematic, appears to-day in an earnest criticism which seeks the elements of this movement as of a kingdom within Christianity, and an idea germane to the latter's consciousness. Certain modern Anglican writers have done much to redefine the Renaissance, and their words are worthy of attention. French writers, whose Catholicism would make them friendly to mediævalism, and whose national pride would incline them to find in early French poetry the seeds of the Renaissance, may well take part in a movement to date back the beginnings of the cultural revival; but English criticism, ignoring the leadership of Matthew Arnold and forgetting its Puritanism, exhibits a greater effort and affords a more valuable contribution to the same end. "It may be," says Bosanquet, "that what we thus distinguish as 'modern' will one day be called 'mediæval;' "

and it is upon the basis of this assumption that he seeks to trace the continuity of the æsthetic consciousness throughout the Middle Ages. The words of Walter Pater are still more significant when he refers to a "theory of the Renaissance within the Middle Age, which seeks to establish a continuity between the most characteristic work of the Middle Age and the works of the later Renaissance, and thus heals the rupture between the Middle Age and the Renaissance which has so often been exaggerated."

More striking, while perhaps less authoritative, is the testimony of Oscar Wilde in his prison-work, *De Profundis,* a book in which he speaks of Pater's "Renaissance" as "that book which has had such strange influence over my life." Says Wilde, "To me one of the things in history the most to be regretted is that the Christ's own Renaissance, which has produced the cathedral at Chartres, the Arthurian cycle of legends, the life of St. Francis of Assisi, the art of Giotto, and Dante's Divine Comedy, was not allowed to develop on its own lines but was interrupted and spoiled by the dreary classical Renaissance that gave us Petrarch and Raphael's frescoes, and Palladian architecture, and formal French tragedy, and St. Paul's Cathedral, and Pope's poetry, and everything that is made from without and by dead rules, and does not spring from within through some spirit informing it.

But wherever there is a romantic movement in art, there somehow, and under some form, is Christ, or the soul of Christ." One may well overlook the unsympathetic treatment of Raphael as he secures for himself that engaging expression of Wilde's, "The Christ's own Renaissance."

The Renaissance, which has all the value of an epoch, was no foe to mediævalism, and can establish no breach between the middle and modern ages. A more serious rupture occurred during the Enlightenment, when an exaggerated form of modernism came forward. But the result of the Enlightenment was internecine rather than international, and while it brought about a separation of reason and tradition, of right and authority, it did not go backward but forward; it corrected Christianity, but did not revive an alien Paganism. If the fruits of Paganism are largely lost to us, the spirit of Hellenism can never again become a factor in our life. Classicism has gone; Romanticism has come. How, then, can one hope to return to antiquity? The artist of the Renaissance when he did so, was merely trying to get back to nature, and his art is characteristic only when the antique gives way before the natural. Certainly the Anglo-Saxon can not be born again into the kingdom of Paganism. When Winckelman entered Classicism, it was as a Catholic; and Arnold, who exalts Hellenism, concludes with

the Hebraic maxim that "conduct is three-fourths of human life."

The calculated effect of this tendency to redefine and enlarge *modernité* is enormous; only the future can accurately measure it. Perhaps we can not to-day affirm a dualism in the history of the Occident which shall express itself in the terms "ancient" and "modern;" but we certainly can not deny that the traditional division which arbitrarily places the mediæval between these ages can not content our present historical spirit. In the midst of all these considerations there appears the genius of Christianity which dominates our modern culture. At its inception this form of religion set itself at variance with the culture then prevailing, and essayed to inaugurate a new type of intellectual life. So indeed it did; and were we to-day conscious of the source of our thinking, we should look back to this far-off event as the cause of the most essential ideas which our philosophy can marshal.

3. The fruit of civilization and culture is the outcome of Christianity. We may not here turn aside from our path, which is one of philosophical inquiry, to observe how Christ has actually laid hold of man to emancipate him in all the completeness of human freedom; nor may we pause to listen to the lyrics of aspiration which burst forth from the soul breathing

some higher and purer atmosphere. Just as sure a result of Christianity may be witnessed within the eminent domain of speculation. In this province, Christianity emancipates the religious consciousness, and reveals to the Western world the inner meaning of Oriental worship. Aspiration becomes an act, and the chance-feeling after God becomes a fact of consciousness. Christianity is a religion conscious of itself; it is worship which has passed from the instinctive to the intuitive; its Founder has made it possible for man to see, so that it is now time for philosophy to realize the service which it has felt. To receive the full benefit of this historical development, religious thought must distinguish its subject from that of both science and philosophy, while the content found within it must be separated from logic and ethics. In this way, religion is seen to have its own field, within which its peculiar character may be appreciated.

The conflict of religion and science has now passed into history; it may have dealt severely with religious ideas which both parties fancied were fundamental, but it did not wound essential Christianity. The conflict of science with philosophy, which has seen here and there the triumphs of skepticism and materialism, has had more distinctive influence over idealism than the religious struggle exercised over the idea of

the spiritual. When we once see that life itself is a conflict, where every aid which science, philosophy, and religion can offer should be welcomed, we are not so anxious to settle these minor disputes. We should not look for the reconciliation of science and religion any more than we should wait to witness the union of science and art. If religion is a problem, life is a still greater one; if Christianity seems to be too mysterious, thought itself is still more so. Much of the criticism which has been directed toward the Christian religion is due to the constant tendency of the latter to put in a clear light the most perplexing problems and the most grievous burdens of human existence. Christ discovered human diseases which seem almost incurable; as, for example, sin and sorrow; but He does not cast the cloud or create the burden. Unlike Socrates, Christ did not command, "Know thyself," but gave the man a revelation of his inherent humanity and the world in which this abides. The view is not scientific, but it is none the less true.

The subordination of religion to philosophy is now over, and the character of religion is as secure as its independent nature. This is another result of Christianity. Philosophy has its idea of mind; religion claims the soul. The use to which philosophy puts the soul is ever an abstract one, consisting in the formation of ideas

and the drawing of inferences. But religion, which is not without its view, has judgments of its own which are profound. Religion may not explain the soul; this is the program for philosophy; religion justifies the soul by giving a final reason for man's existence. Man exists, not that he may think, but that he may lead a spiritual life. Philosophy may show the dignity of the mind, but religion reveals the destiny of the man. Within the precinct of religion, science and philosophy are superseded by a form of spiritual life which reveals the unity of the world and the destiny of man.

The content of the emancipated field is alive with the religious consciousness of humanity. Religion is not consciousness in general, wherein the mysterious reconciliation of change and continuity is made manifest, nor is it some particular phase of this consciousness, like sensation or feeling. When viewed upon its motor side, religion is spontaneous; called forth by no ethical principle of the will, it is a deed which stands for all the humanity there is in man. Conscience is a part of man; religion represents his entirety. In Christianity the supremacy of the religious deed is affirmed as the essential element in human salvation. The rather intrepid position, which consists in affirming that religion is not morality, is one which can be maintained only in connection with Christianity. Plato

transcends the ethical in his philosophical doctrine of the Republic; Hegel is no less idealistic in his philosophy of rights; in Christianity the doctrine of the kingdom of God as the genuine life of humanity supersedes both the ethical and the political, and forms the culmination of human speculation.

Upon the side of the reason, the same fruitful result may be noted. Religion is never a deduction from the understanding any more than it is a production of the will. An unworthy form of worship may have its root in sense, but genuine religion refers to the spiritual life in man. Against a barren intellectualism, religion ever maintains its unique character. There is no concept which can elicit the ideas whose source is within the soul, nor is there any category which can embrace the various features of man's religious consciousness. If religion has no logical basis, it is because it needs none; if it has no proof, it is because it is its own demonstration. The freedom of man's creative activity herein manifested is matched only by the work of æsthetic genius. Saints and artists do not wait for logic to outline for them its arguments, but at once they descry and create the objects which they love to enshrine. But again, it is only in connection with Christianity that this triumphant form of religion may be suffered to transcend experience and outthink the under-

standing. It is Christianity which satisfies the demands of the soul, and it accordingly bids him to repose in the idea of God as the true, spiritual mansion of human worship.

These spiritual features, which outwardly render religion distinct from science and philosophy, and inwardly invest it with a supra-ethical and supra-logical content, are traits which in its history have been derived from Christianity. Here is witnessed the culmination of religion, which among the Greeks was but an affair of nature and the State. Religion may be described as a view and a deed which lead the soul to affirm itself in opposition to nature, and its character in distinction from purely natural existence. This, Christianity has made possible. Alien to the world, the soul stands solitary, like a pelican of the wilderness; antipathetic to nature's course, it raises its voice like one crying in the desert; feeling the sharp antagonism between the soul and the world, it is led to see that affliction is not of the dust, that sorrows spring not from the earth, but that man is born unto sorrow; and, like sparks which ascend to the sun, his soul flies upward. It is our privilege, as those born out of due time, to witness the emancipation of the religious principle in the history of modern times; our duty consists in revising our culture and reforming our civilization, that we may

provide spiritual furtherance for the genuine religion of mankind.

For the accomplishment of this, it is essential to note and to remember that we are never dealing with crude natural religion, nor with vague religious philosophizing, but rather with an advanced, if not a perfect, type of spiritual worship which has been fortified and clarified by two millenniums of European culture. Christianity is religion, and religion is Christianity. The religion of Christ, internal, transcendental, and ultimate as it is, may stand for the culmination of the religious sentiment in humanity, and instead of vainly looking either for some higher form of religious cult or the disappearance of religion altogether, we should rather anticipate a newer and purer form of the Christianity which now is.

Chapter II.

THE INNER POSITION OF CHRISTIANITY; THE SELF-DIREMPTION OF THE MODERN SPIRIT.

The source of philosophy of religion is to be found in modern thought. True it is that the ancient had his philosophy, and the mediævalist his religion, but the combination of the two was not effected until the modern unified thought and deed into the form of a religious philosophy. And this is because our modern thinking, which may not possess the spontaneity of ancient Athens or the reverence of mediæval Rome, still has its own merits just as it contains its own peculiar problems. Indeed, it is not too much to say that only under the conditions which modern thought involves could consistent religious thinking arise. Like Christianity, modernism presents a crisis; and, like Christianity, it arose as a catastrophic movement. Accordingly, the spectacle which to-day presents itself is that of the self-sundering of the human spirit, or man in conflict with his own inherent humanity. It is this which is the predisposing cause of our

psychology of religion and the reason why Christianity is so vivid a problem in our current speculation. The religious sentiment has been in the world since the dawn of human consciousness; Christianity has covered two millenniums of history; while the modern man, as a new species of humanity, has lived many centuries. To-day we are conscious of the living religious problem, and modernism must be studied for its own sake. Within the pale of modernity there appear three factors: (1) The self-sundering of the human spirit; (2) The adjustment of religion to humanity; (3) The problem of modern religion in the form of Christianity.

1. In the conflict of man with humanity, there arise questions which did not and could not occur to the ancient with his characteristic spirit and surroundings. As we have seen in observing the ancient mind, the spirit of Paganism was saturated with the æsthetical to such a degree that the contemplation of the world and the sense of life could only be pleasing ones. Then the world was orderly and benign, while human existence was fraught with grace and dignity. Our modern science has dispelled this bright dream; it has produced storm and stress, the effect of which is not likely to depart, except, perhaps, in the remote future. Let art interpret the world, and the result is fair to behold; even the temple in ruins and the statue

in torso elicit our praise. But turn now to science, wherein all conceptions are mechanical and organic, and the glory has departed. The world is a cosmos; man is statuesque; such ancient ideals are wholly engaging. Nature is a mass of laws: *L'homme est machine!* these modern ideals are filled with bathos. What is the result which is sure to follow when man is thus confronted by an alien idea which his own mind has evolved? Surprise and dismay, skepticism and despair. Profound is the modern situation of religion; intense is the spirit which envelops it.

Such native reaction of the human spirit, which is inherent in modernism and suggestive of Christianity, is further seen in the impulse which animates our civilization. With the ancient, the State was sufficient. Plato views it as a work of art; Aristotle styles it the effect of nature. However vast the nature of man as then conceived, however intense his life as then lived, the individual was supposed to attain to his ideal in the State, while humanity ended in citizenship. Political revolution, based upon a theory of rights, is a modern discovery akin to that of gunpowder; and the modern State is the balance between absolutism and anarchy. *L'etat, c'est moi,* says the monarch, but his egoism is matched by his citizen who is bent upon fire and destruction. The State to-day is

not an end in itself; and, in the sublime order of human events, it is first the man, then the citizen; first humanity, then law and government.

The inner differences which the modern has with himself exist in fact and in consciousness; they appear again in our theories of arts and of rights. Yet these throes within and upheavals without are vital to a religion like Christianity, which is at home among catastrophes. Upon the æsthetical side, it may be said that the modern does not stand in representative relation to his own culture. Modern æsthetics has detached itself from nature, and pursues "art for art's sake." In appreciating the beautiful, the modern has created the term "æsthetical." The æsthetical, in the critical sense of this term, points out the sad fact that beauty and art are no longer one and the same. Likewise the unity of beauty is lost in an intuition which consists, we say, in feeling or in form, in pleasure or in perfection. Unity forsakes the artist who in vain would return to nature; it eludes the critic who, like Winckelmann or Lessing, seeks to reinvest the classic ideal. The very origin of the Christian conception of the beautiful is to be found in that transcendental movement of Plotinus which separated æsthetics from ethics, and art from nature; and our modern criticism feels the reverberation of this original upheaval.

Our theories of rights, which express the meaning of civilization in the same way that æsthetics outlines culture, are beset by the same diremption. Ultimately, this separation of man from nature and from himself must be found in Christianity. Whatever unity may ultimately come from religion, the immediate connection between man and the State is a principle which no longer refreshes the mind of the modern citizen. The individual is at variance with society; personal interest differs from the safety of the body politic; hence our modern philosophy of rights. Such a method of practical philosophy, which has bequeathed to us our modern republics, pursues its method with vigor and sprightliness, which very soon lead it to set up a sharp antinomy between right and law. Right is internal and necessary; law is external and contingent. As a result of this theoretical difference, man is conceived to be independent of the State, to which his relation is only incidental and utilitarian. The older theory of social contract and the newer theory of social custom, which attempt to show how law was made, consider essential humanity as a thing distinct from the State and civilization. That which has brought about this form of diremption may be found psychologically in the shape of a purely human instinct. Its formulation was effected by the Cynics and Stoics when they set enmity

between φύσις and θέσις; but the living content of this instinct and this idea is to be discovered in Christianity, which creates for man a kingdom not of this world.

A similar distinctiveness appears in the realms of logic and ethics. Science and philosophy affected the ancient in a manner now unknown to us. Then, thought was immanent, and there was a perfect unity of reason and reality. This appears in the logic of Aristotle, which illustrates the harmony of thought and thing, and the belief that the thinkable was real, and the real thinkable. Transcendentalism is a modern notion; irrationalism a modern disease. Kant's logic differs from Aristotle's, because it sunders thought from its object; noumenal and phenomenal are by no means the same. It is at a great cost that the modern attained to the conception of inwardness, by virtue of which religion arises. Inner transcendentalism is the spirit of our philosophy, and it is made manifest by psychological introspection and speculative reflection. And this extra-view of reality, unnoticed by the ancient, has made possible that which is hard for thought, but essential to faith —the supernatural. By breaking away from nature, a new form of philosophy has been found, and when we use the term "world," the same means that which is at once subjective and objective. Now, the world which is inner, tran-

scendental, and supernatural, is within the precinct of religion.

Ancient and modern life reveal the same contrast, and the diremption of consciousness into desire and duty is a modern deed calculated to lead to the field of the religious. Pagan views of life were not necessarily unworthy, but they did not suggest that what we want to do is very likely a thing opposed to morality. Plato and Aristotle pursue very different ethical methods, and have correspondingly different views of the State; but they do not represent the modern opposition of autonomy and heteronomy, which appears in Kant and Hume. In the case of Stoic and Epicurean, we have perhaps an anticipation of the modern difficulty between Intuitionist and Hedonist; but these ancient schools agreed that in a resignation, consisting of ataraxy and apathy, a common life-ideal might be found. The modern has felt within and without this conflict, which still goes on. As moderns, we are a house divided against itself; for us, life is a sharp "either—or," affirmation or negation. Religion fills this breach, and not until the diremption of life occurs do we perceive the need of a religious principle. In its nature, religion is at once desperation and aspiration; modern conditions have made religious thought possible. Modernism is mediævalism turned

inside out; we are nearer Scholasticism than the ancient Academy.

The relentless spirit which led the modern to rend his culture and civilization, and bifurcate his sciences of rights and æsthetics, logic and ethics, was further active in promoting systems. Chief among these is the plan of history. When history is regarded as something more than a record, and as having at its center an inherent force which urges it on in its program, then history may be said to be a Christian idea and one which modern thought is beginning to appreciate. Throughout mediævalism in Augustine and Duns Scotus, we may find rudiments of our modern theory of development, the discussion of which has been one of the strong impulses of the nineteenth century. We may also pay tribute to Vico and Lessing, to Hume and Hegel, for having observed how genetic is the nature of mankind. Christianity makes of history an essential moment in spiritual life, for the reason that by means of this method it is able to present the idea of destiny. Such an idea of destiny is essential to humanity, and the unity and character of mankind can scarcely be conceived, certainly can not be treated with any sufficiency, unless this sterling idea be made uppermost. Man is not the measure of all things, conscious human reason is hardly the equal of reality; yet the universe may be subordinate to

humanity when it is seen that the soul of man is subject to divine destiny. To-day we have this idea, or this idea has us, and we present it as a problem, whose result ends in another fatal dualism. History which involves the idea of destiny seems to us to be purely contingent, just as in the Enlightment it was dismissed as consisting of tradition. In setting up the historical idea, the modern has aroused a conflict within his own soul; for the data of history seem unworthy to contain the essentials of spiritual life. Man believes in progress, but he fears lest he himself be but an element in the unyielding chain of evolution.

In the wake of this thought of development there follow various systems which are equally divisive. Christianity itself is broken up into the parties of Catholicism and Protestantism, and we wonder which, if either, is to be the ultimate form of Christendom. Romanism is not that kind of modernism which we have had for the last four centuries, and Protestantism prides itself on being advanced. On the other hand, Protestantism makes poor work of philosophy, and, on the religious side, is lacking in both reverence and romance. The general result is division and a dual Christianity; the modern is a believer, but he is also a partisan who can not assume a judicial attitude in philosophy of

religion. Owing to this vast religious difference, secularism and irreligion make easy progress.

Further divisions of the human spirit as portrayed in the present may be found in general philosophy of life, where man again appears at variance with his humanity. We may not care to suggest degeneration, especially not when we are striving to show how well adapted is modernism to the essence of Christianity; but the fact remains that there is something pathological in the present cultural situation. Our intellectual life is possessed of a double spirit which leads us to form opposing schools and defend inimical parties. Empiricism and rationalism, naturalism and intellectualism, freedom and determinism, optimism and pessimism, are dualisms which beset our contemplative spirit and make impossible an absolute solution of philosophical questions. To understand this situation we must inquire into its cause, and this is to be found only in the spirit of Christianity, whose ultimate effects we are beginning to feel. When a man is dismayed at himself and out of harmony with his own nature, he can begin to appreciate a spiritual religion like Christianity.

The disruptive tendency which ever pursues our thought is not due to the will of any individual thinker, but belongs to man himself as modern. Modernity is a curious condition of mankind; by some it is made equivalent to all manner of prog-

ress and enlightenment; by others, who think in a coarser vein, it is put upon the level of decadence and degeneration. The result is not yet; the cause seems to be found in the interior nature of Christianity. To-day, when, after centuries of evolution, positive religion has groped for consciousness, the independence of religion as a form of culture has been affirmed. Here as well, within a sacred precinct, the same diremption goes on, and upon the discovery of the religious idea, priceless as that discovery was, the modern sets up to construct a system of irreligion. The reason for this is not far to seek; it is because we have suddenly become aware of religion that the modern seeks to deny its authority. Ages of unbelief are ages of faith, and Atheism is the shadow cast by a vivid belief in God. Religion is the wheel upon which the modern is broken.

2. A glance at the essentials of religion will further show how the self-diremption of the modern spirit became the predisposing cause of modern philosophy of religion. Religion ever manifests the tendency to separate man from the world wherein he fancies he has his home. Where humanity remains in nature and leads a life marked by inner harmony, there religion is not to be found; and an immanent view of the world coupled with a naïve conception of human life can not provoke religious speculation. This

arises only when there is set up some distinction between inner and outer, the remote and the immediate. Yearning, which is so germane to essential religion, can not arise unless man's view of life contains somewhat of irony, if not pessimism. In mediæval-modern life, Romanticism has triumphed over the naïve immanence of Classicism, and hereby there is made room for religion in its Christian interpretation. The breach which Christianity made with Paganism, and the rent which it further caused within modernism, has created a precinct for religion which now, for the first time, is put upon an independent basis. Christianity has thus liberated the human spirit by showing that nature can not contain humanity, and that man in his natural capacity is all too human; it has put in the most vivid fashion man's desire for the transcendental.

Genuine religion thus constitutes an essential phase of human thinking. As a natural instinct, religion is healthy; as a form of thought it is sound. To-day, after modern philosophy has established itself, it can be seen that religion is one of the several points of view which speculation may assume. In connection with the diremption of the modern spirit, religion must now assert itself; among the various philosophical disciplines, it must maintain the independence of the religious precinct. As a corollary

to logic or a department of ethics, it can not stand at all. To see that religion is genuine and that religious thinking is essential, it must further be noted that the religious consciousness evinces peculiar interests and incitements. Why elaborate a view of the world? Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free! Why react upon life? What shall it profit one if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Within the confines of the religious precinct, life has a warmth, and thought a vividness, which come from no objective sources. To account for these immediate and simple forms of consciousness is the first task of religious thought.

The self-emancipation of the religious consciousness may be seen when the modern situation is appreciated. How shall the independent nature of religion now be regarded? It is possible to answer this question by referring to the emotional process in human nature, and this method has various advantages; foremost among them is the inner and personal character of feeling. On this account, a social psychology, perceiving how essential is the element of fear in human nature, regards this vivid emotion as constitutive of man's faith. Following similar methods, a romanticist like Schleiermacher styles religion a sense of dependence, while a classicist like Matthew Arnold uses feeling to elaborate the phrase, "morality touched with emotion." But

there is a depth to affection which neither of these theories sounds. What they all lack is the recognition that feeling makes possible, not only emotion and passion, but *judgment,* various forms of which appear in those value-judgments which the human heart produces and sanctions. When, therefore, the process of affection is included within the narrower confines of the religious experience, it must not escape notice that feelings of value and judgment-feelings are native to that fact which in various ways is looked upon as humanity's religious life. Herein the judgment expresses originality.

From the intellectual side, man's religious life may be said to possess *sensitivity;* viewed actively, the *spontaneity* of the religious consciousness is then seen. In distinction from the rational behavior of the mind, there is a certain sensitivity of the intellect for which no logic can account. Sensational experience furnishes the mind with various data which no act of reason could produce; of this fact, color, sweetness, heat, and various other forms of perception bear testimony. Concepts which are essential forms of thought and abstraction and generalization, working through attention and memory, are safe processes for realizing them. Nothing, however, can ever take the place of living perception by means of which actual knowledge is given to us. In the same way, there is a supra-logical form

of apprehension which occurs in the field of human reason. Some may desire to call this intuition; it may likewise be considered as religious judgment, which is no less real than such other forms of reason as lead man to say, "This is beautiful, this is good, this is real." To know that these relations hold, recourse must be had to some other function of human life than logical reasoning. An aroused religious consciousness will, and does, obtain ideas of God, the world, and human life; when we analyze them, we do not find that they were produced by abstraction, but by a very different conscious process. Religion is itself an attitude of the mind, which it inspires with a peculiar interest. This act, this attitude, and this interest are all inherent in religion itself.

The spontaneity of the religious principle appears in the same way. The will here receives a motive which is supplied immediately by man's desires. No theory of human volition can mask the fact that human nature possesses individual impulses and social instincts. These do not make void freedom; they only anticipate it. In like manner, higher forms of activity seize the will and lead man to perform the religious act; this is not inspired by a sense of virtue or a love for justice, but is due to the soul's desire to identify itself with a spiritual order of things. In such a fundamental act the soul is sponta-

neous, being prompted by nothing else than that which results in being a religious affirmation. Such spontaneity is essential to genuine religion; that is, to Christianity.

3. As a result of the foregoing, it can be seen that religion is one of the most characteristic phases of our modern thought. The historical position of the modern, who is kept aloof from pagan environment, and the present condition of his thought, characterized as this is by internal conflict, only bring into relief that essence and character which belong to religion. In conclusion it must be asked, What is Christianity doing to bring about the unity of the modern spirit? Religious thought is a priceless result brought about by virtue of a great conflict. Our philosophy is not likely to surmount the Greek Academy; our politics will not vie with the Roman Empire. Compared with Græco-Romanism, Anglo-Saxon tendencies are subjective and realistic; and they make religious thinking a natural consequence. In completing the religious idea implied by our modern life, we attain to one of our greatest triumphs. We well know that not every view of the world inspires man's devotion, not every conception of life arouses his dull impulses. A peculiar appeal has thus been made to human reasoning, and hereby has religious thinking been made possible. Nevertheless, the present condition of religious thought is by no means satisfactory.

Historical conditions must not escape our attention, for the present situation is in no sense haphazard; it has its roots in the past. Ancient Classicism and mediæval Romanticism may be revived from time to time, but our prevailing tendency is toward *positivism*. Likewise, in the realm of historical life, where nationalism and cosmopolitanism give way to *socialism*. These tendencies, implicit in our historical position, seem calculated to mar the appearance of an ambitious philosophy of religion. When our thought abandons logic and considers religion in the form of culture, we are in danger of ending in mere phenomena, splendid but unreal; and when we turn away from pure ethics, and turn to the philosophy of civilization, it seems as though religion were for us but a social farce. Friendly to religion, positivism and socialism seem likely to betray it.

Socialism threatens religion, because the latter clings to history. Here, however, religion may be saved by its strong individualism and by its conception of human destiny. Since the days and works of Locke and Spinoza, the unity of politics and theology has been set aside, with the result of not only disestablishing religion, but of creating a breach between science and faith. But historical religion is reconcilable with social science, as the history of the nineteenth century will show. Now, by virtue of the social ideal, we

arrive at the thought of equality; and it is this very conception which serves to cure some of the ills of socialism. The equality, which is a religious idea, is something ethical, and contains the thought of the equality of all souls before God. In the religious precinct, all men are upon the same level; one has the same destiny as another, and the same duty. Non-religious socialism construes equality in an inferior sense; and social ethics, which is based upon sympathy and benevolence, causes the ethical subject to look down upon him whom he benefits by his conduct. The higher equality is necessary, if we are to measure to the demands of the religious precinct and the kingdom of God; with this in mind, the danger of the merely social may be averted by a doctrine of religion which rests upon rights rather than ethics.

Positivism is the other danger that threatens a conception of human religion which is ensconced in history. It is impossible to return to an imaginary rational religion; fatal is it to repose in sheer authority. At the same time, positivism, as a revolt against the transcendental, is equally destructive. But there is another view of positivism than that which, as a logical doctrine, is based upon the principle of experience. The race's historical experience of religion is a matter of positive fact, we may say; but the content of this experience is vastly different

from that which is found in the experience of the senses, busied with objects of nature. And it is just this difference in content which constitutes the distinction between psychological and religious positivism. The facts of ethnic worship are the principles of religious thinking; but they are not mere facts; they are fraught with a significance which makes possible historical, synthetic judgments. These are organic to religion.

The way in which this higher socialism and higher positivism are manifest may be seen in connection with the æsthetical and the juristic. Religion, in breaking away from the analytical and abstract as these appear in logic and ethics, now cleaves to art and law, wherein it finds a positive and historical reality. This is seen in the form of definite institutions produced by the historical force of humanity. In thus emphasizing the significance of human history, we enhance the value of the religious precinct, which is marked, not by abstract relations among ideas and maxims, but by events at once real and full of meaning. Religion is something which occurs as an event in the progress of humanity.

The responsibility for having created the breach in human reason may be attributed to Christianity. Desire for the supernatural, coupled with disdain for nature, led to the diremption of the modern spirit. Mind was alienated from matter, intellect from sense, duty from

desire. Nevertheless, we may look to religion as the source of reconciliation; the hand which deals the blow can also heal the wound. What art was to the ancient, religion may be to the modern. Plato and Aristotle were artists, not thinkers only; Spinoza and Kant were religionists. The most profound of our modern philosophical systems have been marked by the presence of religion; and, in addition to the two mentioned, there may be cited the names of Locke and Leibnitz, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. With the exception of Schopenhauer, no great German philosopher has been inimical to the religious idea. English thought, which is never idealistic, has not revealed the same tendency, but even here the great thinkers—*e. g.,* Berkeley, Hume, Hobbes—have not disregarded the problem of religion. Our modern spirit is religious in an unconscious manner; indeed, religion is our most characteristic principle.

So far as unity is concerned, this may be found in Christianity. Here is the reconciliation of idealism and realism, in their various forms. Religion is both *infra-* and *supra-*rational, *infra-* and *supra-*moral. On this account, religion partakes of sense elements, as well as of rational principles; and, like art, it adjusts one to the other. At the same time, the religious life is not sanctioned by sheer duty, but is guided by human desire; so that the breach between

nature and spirit may receive another form of reparation. In its intellectual form, religion is more inclusive and more vital than logic; in its practical character, it is more influential than ethics. But the modern has felt still another phase of self-diremption—that of the absolute and the historical. The Enlightenment magnified the one; the present reposes the other. Religion represents both phases of this dualism; having an absolute character, it is clothed in a historical form, and in the actual life of religion there is perfect hamony between the two. Saturated with the spirit of art, Plato and Aristotle were not perplexed by such contradictions as now embarrass us; permeated by religion, Augustine and Anselm were able to find that unity of thought which is sadly lacking in Spinoza and Kant. For the modern, the secret of unity is to be found, not in art, but in religion; this is able to bridge over the dualism which itself created.

The unity of life, which Christianity is calculated to establish, will not be the same as with the naïve ancient or the romantic mediævalist. As the method which we have pursued will make manifest, religion is a subject of thought, which is closely related to nearly all the other forms of philosophic culture; just as the religious consciousness is an ever-present element in our ordinary conscious life. For this reason, religion is fitted to express that peculiar unity and

completeness which life is expected to contain. But the range of religion is no more important than its immediate character, by virtue of which it becomes intimately related to the soul of man. With an intellectualist like Descartes, the essence of spiritual life consists in a thought by which the soul is affirmed; with a voluntarist like Fichte, the same effect is sought in a deed of the will. But more intimate than either the logical or the ethical moments is the religious achievement of the human spirit, by virtue of which man becomes himself. Both the unity and the manifold of human existence are contained within the precinct of religion.

With respect to the modern problem as such, it may be said, again, that the peculiar diremption, which has so long troubled the Protestant, is but a phase of the original dualism created by Christianity. On the speculative side, the inner was set at variance with the outer; while, for life, the parallel distinction was made between the good and the bad. But religious thought, which has grown out of the development of Christianity, is vast and real enough to include these opposites. The inwardness of religion does not make void the positive form which, like objectified art, is organic to human history; at the same time, the sanctity of faith does not render inconsistent that sense of sin and wrong, which, ever present in law, is not absent from religion.

According to religious thought, man is to have an inner life and this is to be expressed, not merely in abandoning the world, but in subduing it; man is likewise to oppose evil, but only that it may be overcome by the good. The ease with which extremes of idealism and realism, of optimism and pessimism, may meet in Christianity, is only an evidence that the unity, character, and might of spiritual life are contained therein.

Chapter III.

THE UNITY OF HISTORY AND RELIGION IN CHRISTIANITY.

1. The relation of history to religion has not the interest for speculative reason which it had in the preceding ceutury; nevertheless, it is ever a vital question. Whether religion can be conceived of as historical is a question which is no longer current. But, in the present state of the philosophy of religion, a new form of this same question is in vogue: How may religion be historical? At once the purely speculative and polemical form of the question gives place to a view which is vital and constructive. Now, the proper method of discussing such a theme is twofold; the general relation of history and religion must be established before there can be deduced the peculiar unity of the two in Christianity.

Twofold as is the nature of the above problem, the method of procedure is not in each case the same. The relation of history and religion is first to be determined in a general and speculative manner. Only when such has been done

may this relation be applied to a given historical religion. When the general validity of this relation has been pointed out, then the peculiar value of the same for Christianity may be indicated. Development, as a concept, must be made consistent with religion in general before there can be investigated the position of Christianity in universal history.

That religion is historical is by no means self-evident; nor has such a view been developed without a struggle. The light in which we rejoice to-day once shone in a darkness which comprehended it not. In present-day thought nothing is more apparent than that we are awake to the advantages of history; for among the ideals which the passing century has developed, none are more vivid than those of development and process. Hereby is the truth of everything tested, so that reality might be looked upon as that which is capable of development. Both nature and mind reveal this tendency. What has been the influence of Hegel and Darwin in modern thought? A speculative system of becoming and a naturalistic scheme of evolution have dominated the reflections of the nineteenth century. Thus has the universe of thought and things been set in motion *e pur si muove.* But a mention of these names and these tendencies serves to remind us of what is universally felt.

The spirit of the Enlightenment was precisely

the opposite of historicity. Then all was static and eternal, and no greater calumny could be brought against an element than to regard it as capable of change. History gave way to nature. That by which this latter conception was developed was reason, according to whose principles history was tried and found wanting. Nature, not in the current sense of an empirical somewhat, but as rationalistic and dogmatic a principle as Scholasticism ever saw, was the source and method, the criterion and goal of all. In its application this principle was both practical and speculative. No more significant expounders of this tendency are to be found than Grotius and Spinoza, the one inclining toward ethics, the other toward metaphysics. But, in either case, the historical concept was crowded out by the so-called "natural." Grotius proceeded from the principle of natural rights, *jus naturale;* Spinoza, from that of *natura naturans.* As a result the temporal and contingent were unfavorably compared with the eternal and the necessary. How pale did history then appear, when all was regarded in the light of eternity—*sub specie æterni!* The magnificent conception of nature became the be-all and end-all of early modern thought.

Natural religion arose under such auspices, and did not fail to become the most typical and exemplary result of such a rationalistic

method. Historical religion was at once negated; if Christianity had any kernel of truth, it was simply because the former was "as old as creation." Such was the influence of the method *sub specie æterni*. It is not difficult to see how historical (mediæval) Christianity might be set at naught. The practical principle of natural rights was elaborated in direct opposition to that of authority; the speculative principle of reason, in defiance of tradition. It was with the clashing of such contradictory opinions that the early periods of modern thought resounded —*jus* versus *auctoritas, ratio* versus *traditio*. Thus it came about that the facts of positive religion were dismissed, just as the idea of development was despised. Rejoicing in its emancipation and heedless of history, modern thought did not hesitate to undertake the somewhat arduous task of constructing religion anew. The result was natural religion. If it distrusted the positive and contingent, the Enlightenment reassured itself by affirming its faith in nature and reason. For how could the temporal contain the eternal, or contingent facts become necessarily true?

Whatever be the method of history or the principle of historical division in general, the passage from the Enlightenment to the present century was no smooth evolution, but was characterized by opposition and negation. This was

brought about by skepticism. Doubt was entertained as to the power of reason, as well as of the appropriateness of the idea of nature. Hume and Lessing are representatives of this reversal. The latter did not succeed so completely as did Hume in disentangling himself from the artificial Enlightenment; nevertheless, in showing the possibilities of a particular form of religion—Judaism-Christianity—as an educator of humanity he performed a service which was wanting in Hume.

The destruction of natural religion and the corresponding rehabilitation of historical religion were brought about by Hume, whose whole philosophy centers round the idea of the positive-historical. Hume's speculative thought turns away from *a priori* reason and logical necessity to the principles of experience. Causation, the very heart of scientific thought, becomes a merely customary connection of ideas. "Custom, then, is the great guide of human life." In ethics the isolated principle of custom becomes more complete and systematic in the form of conduct. Outwardly viewed, ethics (*ethika*) is but the science of custom. Thus did a formal principle receive life. But in religion, which Hume treated historically, the principle of custom became universalized. Custom became the guide of historical life, and here it received its most characteristic treatment. For it is by virtue of his-

torical process that custom is developed. When history has done its work, then logic and ethics may be elaborated. History thus became the ultimate test of all reality. Reason gave way to custom; nature, to history.

Historicity, according to Hume, was the test of reality. Why was natural religion rejected? Because it was illogical? No; because it was non-historical. Natural religion has no history; hence it is false. Examine the history of humanity. We find that the farther back we go toward man's natural state, the farther removed he is from anything like natural religion. Not reason, but superstition, characterizes early religion. Natural religion has no place in history; hence it can have no place in reason; it is, accordingly, a fiction of the imagination. History was doubly vindicated; it was delivered from rationalism and triumphed over the fictitious "nature." The test to which history has been submitted was calculated to prove its validity and to bring out its inner nature. Certainly a most serious view of the development of humanity must be entertained when we observe how history has weathered the "storm and stress" of rationalism, just as there must be felt our appreciation of that which has been produced, as it were, through "blood and iron."

Emancipated as history has been by skepticism and positivism, it should be thankful for

its escape, yet not content to remain passive in the hands of its deliverers. It is for deliverance from its friends that it should pray; its enemies have disappeared. The now-esteemed method of history may be misapplied. A skeptical positivism may have been of real service in revealing the falsity of rationalism, but the former is by no means the complete form of the philosophy of religion. Thus it comes about that current religious thought is not wholly free from certain dangers inherent in its very method, the historical one. At the same time the experience of the Enlightenment should show that the relation of history to religion is by no means an obvious one, so that the unity of the two is not wholly without difficulty. The historical character of religion must be evinced by a deduction from its very nature.

The recoil from an anti-historical rationalism assumes to-day the guise of positivism. History is contained in the form of this latter; its inner nature is supposed to be expressed in terms of actuality, or phenomenalism, as well as in the principle of development. Manifesting itself in various philosophical sciences, such a twofold tendency is not absent from religion, where it appears in the new science of comparative religion, as well as in a revived evangelical theology. In the one there may be observed, in general, the tendency to center all faith in the

idea of evolution; and in the other the principle of the positive seems to be dominant. Now, to regard religion from the general standpoint of evolution is bound to be as abstract and valueless as was the practice of rationalism. If the Enlightenment reposed its faith in an abstract natural religion developed by reason, current thought tends to look upon the general evolution of religion as the essential and valuable. But for living religion the abstract natural religion and the empirical evolution of nature-religion are equally alien.* History thus interpreted can not serve the needs of religion. An abstract evolution of religion is as impotent as an eternal religion of nature. When history is regarded as mere development, such must ever be the result.

In the same way the relation of history to religion can not be indicated by laying emphasis upon mere matters of historical fact. Advanced evangelical theology is here not without difficulty. Not only does it fail to evince the historical character of religion, but it likewise fails to justify its habit of finding all that is of religious value within the limits of the Christian religion. Such has been the case with the Ritschlian theology; it has not failed to ask the question as to how history relates itself to religion, but it has

*Comp. De la Saussaye, *Die vergleichende Religionsforschung und der religiöse Glaube* (1898).

never given a just answer to the same. With Harnack and Herrmann this is strikingly true. In his pamphlet, "Christianity and History," Harnack finds the value of history for religion to consist in the fact that the former contains an account of the life and influence of a transcendent personality. Hermann is still more pronounced in what may only be regarded as a refined form of positivism. Faith does not repose in a necessary and eternal truth; that would be mysticism. But rather is faith a fact, nothing more. The inner nature of that faith consists in the persuasion that human destiny is not natural but supernatural. As the ground of such belief we have the phenomenon of Jesus Christ, and, seeing that His life has a more than natural reference, we attribute the same to man. Thus it comes about that the theological tendency presents in current religious thought the counterpart of the scheme of evolutional religion. Together they succeed in exalting an abstract process, as well as an isolated fact. Now, this is not history, nor does such a method conserve the interests of religion.

Without abandoning the historical position, and at the same time avoiding the error of the Enlightenment, present-day religious thought must adjust the question in a different way. Neither rationalism nor positivism will suffice; the one defeats history, the other betrays it. No

little light may be thrown upon the question by admitting the difficulty of historical religion; we can not regard it as of passing interest or as being purely fortuitous. Religion should in some way represent God; and how may this be done if the former be temporal and circumstantial? The historical moment as a whole seems inadequate to reflect the Eternal; much less may a definite and limited period contain the Absolute. Such objections as these are proposed by religion, and history must dispose of them. In such a condition as this, gain may result by regarding history, not so much as a problem to be solved, but rather as a means of answering another question, that of religion. In all the discussion of the question religion has been looked upon as a complete concept capable of determining the conditions of its historicity. But when it is seen that religion is itself a problem, history may then find its place as an accompanying principle. The difficulty which religion encounters in realizing itself is obviated by the historical period. History then assumes the form of an assistant, and not that of a burden. Religion can exist and act only as it is historical; in its inner nature it presents problems which history alone can solve.

2. What, then, is religion? The Enlightenment asked this question, but its answer was inadequate. It is not sufficient to refer what is

real and vital to abstract reason and a purely negative conception of eternity. To define religion in so many words is a method fraught with little gain; nor may we here discuss the question at any great length. For the purpose of relating history to religion it will suffice to indicate the latter's nature, and that by reference to the soul, the world, and to God. Hereby the inner nature of religion may be brought out. Religion is not primarily an attempt to gain some speculative view of the world, nor is it a desire to produce practically some result in the world; but is rather the impulse, on the part of the soul, to affirm itself over against the opposition of the world. Thus the end and aim of religion is not a speculative conclusion or an objective result, but consists rather in the self-realization of the soul. Destiny is that which determines the behavior of the soul when its religious consciousness is aroused; the idea of logical deduction and the principle of duty are quite alien to its central spring. The perfect realization of religion occurs when the victory over the world is complete. Christ realizes religion in His own person when He says, "I have overcome the world." Such was the religion of Christ. The good cheer which it imparts follows not as the result of any work He performed or by virtue of any new view of the universe, but is inherent in that religious victory which

was His. But this is only a partial and rather negative view of religion.

The task which religion has to accomplish is that of self-realization and world-overcoming. Such is the destiny of the soul. But to work out such a salvation is a task beyond the private powers of the personal soul. The awakening to religious consciousness at once reveals this fact; and, out of the depths of some divine despair, the soul cries out for aid from some more than natural source. Various forms and ages of religion would represent differently this common element of all religious life. Thus, as a second moment in religion enters in the belief in God, such an idea comes not primarily from the world, for religion is more than scholastic curiosity, but is rather of an inner origin. The idea of God becomes a demand of the soul, when the latter seeks its salvation. While having some general reference to the world, this view of religion involves a twofold principle—the impulse of the soul, in response to the idea of its destiny, and the postulated tendency on the part of a divine soul to further this. Now, such a view of religion is not only capable of historical interpretation, but can not be conceived of apart from historical influence.

With its historical character religion may find a means of realizing that which otherwise would be impossible. This may be shown from the

twofold standpoint involved, and by a method in keeping with actual religion. History provides a method by which the soul can work out its religious destiny, as well as a means by which God can consistently supply His aid. The history of the race makes possible the solution of a problem too great for the individual in his isolated life. To overcome the world is a cumulative effort demanding time indefinite; in it the activity of the soul, as well as the assistance of God, may find room. At the same time the effect of social history upon the individual is not only such as to make possible the working out of his problem, but it likewise serves to develop the character of his problem. Self-affirmation becomes transfigured, and thus receives a more appropriate form than that of egoism. Historical religion thus is influential in assisting the soul in its activity, as well as in setting up the point of departure for its destiny. Accordingly, various stages in the progress of the soul will be indicated by epochs in religious history. The inner connection of the two will be evinced by the inner and outer forms of development.

If nature religion may be regarded as typical of the original form of man's belief in his supernatural destiny, then the self-affirmation of the soul will be such as to assume the form of ingenuous egoism, this being the result of a nomadic form of social life. But, even here, such an

egoism will be tempered by the demands of family and clan. A stage higher, in national religion, the individual soul becomes exalted in the nation, just as the latter by its culture and worship react upon him, enabling him more readily and more consistently to accomplish his task. Universal religion completes the process. The soul in the moment of its complete self-realization is seen; God appears in His absolute and perfect character. Narrow egoism and partial nationalism are done away with. In their stead appears some universal realm of religious life, as the kingdom of God. Such is the climax in the soul's career.

Another view of the same process may at the same time be entertained. Just as the soul has availed itself of various stages and epochs in the history of its realization, so God may be regarded as a companion idea, developing in a manner consistent and appropriate. Here, again, various stages may be determined. To the patriarch and his clan God appears as a covenant-making Being. With the people of God He assumes the form of a national Jahveh. In universal religion the pure spirituality of God is revealed. In the kingdom of heaven man and God are conceived of as naturally related. Such a kingdom is man's true destiny, just as it is also God's veritable design. In this realm the soul is realized, while God is revealed. And here

is the inner meaning of history. The idea of the kingdom has been wrought out by virtue of an historical method, just as the idea itself is an historical one. As seed sown in the ground, so is the kingdom in the world. Development is inherent in the very notion, and such development makes up the history of religion.

3. Already, by our mention of the kingdom of God, we have been brought to the very borders of the second and particular part of our theme, the historical form of Christianity. All that has been said concerning the general relation of history and religion is singularly true here. In a double manner has Christianity united these two. It has created the historical form of religion, just as it has also adjusted to faith the content of universal history. Christianity in its most essential nature is pre-eminently historical. In it we observe the peculiar unity of history and religion. Pre-Christian thought was strikingly non-historical; such was the case in both antique and Oriental worlds, as will become apparent when we glance at Greece, India, and China. Chinese thought is plainly unhistorical. No progress is made; conservatism rules supreme. If Indian thought has in it the idea of motion and change, such is not with the purpose or result of producing anything vital or essential. All is in motion, an endless becoming, but all is in vain. Change

is all for naught; progress leads only to annihilation. In a somewhat different sense does the antique world show itself to be unhistorical. While here there is no particular reverence for the ancient, much less an antipathy to the world, as in the above cases, there is in Greek thought a similar inability to conceive of historical progress. Motion and activity are present, to be sure, but such evince themselves within a closed circle; nothing new is produced. All reality is given; all that is essential has been accomplished. As a result, there prevailed in Greek thought that peace of mind which passed from complacency to resignaiton, just as Oriental thought had been conservative and pessimistic.

Christianity, in striking contrast to such a view, is clearly historical. The historical principle it has created for its own needs. Not as given, but as to be produced, are the real and valuable regarded. History is looked upon as working out a result, and such is regarded as being of the nature of an innovation. The new is wrought out. For the first time did history become valid, just as religion was then placed upon its merits and looked upon as capable of solution. When the essential meaning of religion was seen, the value of history was brought out. Such a unique method has already been observed in the mention of the kingdom of God as a typical idea of Christianity. From a purely formal

standpoint this idea of an independent religious realm may find some counterpart in the Buddhist notion of Nirvana, or in the Platonic cosmos of ideas. But, apart from such metaphysical differences as might be pointed out, the great distinction in the positive working out of the plan of the kingdom of God consists in the fact that the latter is historical. In the kingdom man realizes himself while God is revealed; but such a use of this idea is made possible only by the historical moment which it contains. That which is realized is by virtue of the historical idea, and such an idea has been achieved by the Christian religion.

The mastery over history which Christianity reveals is still further evinced when we turn from the purely historical idea to the positive content of universal history. Here a remarkable adjustment takes place. Dualism in history is created. The world begins anew; chronology is revised. A glance at the geographical arrangement of this dualism will bring out the radical nature of the latter. The ancient Orient is one thing; the modern Occident another. Europe and America are Christian, and herein consists the striking contrast to the Orient. The Oriental world, so far as its significance is concerned, is past and gone; its place has been taken by a new civilization, a new view of the world and of life.

This dualistic view of history which is implied by Christianity becomes more vivid when we pass from purely outer comparisons to the inner meaning of the two parts of human development. The ethical change from Orient to Occident was most radical and striking. It is true that certain phases of advanced Greek thought were more or less indicative of the change which was to follow and that there was a general connection between Judaism and Christianity, but it can not be denied that the effect of this new movement was catastrophic, just as the position of its founder was cataclysmic. As a direct opposition does Christian ethics relate itself to what had formerly been of moral value. Whether such a change be regarded with favor or otherwise, it can not be denied that the inauguration of Christianity was the signal for an ethical upheaval in universal history.

Cataclysmic as is the nature of Christianity, so is the original and unique position of its Founder. And what gain will ensue when theology, assuming the standpoint of religion, measures Christ by means of history? With respect to this original soul all else is a mere before or after; a for or against. In history Christ is creative. Well has St. Paul compared Him with Adam. The first Adam desiring to become as God, knowing good and evil, discovered the moral law for himself. Christ, the second

and superior Adam, pursued a different method. He thought it not robbery to become equal with God, and thus, according to the mystery of the *kenosis,* He rediscovered the moral law, the will of God. But what may such symbolism mean? The first Adam and his *morale* were both Oriental, and are now antiquated; whereas the heavenly Adam finds value in a totally different method of life, and this becomes the ethics of the Occident. Thus does the dualism of universal history bring out the comparison of these two creative personalities.

The general relation of religion to history and the unity of the two in Christianity lead to a final question: "How may a single period in universal history become of intrinsic value for what is so embracing as the relation of the eternal God to humanity?" In a new guise rationalism here appears, demanding that we regard history as a smooth and gradual evolution. But such a view, however applicable to the history of nature, does not necessarily hold in the history of culture. In the latter prevails the spirit of freedom, so that history is not naturalized but spiritualized. Various branches of culture reveal this truth. In the history of philosophy all that was essential to ancient and mediæval thought was developed within the chronological limits of the life of Plato. The history of art shows that the secrets of the

Renaissance were solved in the twinkling of an eye. Slowly ascending through Romanesque and Gothic types, then as regularly descending in Barock and Rococo, the essentials of modern art were all developed upon the narrow ridge spanned by Raphael's life of thirty-seven years. Why, then, may we not find the essentials of Occidental religion limited to the life of John the evangelist, who observed the influence of Christ's life and the effect of His death upon men? The guiding principle should be, not a theory of evolution, but a sense of religious value. Philosophy ignores the ages and hastens to Plato. Art centers in Raphael and his contemporaries. Religion thus knows only one Name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved.

Chapter IV.

THE UNITY OF ART AND HUMANITY IN CHRISTIANITY.

Who ever reads the "evidences of Christianity?" and who is not interested in the "essence of Christianity?" To speak of evidence is to put religion upon trial; to discuss the essence is to make a sympathetic study of a great field. Our present problem is not so much a forensic as it is an æsthetic one. Christ once stood upon Gabbatha, the pavement; but His trial before Pontius Pilate is a thing of the past, and hence we no longer assume the attitude of the judge, but rather that of the beholder. As an artist by the grace of God, Christ created a world of His own; this our modern culture must esteem. Religious conflict, by virtue of which man judges for or against Christianity, has given way before a calm study of humanity's religious consciousness; and in the inevitable struggle of man with his doubt, these gleams of light divine are gladly accepted. We have our world, which envelops us, and its thought we must breathe, yet we are still Christians, and we

seek to know what spirit we are of. In addition to the popular question of Christianity's *essence,* we must make an examination of its *character* as well as its *destiny,* for in these latter especially do we find what is essential to Christianity and discover what it is worth.

For most of us, religion means Christianity, and Christianity signifies Protestantism, which Protestantism is the equivalent of evangelicalism. The historical optimist loves to dwell upon the possibilities inherent in the future; thus he says, with Schelling, Peter had his Catholicism, Paul his Protestantism, now John shall have the religion of the future. The realm of the Father gives way to the sway of the Son, and now is ushered in the period of the dove-apostle of Spirit, which shall brood over the coming centuries. If we must go forward in life, we must go backward in thought; history is to be reread and rewritten in the light of the present. Protestantism is lacking in romance and reverence; evangelicalism, which is innocent of psychological profundity, is at times guilty, of regarding religion as a kind of magic, as though God happened to reveal Himself while Israel was standing by. True religion has no such contingencies in it; one with humanity is its inner essence. That which is calculated to evince the intrinsic nature of the Christian religion is the science of æsthetics; in following

out its own principles, we see that romanticism is expressive of the Christian view of human life. Pursuing this romantic view of the religious problem, we note, first, the sense of humanity, and, second, the significance of history manifest in Christian culture.

1. It was the fate of Christianity to change the culture of mankind from Classicism to Romanticism. Take the historical phase first, and is there any more striking picture than that which a comparison of Christianity and Classicism presents? At a time when our academic institutions are losing interest in antique literature, we begin to ask, Just wherein consists the difference between Christians and pagans? Between us and them a great gulf is now fixed. "I stood one day in a Swiss village at the foot of the Jura," says Mazzini, "and watched the coming of a storm. Heavy black clouds, their edges purpled by the setting sun, were rapidly covering the loveliest sky in Europe, save that of Italy. Thunder-clouds growled in the distance, and gusts of biting wind were driving huge drops of rain over the thirsty plain. Looking upward, I beheld a large Alpine falcon, now rising, now sinking, as he floated bravely in the very midst of the storm, and I could almost fancy that he strove to battle with it. At every fresh peal of thunder, the noble bird bounded aloft as if in answering defiance. On the ground,

fifty paces beneath me, stood a stork, perfectly tranquil and impassible in the midst of the warring elements. Twice, or thrice, she turned her head toward the quarter from whence the wind came, but at length she hid her head beneath her wing and calmly composed herself to sleep." What more graphically than this could express the contrast between Christian and pagan? Clinging to the world although glancing upward toward the realm of spiritual conflict, the pagan presents a picture of majestic calm; striving to ascend from the earth upward to the feet of Him who walketh upon the wings of the wind, the Christian shines forth in the glints of a new world-order.

More than a century ago, when revolution had destroyed old politics and skepticism had vanquished old philosophies, Schiller put this distinction into language at once critical and literary. Poetic art, so urged he, may be divided into two classes, called the "naïve" and the "sentimental," the realistic and the idealistic, and this distinction is found in the thought of nature. The naïve poet is nature; the sentimental poet merely seeks her, as his lost paradise. At one with himself and glorying in the feeling of his humanity, the Greek poet's imagination led him out into nature; having sundered his own spirit, the modern poet loves nature just as the sick man loves health. The ancient lived

a life where beauty and art were one and where man was serenely wrapped in nature; not so the modern, living in a house divided against itself, where he can reflect only upon his own feelings. Like an ancient realist, Goethe, in the statue of Weimar, looks down contentedly upon the world, while Schiller, in spite of his affinity for the creator of "Wilhelm Meister," looks out into the vast beyond. Following the distinction which Schiller made, we may say, in defiance of his own judgment, that Shakespeare's drama is sentimental, in distinction from Homer's epic, which is naïve. The greatness of Shakespeare is to be determined in accordance with the standards of modernness, Romanticism, and Christianity; the reason for this is to be found in the omnipresent tendency of this poet to ascend to the ideal. Poetry is superior to the play, and the spirit excels them both. "The recitation begins; one golden world leaps out immortal from all this painted pedantry and sweetly torments us with invitations to its own inaccessible homes." Where art is in any sense Christian, the flight to the inaccessible may clearly be discerned.

Our art is Christian and our Romanticism breathes a revelation. Again we may conjure with the name of Schiller and let him enunciate the æsthetics of the nineteenth century. His fondness for Goethe and his reverence for Kant

led Schiller to seek some middle path which should surmount the low plane of the sensuous, without ascending to the crags of rationalism. This was found in mankind's play-impulse suggestive of Goethe's personality and in harmony with Kant's "Critique of Judgment." Man, argued Schiller, must not cleave to mere sense, yet he can not embrace sheer reason; he mediates between them by evoking an art which, in its disinterested treatment of its object, merely plays with nature. This is the play of spirit. Mere nature is below man; pure reason is above him; his human destiny is found in a play-impulse, which rises from the fen to the summit.

Love is to life what art is to culture; common to them is the recognition of beauty. But love is no blind constraint of sense, much less is it abstract esteem; it is an affection which is meritorious. Plato saw this when he founded his philosophy upon an erotic; St. John felt it in his contact with his Master. Religion, which possesses somewhat the same unity which is found in art, worketh but by love. Long ago did Simon Peter of Capernaum learn the height and depth of religious affection. "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest Thou me [ἀγαπᾷς με]?" "Thou knowest that I love Thee [φιλῶ σε]." Having repeated this question only to receive the same answer, Christ finally asks, "And dost thou love Me [φιλεῖς με]?" This was Simon's own word

indicating the low plane of natural affection, but his answer never rose above the φιλῶ σε "There are moments when the affections absorb us and make our happiness dependent upon a person or persons; but, in health, the mind is presently seen again, its overarching vault bright with galaxies of immutable lights, and the warm loves and fears that have swept over us must lose their finite quality and blend with God to attain their own perfection."

Christianity is the flight of the falcon to its eyrie among the crags; it is the reflection of the soul in nature's mirror, and the play of spirit —*jeu d'esprit*—which proclaims the freedom of humanity. Richard Wagner has taught us this same lesson. By means of music, we penetrate directly to the ultimate essence of reality; for the realm of sound like the realm of spirit is independent of the phenomenal world. Speaking of Beethoven, Wagner says, "It was his mission to announce the inmost contemplation of the tone-world." With a world of its own, musical art finds original form in the involuntary cry put forth by one awakening from slumber, and the "Ninth Symphony" reveals the experience of one arousing in deepest need and disburdening his soul from a profoundly disquieting dream. This cry finds a response in the tone-world of the universal; it is like the call and counter-call of Venetian gondoliers, like the

trumpeting and echoing of Alpine shepherds, like the sobbing and soothing cries of child and mother. Hence the affiliation of Christianity and music. The one arose among the fashions of Roman civilization, the other in the midst of the artificial conditions of the modern world. "Both affirm, Our kingdom is not of this world. We are from within, you from without; we are the offspring of the essential nature of things, you of the semblance of things."

Nietzsche's opposition to Wagner is on a par with his contempt for Christianity, for both have to do with the theme of *salvation.* "Nietzsche contra Wagner" and "The Antichrist" are found in the same ninth volume of the insane author's works. "There is nothing," says he, "which Wagner has meditated on more profoundly than salvation; his opera is the opera of salvation." Certainly this is the peculiar art of Christianity, and we are gratified when we note that the music of Beethoven and Wagner is in harmony with the tendency to deny the world and affirm the need of salvation. No wonder, then, that a culture of salvation arose in connection with Christianity; no wonder that, at a time when Schiller was separating Christianity from Classicism, Schleiermacher, writing to cultured Germany, was founding the philosophy of religion. This was the triumph of spirit, and it has been the happy fate of modern Romanti-

cism to reflect that depth of meaning which is to be found in Christianity. Of such a fact the case of Schleiermacher is well-nigh convincing. Accordingly, the problem of Christianity and the case of Christ are very different elements in our thought to-day from what they were in the eighteenth century. We seek neither to prove nor to disprove, but to become conscious of, the Christian religion, in order that we may estimate it. For such a purpose, nothing is more practical than the idea of culture.

In its effect upon the fine arts, the Christian religion has emphasized that peculiar freedom from the material which is celebrated among the Germans from Kant and Schiller to Schopenhauer and Wagner. This will be seen in its architecture and plastic art, in its literature and music. If architecture ascends to a height in the Greek temple, it rises again in the Gothic cathedral; if blind Homer sang then, blind Milton has his song now; what we may lose by a comparison of antique and Renaissance sculpture, we gain in our painting, while in music the free nature of spiritual Christianity bursts forth afresh. Christianity is not crude; Gothicism is not barbarism; Romanticism may be as fine as Classicism. Christ is a Teacher, and He says, "Learn of Me!"

The several moments and motives in architecture proclaim the age and its spirit. Is there

no difference between the rococo of the "Zwinger" in Dresden and the dome of the Roman Pantheon? The chief difference between classic and Christian conceptions is sufficiently reflected in a comparison of the Doric and the Gothic; in each, the problem is the same; but the difference in method of solution is that which reveals how distinct were the spirits of the architects. Every architect is confronted by the task of overcoming the downward force of gravitation, which is the way in which nature presents the problem. Various are the plans for circumventing this force, and these indicate the numerous styles of art. The Greek architect went at the problem of load and support with the end of evolving a columnar style, where the weight of the roof falls at right angles upon the column. Perfect as a solution of the problem, the effect of such a temple, where the horizontal predominates, is to suggest an even balance of load and support. Now the Gothic transcends this.

Tower and buttress, groined and flying arches, unite in the Gothic to produce a tendency which is distinctly vertical. The weight of the high-canopied roof is upborne by pointed arches, which occasion a thrust at once downward and outward. So far as the first is concerned, groined arches conduct the weight of the structure to pillars erected at frequent intervals; while,

without, the lateral thrust is caught in mid-air by flying arches and conveyed, over the side aisle, to striving pillars. The upward tendency, vital to the system, is seen everywhere, from the graceful minaret, which fastens the arch to the buttress, to the enormous towers on the west, which anchor the edifice to the earth. Not only the cruciform arrangement of the ground plan, but the striving tendency of the cathedral, make it a fit monument to the religion of Him who said, "My yoke is easy and My burden is light!"

Sculpture, as a fine art, assumes its own appointed task when it seeks to portray human life, and the treatment of clay or marble must be so constructed that one beholding the model shall understand how the soul esteems its bodily existence. The classic sculptor, like his fellow-architect, solved his problem by representing in the marble a type rather than an individual. As Socrates, enunciating his famous "Know thyself," went about conversing with men universally, that he might find in the consensus of opinion a concept, so Praxiteles in the preceding age united characteristic traits in a form which should represent the race. Added to this universalism, the Greek conceived of his model as being in harmony with nature, and at home in the realm of time and space. When we turn to Donatello or to Angelo, as representatives of a new life, we are greeted with new conceptions. Here

are character and conquest; the soul within the marble would break his bonds asunder and come forth. Angelo, especially, shows this tendency, and he recognized it in others, too; when his eyes first fell upon Donatello's "St. George," his lips parted and he shouted, "March!"

Let the eye trace the lines of the old Florentine's chisel, and let the heart follow the eye. The great "Moses" is an anxious being, while "Jeremiah" is the picture of despair; the roof of the Sistine Chapel, unlike the classic frieze, was peopled with a host dissatisfied with their present outlook and longing for the life everlasting. Angelo's "Slaves" reveal the power of the soul in its battle with the flesh, and, in the case of the dead one, show a face lighted up with immortality. Such movement and such spirit, as are here displayed, proclaim a new order and give a decided negative to the question, Are we still pagans? Think of Savonarola preaching in the "Duomo," in Florence! Forget the fiery carnival of 1497, when the splendid vices of Renaissance Paganism were changed from beauty to ashes, and remember that Lucca della Robia, Botticelli, and Michael Angelo found it possible to construct an art after Christ's own heart.

If striving appears in Christian architecture, and suffering is implied by its sculpture, depths of sympathy may further be seen in its

403330

poetry and painting. Our nineteenth century has seen the development of this latter to such an extent that it is not impossible to compare it with the fifteenth century and its marvelous art intuitions. If this be allowable, then Romanticism rehabilitates the Renaissance, and beautiful souls, like the German musician's, reappear. But what was romantic a century ago is now socialistic, and Tieck gives way before Tolstoi. The common bond is that of sympathy; then it was feeling for self, now it is feeling for others, but in each case grief is treated as though it had a peculiar value. It might further be added that between Romanticism and socialism there yawn the depths of pessimism, and Schopenhauer—no mean art critic, by the way—makes possible the philosophies of Tolstoi and Nietzsche.

Christianity differs from every utilitarian doctrine in the same way that it is divorced from Hedonism. The difference lies herein: Hedonism believes in giving pleasure to your neighbor, while Chrisitanity believes in taking his pain. Christ is not represented as a philanthropist, but rather as one who surely bore our griefs; this is realism, and it is also redemption. This view is realistic, because it is in harmony with a sorrow-stricken world; it contains redemption, because it shows that life must be utterly transformed. As one acquainted with grief, Christ

showed how ineffable and how inevitable is sorrow, but He also showed that it is the task of love to save.

De Quincey's fine portrayal of Joan of Arc is all feeling and sympathy, especially in the isolated introduction and conclusion. The opening paragraph contains a comparison of Joan and David; in the closing one, the comparison is resumed, but there we recognize "great David's greater Son." Unlike the Hebrew shepherd boy from the hills of Judah, the shepherdess from the forests of Domremy never found her true recognition in the eyes of the world. "The boy rose to splendor and a noonday prosperity that rang through the records of his people until the scepter was departing from Judah. The poor, forsaken girl, on the contrary, drank not for herself from that cup of rest which she had secured for France." Reared in Domremy, with its forest and fountain, tried and convicted in Rheims by the Bishop of Beauvais, at Rouen she is executed upon a fiery scaffold, appalling by reason of its great height. Peering through the gigantic glooms which, in the hour of death, envelop the bishop and shepherd girl, one fancies that the maid, forgetting the flame and its torment, dreams of her girlhood in Domremy, while her accuser, who had died upon a bed of down, seems to find himself condemned and ready to mount to the stake of fire. Seek-

ing for some one to take his brief and defend him, he looks out into the vast crowd stretching away into infinity. "Who is this that cometh from Domremy? Who is she that cometh in bloody coronation robes from Rheims? Who is she that cometh with blackened flesh from walking the furnaces of Rouen? This is she, the shepherd girl, counselor that had none for herself whom we choose, bishop, for yours. She it is who would plead for you when heaven and earth are silent." Such words express the sweetness and spirit of Christianity, and show that the love of enemies is a doctrine which appears only when God lets down a sheet from heaven.

The "man of feeling" will find a significance still greater in the sorrows of Him who has inspired romantic sympathy. If death, indeed, be nature's device for having more life, the death of Christ—*morte de Jesu*—must be profound in its meaning as it was intense in its passion. For years we have talked about the *kenosis* of Christ; but was there not also a *pleroma?* By nature, He was Sorrow's Man, acquainted, ah! so well, with grief. World-sorrow was His own, and in this His character unfolded. The spectacle of One who was despised for His doctrine and rejected for His deeds was not wholly without parallel when Pontius Pilate washed his hands of the bloody affair; yet the sorrows of the young Jesus have

no real counterpart in history. Who like Him felt the pains of finitude? On the Mount of Transfiguration, while His heavenly visitors were speaking of the death which He was to accomplish at Jerusalem, the voice of God came from the *cloud,* whose shadow fell on the garments so white that no fuller on earth could bleach them. Suffering came in stages, and each scaffolding saw the Stranger from Gennesaret nearer and nearer unto His God. As a Son, kneeling in Gethsemane's garden, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered; again, as a Captain of salvation, in Gabbatha, He became perfect through passion; while for the suffering and death of Golgotha He was crowned with honor and glory. First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear.

Rubens's "Descent from the Cross" is a painting which, as an example of the Northern Renaissance, compares favorably with Raphael's "Transfiguration." Hanging in the transept of the Antwerp Cathedral this canvas is seen at its best, and its draughtmanship, bold coloring, and majestic composition are likely to be fully appreciated. The drawing of the men balanced upon the cross-arm, especially in the case of the one whose right hand grasps the Savior's arm and whose teeth hold the linen sheet, is worthy of Angelo; to match it we have the fine tints which reveal the beauty of the women crouching

upon the ground. Death is vividly seen in the deep lines of the Sufferer's body, while the *descent* is felt in our perception of the slanting lines which mark the whole composition. When we learn that every day at noon a curtain is lowered over this spectacle, we can easily credit the story of the stranger who interrupted the work of the sacristan about to veil the canvas and exclaimed, "O! let me wait until they get Him down." Such fellowship with suffering makes the culmination of Christian æsthetics; it likewise penetrates to the peculiar inwardness which modern thought has discovered in this religion.

2. Christianity possesses sweetness, but does not fail to shed light; its beauty likewise is not such as to mask its *significance.* Romanticism, which in the mediæval period grew up as a life and which in modern times has become a theory, is as clear an expression of Christian culture as may be found. Its central idea is humanity, which is an outgrowth of the idea of the soul. In Christianity we find a distinct view of life, and this has its own originality. Related to Judaism and contemporaneous with a certain phase of Paganism, Christianity still has the merit of having introduced a tendency which was calculated to change the form and conditions of culture. This tendency was lodged in the estimate of *mankind,* a conception marked

by universality and humanity and having its origin in the heart of Christ. His mind was marked by *amor intellectualis dei,* which made it possible for Him to become a Teacher of all nations. We hesitate to make use of the expression "ideas," as though the Founder of Christianity elaborated such mental products; and we do not care to attribute to His system "principles," lest we suggest something purely academic. When, however, we are so bold as to construe the activity of Christ in such a way that it becomes the social institution which we call the Church, we may be equally bold in considering the thought of Jesus as though it made up a system. If we admit that St. Paul had a theology, why may we not suggest that Christ had a religion?

It was fitting, as it was also necessary, that the Founder of Christianity should make use of realms established in the life of humanity, and to Christ there were opened the paths of theology and politics. In each case, with His conceptions of God's Fatherhood and kingdom, He idealized the prosaic material which the times afforded. Such idealization was ever carried on in the spirit of humanity and in accordance with a method which was æsthetical; for this reason, it was possible for Christianity to produce Romanticism. The path to this led through a series of ideas marked by the attributes of per-

sonality and humanity; in pursuing it, Christ perceived the essence of the soul and then saw its value. Here is the place to quote one of the sentences which tend to redeem the superficiality of Emerson's famous Harvard address of 1838:

"Jesus Christ belonged to the race of true prophets. He saw with open eye the mystery of the soul. Drawn by its severe harmony, ravished with its beauty, He lived in it and had His being there. Alone in all history He estimated the greatness of man. One man was true to what is in you and me."

Vast without as is the world, deep within as is the soul, Christ was their first interpreter. To Christendom He gave a priceless gift. Phidias and Praxiteles, with their strength and sweetness, discovered in man no such depths as Angelo and Raphael portray; Plato and Aristotle, quickened by a desire to scan the world and fathom the soul, did not detect the cosmic completeness or psychological profundity so clearly seen by Plotinus and Augustine. To separate the soul from the world, so that each may receive its proper interpretation, is a task which involves microscopic and telescopic views, and these are wanting among the classic thinkers. The necessary principle of differentiation is to be found in the distinction between *immanence* and *transcendence,* and the dawning of transcendentalism was first noted by Plotinus and

Augustine. The transcendence of spiritual life, which was conceived by Plotinus, had at once a direct bearing upon the æsthetical phase of Christianity, and thereby a metaphysics of the beautiful was made possible. Spirit became fair to behold when it was viewed shining through the material world, and spiritual life revealed its dignity when it manifested the impulse to overcome nature. Plotinus thus showed how the transition from Classicism to Romanticism was to be effected. So far as he is concerned, his Neo-Platonism has as much of the antique as the modern, and yet we may fitly call him the first romantic metaphysicist.

In addition to the thought of mankind as constituting a spiritual universality, Christianity produced another idea which became vital to Romanticism—the idea of humanity. Among late pagan writers, especially in the case of the Stoics, who employ the terms *humanitas* and *philanthropia*, there is noticed an anticipation of Christian humanism. Yet among these late systems, which are but the dying echoes of Classicism, only negative significance may be discerned. Dearth of culture and decay of civilization finally led the thinking spirit to despise the phases of art and the forms of politics then crumbling to ruin, and it was only natural that hopes of humanity and ideals of world-citizenship should make their appearance. Christianity,

working in an independent fashion, created the personal world out of nothing, and invested it with a character alien to Paganism. The form of humanity projected in the New Testament is no doctrine of social sympathy which aims at the amelioration of natural existence, but is a spiritual love which recognizes that the neighbor is also a soul having a destiny.

Humanity is history, and history is humanity. The historical is the realm in which Christianity lives and breathes; the discovery of history as a spiritual fact and speculative ideal is of quite recent date, belonging to the nineteenth century. Vico and Voltaire, Hume and Herder, not to speak of Leibnitz and Lessing, all of them thinkers of an age hostile to the idea of development, may have foreshadowed the evolutionary thought of the last century; but the conscious use of the idea was not current among them. As early as 1794, in Fichte's "Destiny of Mankind," the appreciation of history and culture is consciously felt. "The achievement of the historical," says Fichte, "is called culture." Such culture is gradual; history provides a realm in which endless degrees are found, and by them the soul may ascend to his high calling. It is at this point that Fichte begins to suggest Plotinus.

Christianity uses history to prove the immortality of mankind; the infinite grades of

spiritual culture lead on to man's destiny, which is eternal life. Romanticism can live only as the element of humanity is accented, and this can be done only where the progressive plan of history is applied. It is often asked whether Christ was the author of immortality as a doctrine, but it is seldom inquired how He revealed unto mankind the possibilities and imperatives of an endless life. This mortal must now put on immortality. In such a crisis, metaphysical views and ethical convictions are important, but they do not present those final considerations which invest immortality with warmth and vividness. Unfolding His belief, Christ drew upon spiritual sources, whereby He created a taste for the eternal and made immortality to be only a natural expectation. Such was the tendency of His doctrine of eternal life, which aroused the soul of man and evoked his historical consciousness; eternal life is a religious realm whose vanishing point is eternity.

Romanticism involves that peculiar projection of the soul into the infinite which ever pierces through the pages of the New Testament. Endless striving, prompted by a complete dissatisfaction with nature, incessant seeking, urged on by a glimpse of the spiritual precinct, have a new meaning when they are scanned in the marvelous light of immortality. These impulses, which reveal the aspiration of the soul,

provide a motive for immortality. Does not the search for the "blue flower," described by Novalis, at least suggest that the satisfaction of the heart can not be found in the barren moors of earth? And does not the "allegorical dream" and anguished cry of Wagner's tone-genius tell us that we must hearken to the music of a life which is not of sense? The spirit of modern thought, when this is clearly discerned, is Christian, marked as it is by a taste for immortality; in bringing this out, nothing has been more suggestive than Romanticism.

The historical moment in the conception of immortality has never been sufficiently emphasized. It is through historical progress that the path to eternity leads. Vico saw this when he inaugurated the philosophy of history as a *scienzo nuova,* an "historical demonstration of providence." Three principles, urged he, have guided the development of social history—worship, marriage, and burial—signifying belief in God and man's immortality. History, which is the realm in which God is revealed, bears directly upon the belief in immortality. In Christ's career, time and eternity are serenely united. He had His historical position among His contemporaries, yet He antedated Abraham. His Gospel seems local and rural; seaside and mountain, field and hedge-row bound it, but they can not contain its essence; the Galilean history becomes

a universal narrative, known and read of all men, and Christ betrays a peculiar aptitude for eternity.

When Christ achieved history, He made eternal life a tangible conception. All speculation concerning the future existence is prompted by a sense of the incompleteness and unsatisfactory character of the life which now is, and immortality as a premise of metaphysics or a postulate of morality has as its motive the expansion of temporal existence. Dealing with the isolated consciousness, it is by no means easy to transfer this to the category of eternity, for threescore-ten stand no chance in the conflict with the ever-and-ever. Infuse history into humanity! Measure the endlessness of human striving! Perceive that thought rests only in the infinite, and then the barriers of eternity finally wear away. The child of the ages inherits endless life; and historical humanity presses to the borders of immortality. The ages now confront the eternities, and, bulwarked by countless cycles, mankind is surveyed *sub specie æterni.*

History reveals immortality as surely as it reveals God, but thus far the consideration of history has been aplied to the latter problem alone. Do we not see that a mere creature of time can not recognize the Absolute? Where God is revealed, humanity is revealed in all its

eternity; this is in history. When Christ made use of humanity's history, He made the transition from time to eternity by no means an abrupt one, but He also filled human life with a new meaning. This life becomes eternal and the soul is surveyed in its immortality. To develop character, humanity demands time, and virtue is a task for the ages; this is shown in history, wherein the human spirit unfolds; and it is this very tendency which leads on to the thought of immortality. When it is seen that the vanishing point of the ages is to be found in the eternities, the possibility of immortality is more directly assured; and when Christianity wins history, and imbues it with spiritual life, it makes its doctrine of eternal life more secure. The beauty of the world consists in the thought that it is a realm where the light and shadow outline the precincts of man's spiritual life; the significance consists in the fact of eternal life. The meaning of the world's history is the destiny of man as an ethical being, and the ages strive to bring about his education, so that having been strengthened by running with footmen, he may hope to contend with horses.

Chapter V.

CHRISTIANITY AND ROMANTICISM.

It is only when culture is conceived of in the broadest sense that it may be related to the Christian religion; when it is regarded as the spiritual life of mankind, then it may be said that it is Christianity which gives us our first practical idea of the doctrine. Humanity is the only field of culture, and humanity is one of the discoveries made by Jesus Christ. It is on this account that conscious culture is a contribution which Christianity has made to the intellectual life of the world. In modern times, the idea of culture is a problematic one, and, as in the instance of most of the phases of our thought which we have examined, the question is raised whether the idea is tenable in itself or its content desirable for its own sake. Modern thought is for or against culture; just for this reason it is divided against itself. The principle which contrasts itself to culture is nature, and, from the earliest years of the modern Enlightenment, thought has divided itself over the question of nature and institution, right and law, reason and

tradition. In other words, it has raised the question of culture for the sake of assuming a negative attitude toward it.

No formal definition of culture can be projected without a circular method of reasoning which involves the idea of culture itself; and, even if such an explanation of the term were possible, it would be of value only from the standpoint of terminology. The force of the idea may be felt, however, when we observe that culture is a form of life which is ever distinguished from nature, and the cultural is ever that which contrasts itself with the natural. Furthermore, it may be said that the idea of culture is broad, so that it does not confine itself to the science of æsthetics or the doctrine of the fine arts, but covers the whole life of man in his intellectual capacity. As an idea, culture belongs to a spiritual movement which itself starts out by aligning itself against nature; that is, Christianity. True it is that the ancients had the culture, but true is it not that they had the conscious idea of culture in its subjective sense. In modern times, where Christianity has become a subject of discussion, the idea of culture becomes a problem, and the modern begins to doubt the testimony of his own reason, and denies the desires of his own heart.

To evince the idea of culture and to propose it as a program for nations was no easy task,

and when the modern assumed it he found that he must needs penetrate to the very heart of man. The seventeenth century witnessed the emancipation of the modern citizen and person; this was brought about by a theory of natural rights which tended to set man at variance with civilization and culture. Parallel to this was a theory of religion which, by its emphasis upon nature, further separated man from his history. What the seventeenth century did in theory, that the eighteenth performed in practice. It undid the culture of the past and put a new one in its place; then the significance of culture as an idea appeared, and the problem itself arose. The French Revolution produced the idea and the term culture. Rousseau raises the question, impugns the validity of civilization, denies the value of culture, and in his counsel to return to nature he introduces revolution and makes man conscious of his intellectual life. Fichte, let it be noted, gives us the ground of "Cultur," and he does so in his "Observations on the French Revolution," wherein he affirms, "Der Krieg cultiviert"—"War makes culture." With Rousseau, the true state is the most natural one; with Fichte, the true fatherland is that which gives the highest culture. Differing as they do in their estimate of the value of culture, these French and German prophets of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries agree that war and

political change are the cause and effect of the cultural idea, and it is significant that Arnold, the modern English apostle of culture, should style his work, "Culture and Anarchy."

1. In the history of culture, the first stage is the Oriental, where began to beat the light which later on was to make man appear as spiritual. To look at the East is to see that when culture begins to separate man from nature, it does so, first of all, by calling attention to his sensuous life. Accordingly, Oriental art is the art of sense, which makes it appear grewsome and grotesque to the eye of the understanding, and the lack of proportion and want of fineness reveal the fact that the æsthetic consciousness is playing very roughly with the objects of nature. The odes of the Shih-king are heavy, revealing want of genuine imagination. Famous as is Veda, the Mantras which were sung before the days of Homer have a richness which is only of the quality of sense, and one can see little but cow and horse and herds of spotted deer. Plastic art is here imperfect in its imitative quality, and the symbolism which enters is such as to suggest the mystery of spiritual life without there being added any element of interpretation. Nature is expressed by the Orient, but nature is never transcended there.

With the Egyptian, there is not only a consciousness of nature, but a sense of its mystery,

and the art of the Nile and the desert begins to reveal the coming of spiritual life. The limits of life in nature and the possibilities of life eternal begin to apear in the Book of the Dead, but in what a hideous manner! Then, as Hegel has suggested, the figure of the Sphinx, half human and yet half animal, seems to show that the Egyptian has begun to be emancipated from nature and animalism. Man is not yet man, but he is no longer a creature of mere nature. In the instance of the Sphinx we see that, in the Coptic consciousness, animal and man could consort in the same form, although the Egyptian looks upon this union as a matter of mystery. The Greek departs from this dualistic conception, and yet not wholly, as Hegel concludes; for the Greek continues the same idea in the figure of the Centaur. Less pleasing artistically and more monstrous scientifically, the Centaur is no object of adoration to the Greek, who, as a hero, valiantly contends with him, thus severing allegiance to the animal form.

Greek art in its perfection affords its vivid contrast to Christianity, yet in the grand development of humanity it forms a stage of transition to the art of Christianity, wherein culture becomes conscious. The ideals of the Greek were quite alien to those of the Christian, hence the vast difference in the appearance of their art. It was in sculpture that the Greek excelled, and

herein he reveals, not only his mastery over the body, but his own conception of mind. The Greek brow shines with psychological significance. The forehead seems to continue to and along the line of the nose, which is made broad and straight upon the same plane. Such plastic art suggests that the domain of reason is not essentially different from that of sense, so that the lower part of the head may unite with the upper portion. An exception to this may be found in the Hermes of Praxiteles, an artist who stands for beauty rather than for that grandeur which accompanies the work of Phidias. In the case of Hermes something like an exception may be found to the rule which united face and forehead; for here a line of separation appears between them, increasing the breadth of brow and enhancing the nobility of the countenance. In modern times we have learned to expect this sculptural differentiation of higher and lower functions in the head, and nothing has been more instructive in this respect than the "bar of Michael Angelo." For the most part, classic sculpture is lacking in this psychological detail.

Roman culture offsets the Grecian in the way that Egypt completes the work of the Orient. To Rome we look for finish rather than originality; for dignity rather than beauty; for law rather than art; for civilization rather than culture. In his language the Roman reveals not

the freedom and richness which prevailed with the Greek; in place of these he substitutes taciturnity and strength. Roman culture has a value which is one of means rather than end, and it forms the medium rather than the goal of modern study. In architecture, Christianity finds certain structural *motifs* in the arch and dome, which, losing their practical significance as a means of uniting peoples under a common empire, find their place in the Church as the sign of the Divine kingdom.

2. Christianity affiliates with culture for the reason that both have a spiritual principle, which appears in their attempts to distinguish man from nature and render him a being of freedom and self-consciousness. In their programs they are further allied, inasmuch as they protest against work which begins and ends in utility. These two principles contain, as their respective kernels, the idea of inwardness and the thought that it is only in the endless and deathless that man can find a fit subject for his endeavor. The kingdom is within the heart of mankind, and man shall not say, Lo, here! or, Lo, there! The kingdom ever cometh, yet no morning red or evening red, or any other sign of the times, shall usher in the kingdom of the ages. He who, joining labor with happiness, works for culture, works also for the inner life,

and seeks to promote the remote interest of man.

Christ found Himself at home in nature, although His religion was of a spiritual character, which made it affiliate with humanity and Divinity. Yet Christ in His treatment of natural objects touched so lightly upon them that their crass naturalism was lost sight of, especially when they became in His mind the sign of spiritual truth. He considered the lillies, and watched the flight of the bird; His teaching touched upon the vineyard with its hedge-row; He observed the mountain, and marked the peculiar facts of the growth of plant life. All this was done without desire for effect, and with no particular interest in nature. Symbolism was the spirit which Christ cast over the æsthetical consciousness of man, and He taught him to look beyond the whitening harvest-fields and wave-beaten shore to the eternal truth pressing through the outward forms. Yet the fact remains that the pure and spiritual views of the Gospels were expressed amid scenes of nature rather than, as with St. Paul, in centers of civil life, and to people whose moral instincts fitted them to perceive truth when this was clad in imagery.

Toward the appearance of nature the attitude of Christianity is not critical only, but superior. When culture consists in transcending nature, it is only by taking the latter as its

point of departure that it accomplishes its end. Nature is the competitor of culture; hence art realizes itself by improving upon that which appears to the eye and ear. Art is art because it is not nature; yet art can not become art unless it work with eyes turned toward the world of natural forms. Of its own beauty nature is not conscious; the animal does not realize the beauty which environs him; the nature-man is not ready to appreciate the world which has produced him. Only when man becomes cultured and spiritual does he begin to find interest in his natural counterpart, and an aroused æsthetical or religious consciousness is necessary for the appreciation of natural phenomena. When the Swiss critics, like Haller, Bodmer, and Breitinger, begin to study art and produce criticism, the glory of the Alps bursts upon them, and the ascent of those mighty peaks dates from the beginning of culture in Switzerland. Nature is nothing until art arrives.

The establishment of truly Christian culture was made possible through Alexandrian and Byzantine influences, whereby we may note here the origin of Christian æsthetics and there the beginning of Christian art. Alexandria was a center of culture which does not gain in importance when compared with Athens, but yet had a significance of its own which no glory of Greece could supply. This significance must be

measured in connection with æsthetics and religion, the first metaphysics of which was given by Plotinus. That spirit which made possible such a new departure in human thinking as that which may be called the Christian view was the spirit of ecstasy, not so much of value in itself but rather of import in the negative sense, since it suggested that the intellect is not the only source of truth. In addition to this was the idea of νοῦς, or mind, emanating throughout nature, and, as a second contribution of Alexandrianism, this principle presented a difference to pagan philosophy and a likeness to Christian thought. As a Neo-Platonist, Plotinus was as near Christianity as he was far from Plato; at the same time his dialectics express a new conception of life and culture.

In particular, and with direct reference to Plotinus, Alexandrian culture wrought its peculiar result by distinguishing between sense and spirit. It was for this very distinction that Christianity had prepared the way, and to Alexandria the Church is indebted for a form of culture which expresses the independence of spiritual life. How may beauty be represented when the material is distinguished from the spiritual?—for beauty by its very nature must assume a sensuous form. Plotinus here introduces the idea of symbolism, wherein the sensuous is esteemed, not by means of mere impres-

sion, but by virtue of what it signifies to the percipient soul. The eye beholds the sun because it is itself sunlike; beauty consists in the immanent reality shining through the manifold forms of sense. With such a transcendental conception of beauty, it was possible to regard art as an independent form of spiritual activity, and the philosophy of Alexandria had the effect of separating æsthetics from ethics, a method which is still current in an age which now seeks some essential means of relating them.

The dialectic of Plotinus is essentially æsthetical; it emancipates beauty and lays down the fundamental features of the artistic life in humanity. To arrive at the supreme good, there is necessary a certain elevation of soul which is to be found in the philosopher, the musician, and the lover; and these ascend to the very summit of the intelligible world. The musician is easily astonished at the beautiful, and, flying from dissonance as the timid shun loud noises, he pursues the perfect in the form of congruent sounds. Amazed at the beauty of bodies, the lover passes from abject astonishment at material elegance to the intrinsic beauty of art, science, and virtue. Then, separated from the sensible object, he is ready to "commence the procession on high." So, also, the philosopher; being free and by nature winged, he can pass by easy steps to the "supernal region," needing only a guide

to point out the way. It is toward the supernal region that the souls of musician, lover, and dialectician soar; there they discover a realm which consists of nothing intellective, but possesses a light of its own. This inner light is not intellectual perception, but is rather spiritual inclination. The wish is father to the thought, and intelligence is the creation of desire. The eye sees the sun, because the eye is sunlike; and sight itself consists in the desire to see. That which is discovered is the One, which in itself is beyond essence and beyond intellectual perception—*ultra esse, ultra percipi.* Such intrepid ideas as these, which characterize the transcendentalism of Plotinus, made possible the philosophical enunciation of Christian culture.

The other side of Christian culture is to be found in the Byzantine movement. As Alexandria relates to Athens, so Constantinople relates to Rome, and what fitted these later centers of civilization to contain and communicate Christian thought was the presence of the religious principle which belonged to the Oriental world. Byzantium lays the foundation for Christian art in the same way that Alexandria propounds a theory of æsthetical philosophy. Through Byzantine architecture we may trace the connection of æsthetical endeavor throughout the earlier period of Christianity, and may see in the magnificence of this central style of building some-

thing of the glory which was to appear in the architectural work after the year 1000. Furthermore, the detail work of this form of architecture, where the mosaics entered in so largely, was sufficient to make possible the painting of the Renaissance, which, when its first beginnings were being observed, was guided by Cimabue and Giotto. The founding of the Byzantine Empire and the development of Byzantine culture were of vast importance in laying down the principles of a new Christian culture whose leading idea should be that of Romanticism.

Romanticism is the Christian form of art and culture, and of this movement Christ was the real founder. To make possible such a movement, wherein the soul in all its freedom might exercise itself and realize its destiny, it was necessary that spirit should be separated from matter, and that the view of life should be directed within, and not without, while nature should assume a purely symbolical relation to the æsthetic soul. Christianity brought about this inwardness and provided the remote goal toward which, Crusader-like, the will of humanity should tend. The culture of the Orient was immediate and outward; that of Greece was stationary and plastic; Christian culture is internal and progressive, being content, not with the outward appearance, nor yet with the immediate fact, but desiring to penetrate inward to newer

and richer depths. Romance and chivalry, cloister and crusade, were external forms manifesting the reality of this new culture which aroused new desires and created new duties.

The genuine Romanticist is not only a seeker but a finder, so that in his original and mediæval form he was styled the Troubadour, or Trouvère. In his cultural capacity, therefore, he was not like the Classicist, who believed that beauty and merit were immediately in his possession, while art was a given fact needing only the formative touch of man, but, like a trouvère, or finder, he was persuaded that truth and goodness were neither before nor beyond him, while within his vision they were not within his grasp. Herein were realized the words which said, "Seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you." The fulfillment of Romanticism is inherent in Christianity, since the latter counsels man ever to seek the remote benefit, and promises him ultimate satisfaction. To-day, after we have realized that the promise of Hellenism has faded, and after we have seen that individual pursuit and social history must enter in to produce that which is not directly given to us, we stand in need of a new doctrine which shall reveal to man the actuality of the ideal which now seems to him to be only a matter of pursuit; so that culture may have, not the mere subjective sense of discipline, but the

objective significance of a reality which has been found. Such is the manifest teaching of Christ, especially in His Syrian parables of the Pearl of Great Price, the Treasure in the Field, the Coin in the Dark Room; and it brings us to see that the thing desirable and needful is given, yet must be sought; is to be pursued, yet can be found. It is, therefore, an ideal which supersedes that of Classicism and realizes that of Romanticism.

3. Here may be noted some of the ideas which are expressed in Arnold's theory of culture. According to this apostle, the aims of culture and religion are the same, so that "he who works for sweetness and light works to make reason and the will of God to prevail." The elements of culture are as follows: Culture is an internal condition, marked not by "having and resting," but by "growing and becoming;" being of a general nature, it includes the whole man and embraces all mankind. With such an ideal before him, Arnold pursues an historical method, with the result of showing that in the world there have prevailed two forms of life,— "Hellenism," with its ideal of "spontaneity of consciousness," and "Hebraism," with its "strictness of conscience." Arnold regrets that Hebraism instead of Hellenism prevails, and concerning the former he says, "It was unsound at that particular moment of its development,

it was premature; therefore the bright promise of Hellenism faded, and Hebraism ruled the world." Where the Renaissance sought to rehabilitate Hellenism, it failed through lack of ethical earnestness, so that Puritanism succeeded in re-establishing Hebraism. Arnold, however, overlooks the point that his ideal of culture as internal and universal is such as to mark it with a distinctly Christian character in the light of which the imperfection of Hebraism and the crudity of Puritanism is lost to view.

In another direction—namely, that of speculative philosophy—there appears a statement of the problem of Christianity and modern culture. This is in the idealism of Rudolph Eucken, whose system has much of the spirit of Fichte, an important factor in modern culture-philosophy. Eucken's system is one of *"Wesensbildung;"* let us call it culture. His method is that of *Geistesleben;* let us call it spiritual life and Christianity. According to Eucken, modern life reveals two culture systems—naturalism and intellectualism—which, with all their differences, agree in turning away from the personal principle of spiritual life; for one raises nature toward the soul, while the other lowers the soul toward nature. In the whole career of the philosophic man, two periods appear in history,—the plastic one of the ancient, the dynamic one of the modern. Thus, in place of mere form or

mere force, instead of nature or mind, there should prevail the essential culture of spiritual life. Such is about the conclusion of Eucken, and we style this the Christian conception of culture which now belongs to the modern.

With its Christian basis and romantic form, culture comes to consciousness in man, and assumes the character of a problem for his thought. To-day we question the value of culture; we place the problem upon an ethical basis. Culture for culture's sake can not make essential progress or produce any genuine result; but where culture is seen to be the true method of humanity in its development, the value of the program will not fail to appear. It is Christianity which emancipates humanity and aligns for it an ideal; hence Christianity can justify culture, whose validity and value were leading questions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively. Nature, which is ever the negative aspect of culture, and psychological existence which envelops man, can not provide the habitat for man in view of the fact that he has a spiritual vocation. Here culture enters and finds that the Christian view of the world and evolution of life are adapted to its progress. The height of culture is Romanticism, and its ideals are but a little removed from the principles of Christianity.

Like the idea of religion, that of culture is a modern one, and it is only within a period of

two centuries that the consciousness of culture has become so direct that culture itself has become a problem. But, like religion, culture itself is about as old as man himself. Upon the historical side, where the question of development appears, the position of Christianity becomes strategic, so that it is possible to say that it is first in Christianity that the meaning of religion is realized, just as it is here also that culture, as such, is emancipated and is rendered capable of an independent development. The ground of this is to be found in the very essence of Christianity, which consists in the idea of spirit, whose sanctions and duties are alien to those of nature; and for this reason both culture and religion come to self-consciousness when they receive a Christian interpretation.

Such considerations, wherein the indispensability of culture becomes manifest, may further be considered in the special case of landscape painting. Sculpture and portraiture naturally demand man as their subject, and arouse within us a human interest; yet the case of the landscape, which at first was employed merely as the setting for a scene or the background for a personality, is not much different. As Lotze has suggested, the landscape suggests that the world has itself a spirit akin to man's, and this appears in the dreamy and half-conscious air which is cast over the canvas. Or, the

landscape raises within us the question whether and how far nature is fitted to become the home of spiritual life. Rough may be the crag and fierce the torrent, terrifying the appearance of cliff and peak, yet nature may contain man, and form a scene wherein his career may be realized and his work performed. Such conclusions are reached, however, not by pursuing natural appearances, but by consulting the dictates of culture, which makes man what he is, and enables him to distinguish between nature and the world of humanity.

Where culture begins by separating spirit from nature, it continues its work by distinguishing animality from humanity. This distinction is of importance in itself, and furthermore because it relates to the man himself, whereby it brings about a separation of the two parts of his own nature. It is in this regard that the general method of culture resembles Christianity. With all the particular forms which culture may assume, its leading motive consists in this gradual separation of the lower from the higher in man, and with all the complexity of the Christian religion, the central principle consists in making man see his spiritual nature, and further in causing the animal in him to realize its subordinate position. The place wherein Christianity differs from culture may be found in connection with the ethical; for religion, in its at-

tempt to separate man from nature, lays upon him a certain weight of moral necessity unknown in the realm of culture.

Christianity establishes the value of culture, by justifying the pursuit of a remote object of interest. Man with his spiritual capacities is situated in a world of sense and need, and for this reason he must pursue the things which belong to these, and make of them objects of interest. Hereby is the well-being of man determined, and his happiness consists in the degree of ability and success with which work is carried on. But the worldly interest of man and the natural need of his being are presided over by instincts and desires which do their work apart from the man himself, or his humanity; so that something more than the natural in its causes and compensations must intervene in order to bring man to himself. This ideal labor is the pursuit of culture, whose value can never be established by any test of utility or necessity. Yet culture is without ground in human reason and sanction in human life unless it be guided by a view of man which is genuine in its humanity and essential in its spiritual character. Failure must attach itself to every program of culture which consists merely in that negative side of the idealistic labor which only turns away from nature and man's immediate life therein, while it fails to provide a positive principle upon which culture may be based.

The onesidedness and negative character of culture may easily be censured by those who are alive to the advantages of nature and dead to the demands of spirit; and with great facility they can point out how useless, how miserable is the condition of him who has departed from pursuing the immediate object in his natural horizon for the sake of following some idealistic aim which apparently ends in resultlessness. To all appearances, man is fitted for seeking that which lies just before him, and he becomes unhappy when he conceives of some extra and higher pursuit. The correction of this whole affair, both the culture and the criticism of it, is to be found in a view which justifies that which nature can not yield and that which culture seeks. Christianity affords this view, and with the strong negation which it applies to the world of sense it furthers most thoroughly the effort of culture. It is not what shall we eat, or wherewithal shall we be clothed, but what shall be the spiritual food and vesture which should interest man, whose natural instincts will take care of themselves.

Chapter VI.

CHRISTIANITY AND TRANSCENDENTALISM.

In still another place does Christianity appear in conjunction with modern culture, and in still another form does it manifest that separation of mind and matter, sense and spirit, which by historical necessity belongs to it. Modern culture, when regarded in the light of speculation, shows how strikingly it is adapted to the essence of Christianity; for here we encounter the dualism which, in the form of rationalism or empiricism, idealism or materialism, ever besets our thinking. Such a bifurcation of the human understanding, which relates both to the method and the calculated result of our speculation, is the product of modernity and also the outcome of Christianity. The problem which is thus presented is that of positivism; and Christianity, while necessarily inclined toward idealism, is not without its positivist implications. At the same time the cure for positivism is to be found in the Christian conception of a spiritual life which is not of sense nor yet of under-

standing, but arches above them as it erects a third order of life and thought. To see how this comes about, it is necessary to examine in outline the features of our modern thought as a process of abstract speculation.

The conditions of modern speculation which are now culminating in positivism are conditions incident upon the working out of the Christian conception of life. It is true that just as religion does not make use of a logical method of conception, or a rational form of expression, so Christianity did not resort to speculative principles to bring about its vast conception of the world. Yet these very ideas were implicit in the poetical forms of Christ's teaching, and in the culture of mankind the trope becomes as mighty as the category. Christ counseled His followers to turn away from the world and love it not, because for man there was something more essential to be found in the domain of spirit. But this very counsel wrought a change of view as well as a difference of taste, and it finally evolved a new culture, whose fruits our modern times are now bearing. To-day, when we distinguish sense and understanding, soul and body, we are but carrying out this principle so germane to Christianity.

1. With respect to method, our modern thought is divided into the camps of empiricism and rationalism; since the days of Kant, or with

the rise of the Neo-Kantian school, this distinction has made its presence felt in theology. For this reason, when we attempt to relate Christianity to our culture, we must appreciate the difficulty which besets us moderns, and try to indicate a way out of the predicament. Both empiricism and rationalism belong to the science of logic; now it may be possible to discover a supralogical method of thinking which shall be more in accord with the spiritual form of Christianity. At the outset the question is one of method; we must inquire the way—another peculiarity of a form of culture which severs itself from the world and falls back upon the facts of subjective experience. The history of the knowledge problem, confined as it is to modern philosophy, reveals the sharp contrast between the tenets of the opposing schools, but yet it does not fail to evince their common root. In the technical sense of the term, all knowledge comes from experience or from the understanding; hence, there can be but two methods of arriving at the logical goal. But in the larger sense, when knowledge takes on the universal form of truth, and where experience includes the data of history while the understanding grasps the facts of the spiritual life, there is an extralogical method of attaining to reality. If nowhere else, this may be found in the realm of ethics, so that reason must be understood to in-

clude something more than the relations set up by the understanding in handling the data of sense.

The claims of empiricism are readily made and almost as readily granted; for, by its very nature, experience is necessary for human beings who are limited by their own finitude. To obtain knowledge, whether of a low or high order, man must exercise the functions of his conscious life whereby experience is obtained; and yet, because experience is the perpetual accompaniment of a thought-process which never appears in logical isolation, it need not be urged that experience indicates the whole content of the human mind. The value of experience is educational; it affords a means of approximating to truth which, when thus discovered, is obvious. In the beginning is the fact, but in the conclusion which is drawn from it there is no mere matter of actuality, but that necessity which by right belongs to philosophy.

Experience is a word easily invoked for aid which is not always forthcoming; at the same time the meaning of the term is not always discussed with sufficiency. In the history of our thought, various stages of development as well as certain typical forms appear, with the result that experience becomes more than empiricism. With the ancient Stoics the term was employed in a practical sense to indicate common knowledge.

Augustine falls back upon inner experience which has a psychological validity. Eckhart, with his mysticism, suggests the idea of religious intuition. Paracelsus uses it in a more technical manner, as becomes a physician. Locke's conception of experience involves the further idea of sense-experience. Kant makes use of the idea of a "possible experience," founded upon those forms of the understanding which he calls categories. With Hegel and Herbart, even more comprehensive views of experience enter in; Hegel tends to regard experience as the mental life of the race in its spiritual evolution, while Herbart looks upon experience as somewhat given, from which philosophy departs by correcting the contradictions involved therein. It would seem to appear, then, that empiricism does not consider its fundamental principle in anything like a sufficient sense, nor does it perceive that pure empiricism leads only to subjectivism and skepticism, as was the case with Berkeley and Hume in their development of Locke. At the same time, "inner experience" is fraught with a significance which empiricism scarcely suggests.

Rationalism is the antipode of the doctrine which claims that knowledge comes from without by means of experience. The claim of rationalism is that knowledge, which is universal and necessary, comes from the understanding with its permanent forms; and this doctrine points

out that the goal of human thinking is pure knowledge. Where failure to obtain this enters in, it may be explained by showing that it all comes from the extra-humanity of man, whose mind is clouded by practical interests. According to rationalism, there can be no ground of certainty apart from a mind which contains this, no such principle appearing in the world; and the most fundamental of our notions—quality, quantity, substance, and causality—have an intrinsic standard of certainty. Rationalism finds in nature what empiricism finds in experience; nature is one and uniform, its laws are laws of the mind.

Upon the basis of these logical theories, religious thought strives to settle the question concerning the truth of the Christian religion. Yet such an attempt would seem to promise but little, inasmuch as the data of experience and the laws of the understanding do not seem able to convey in any convincing manner the intrinsic sense of Christianity. History only shows that when empiricism and rationalism are applied to the religious problem, they immediately depart from their tenets and adopt a purely practical form of discussion. Such was the case with both Locke and Kant. Locke styled his work "The Reasonableness of Christianity," as though a system of empiricism like his own could employ such an idea. But by the term "reasonableness"

Locke only means that Christianity should both receive and permit civil toleration in a land of religious establishment; and Locke reveals himself, not as the typical British empiricist, but as a man of affairs, who, for practical purposes, makes use of the principle of jurisprudence. And just as Locke fails to apply empiricism to religion, so Kant departs from his critical rationalism, even when he writes a work called "Religion Within the Limits of Reason Only." With Kant, the term "reason" is broad, and in its wider application it includes the ethical or practical; on this account Kant seeks to limit Christianity to the ethical, so that in his hand it receives no rationalistic treatment whatsoever. The transcendentalism of the great Königsberger was calculated to show that transcendent knowledge of the soul, the world, and God is impossible. His thought ascended beyond time, space, and causality as a camera is flown from a kite, but the picture produced by such aerial photography reveals, not the heavens above, but the earth beneath.

To determine the essence of Christianity, therefore, it would seem as though both positivism and rationalism must be abandoned, if not transcended; the great demand of present thought is for some tertiary means of pursuing the problems of thought and reality. Already, in the case of Ritschlian theology, it has become

the fashion to disregard both empirical and rationalistic forms of speculation and resort to the purely ethical in the form of value-judgments. It may appear in the course of our modern thinking, that since Christianity has itself brought about the means of separating sense and spirit, experience and reason, so it may further provide a new view of the world, which shall reconcile these points of opposition and make possible a distinctly religious and Christian view. This must be expressed in terms of spirit, whose meaning can not be made out merely by denying experience and affirming the understanding, but rather by virtue of a wholly new view of the world of reality.

Does logic indicate the limits of our knowledge? If such be the case, we must abandon any attempt to transcend empiricism and rationalism, and must rest content with the findings of science and the formulas of philosophy. But it would seem as though there were in knowledge itself a supralogical element by virtue of which we may form judgments which are derived neither from experience nor from the understanding. In addition to knowledge itself, there is a certain knowledge-feeling, which consists of appreciation and determines whether the knowledge is fit for human culture. Much can be known which could be of no value, and much more can not be known by the finite reason of man;

but we have a feeling that between these extremes there lies a realm of knowledge which is adapted to man and sufficient for his human career. With the ancient, knowledge meant pleasure, and happy he who could cognize the causes of things; with the modern, knowledge means power, and our science soon becomes utilized for the sake of industry. In all this we are drawing circles about what we know, and are passing judgment upon the value of truth. Our doctrine of culture, our question concerning what kind of knowledge has the most worth, are only indications of the supralogical element in knowledge whose practical value we examine. Our present decline in metaphysical speculation is due, not so much to inability as to lack of interest.

In the last resort, all human thinking, because it is human, depends upon the condition and development of culture, so that systems which seem to be independent in their origin and final in their outcome receive only a secondary place in the intellectual life of mankind. Plato, who advances as far as the speculative mind of man has gone, is still a Greek whose philosophy, instead of being a world-system, has its causes and conditions in the plastic culture of Athens. Hegel, whose logic attempted all that belongs to philosophy, was the child of his generation and was thoroughly German. The mysterious prog-

ress of culture determines these systems, and from the silent influence of the age's intellectual life there is no escape. We think as we live, and reason never discovers a truth until humanity has reached the stage of culture to which that truth belongs.

With the power of culture appreciated, the influence of Christianity may begin to be seen, in the realm of speculation as well as in connection with civilization. As moderns, we are Christian, and our thought is pervaded by the ineffable spirit of Christianity. To measure this we must appreciate the position and importance of culture-truths in human knowledge. Our genuine knowledge, which has been the product of human thinking and the consolation of human life, is not made up of the abstract idea of the understanding or of the crass, concrete fact of sense, but has another source and a different significance. Truths of history, truths of religion, truths of art, and truths of ethics are neither empirical nor rational, but are cultural, being the product of the living, human spirit in all its entirety. Culture is a consistent method in human thinking, for the mind possesses the power to pass, not only judgments of fact and judgments of relation, but also judgments of value. Such value-judgments, which relate the events of the world to the entirety of man's being, find their full expression within the realm

of culture, and in the last analysis all human thinking depends upon this principle.

Concerning Christianity and the problem of its essence, it may now be suggested that it is not by means of logical theory that we may seek to discover the truth of this form of religion. Christianity is not a method of philosophy, but a form of culture; so that any attempt to discuss its nature in connection with a positivist theory of knowledge is sure to miss the point of the problem and produce confusion. It is in connection with forms of culture rather than schools of epistemology that Christianity is to be discussed; for it is within this realm that it has worked to produce its intrinsic effects. Christianity did nothing for the science of logic; it did practically everything for the history of culture. Its appeal was never made to the understanding, but rather to the living creating spirit of humanity. On this account, we can not credit the attempted deduction of rational Christianity made by the Deist of the Enlightenment, nor can we grant the claims made by the positivist Christianity of the present. As methods, these two theories of thought can not aid directly in solving the problem of life.

2. The Christian view of the world is to be developed in accordance with a method which turns away from experience and the understanding and resorts to a living means of culture.

But the apprehension of reality is not to be lost when we have abandoned the methods of logic, especially when the logic of the present consists chiefly in a critical study which concludes that things in themselves can not be known by the reason of man. If idealism and materialism have their importance here, they are not without difficulty; and, furthermore, it is obvious that of the two both can not be correct. Idealism and positivism are significant in that one is the antagonist of the other, while both fail to apprehend the unity of the world without and the integrity of humanity within. The way is thus prepared for a third view, which, making use of the living method of culture, shall lead to a sufficient conception of reality. What such a view may lack in academic form, it may gain in inwardness and range. To appreciate the need of some higher conception of the world, a review of the results of realism and idealism must be made. Then the Christian conception will appear more clearly.

Division with respect to theory is the result of dualistic methods of logic, and the outcome of rationalism and empiricism is a double doctrine of idealism and materialism. On account of this division, the interpretation of reality takes on an extra difficulty, inasmuch as we are confronted by the question itself as well as the theory of its best solution. Hereby we lose that unity

of intuition which gratified the mind of the ancient speculator, and spend our time adjusting the claims of two opposed theories. Sought everywhere, but realized nowhere, the unity of the world is an idea which eludes both parties in this dispute. Furthermore, the way in which the problem appeals to the modern is by no means parallel to that of the ancients. Our modern criterion is the criterion of reality, while that of the ancient was the principle of being. The ancient, whose thought was characterized by logical consistency rather than psychological profundity, sought for a permanent principle of being which should distinguish itself from non-being. The modern, having mediæval Christianity behind him, analyzes the conception of a reality which distinguishes itself from appearance, and for him non-being is a problem which forces upon his mind no such crisis as that proposed by the notion of the phenomenal, the shadow of the real or noumenal. Such a way of presenting the question provokes dispute which is altogether more vital than the classic conflict over being and becoming; it is the question of idealism and materialism, and as such it concerns, not merely man's conception of the world, but his view of his own spirit.

The program of naturalistic materialism appears at once, since this theory resides in the immediate and apparent fact. Of this fact, that

matter exists, the mind can never rid itself, although it need not suffer its ideal to be overcome by the mere actuality of the material. Reason need not yield to the peculiar arbitrariness of a theory which protests that we can not help thinking after a materialistic manner. Why man in his corporeal capacity should yet be a thinking spirit we can not say, although we should expect pure thought to be carried on by a being possessed of mind minus body. The fact is, that with a body, man *does* have intelligence and destiny, and unless we grant that his consciousness depends upon and varies with the structure and function of the nervous system, we can not think scientifically. Without brain, no thought, —this seems to be the program of nature, although the same mental process would be rendered null were any other organ, like the heart, to be eliminated. Man must live in order to think, and he must eat to live; yet thinking is not mere living; mind is not metabolism. There is nothing extraordinary in this case, for it all traces back to the great problem of man's finitude. To be man, he must be a creature of sense as well as of spirit, and the problem of living, as well as that of thinking, involves the same perplexity of mind and body.

Similar and similarly destructive is the testimony of subjective idealism. Like materialism, it can not be disputed upon its own grounds,

and we can not help thinking upon a basis which is purely subjective. Strange as it may seem, the common conception of matter, as that which is perceived by the senses, is the very basis of the contrary doctrine of subjective idealism. Materialism is but the counterpart of idealism and their common ground is to be found in sensationalism, the method of which each follows to its own conclusion. When, therefore, we are forced to admit the plausibility of materialism as a working basis for our thought, we can further see that what such a theory explains is only the psychological process which turns out to be a matter for idealistic interpretation. If you can not deny the validity of the object, you can not gainsay the testimony of the subject, and a crass materialism falls down before an equally crass idealism. That which materialism explains, idealism explains away, and each prevents the other from trespassing upon the all-important realm of spirit. The calculated effect of materialism is self-destructive; for as soon as matter attempts to explain mind, the mental nature of the affair appears only to turn against mere matter and render necessary a new definition of the latter. The success of materialism is its failure; the more potent matter becomes, the less material it really is. Idealism, by making all being to consist of perception, destroys itself since it leads to the conclusion that only

the individual in his subjective capacity exists; and such a solipsism finally destroys the fundamental principle of mind.

In dividing the methods of speculation into rationalism and empiricism, and in aligning theories of idealism and realism, modern thought has decreased the power of human reason and has set limits upon the science of logic. The criticism of Kant leads him to regard the ethical reason as though it were superior to the speculative understanding, while the realism of Lotze urges him to say, "Reality is richer than thought." But long before modernism began its critical work, Plotinus enunciated the doctrine that there is something which is not only beyond thought but beyond being; an idea which may have been provoked by the phantasies of Alexandrian culture, but one which is not wholly out of keeping with our modern views of the world. If reality is richer than thought, the ideal is richer than reality, and the value of things transcends their logical ground as well as their actual existence. The realm of spirit transcends the world of thought and experience, and it does this by virtue of its character. Between the logically real and the spiritually ideal there is a difference, not merely of degree, but of quality, and of this higher order the world is not so much the copy as it is the symbol.

The reason why the New Testament does not

pursue a metaphysical method, with the aim of denying matter and demonstrating mind, is to be found in the fact that Christianity does not take matter seriously. Phenomena of the world, as we style them, appear to have only a relative significance, and at heart they are but symbols of the kingdom of God; and the world as a whole is serenely set aside because in comparison with the inner life of the soul it has no value. It is on this account that Christianity makes possible a theory of phenomenalism, for it regards the given world as though it were purely relative and dependent upon mind, which alone is fundamental. This view is never put in a philosophical form, but rather assumes a poetical cast in accordance with which the facts of nature receive symbolic treatment, as though they were striving to reveal the presence of spiritual life. Christianity has made possible the critical question of idealism and materialism; and it is Christianity which points out the solution of the problem.

3. It is Christianity, then, which has arranged this crisis; alienating man from the physical world it has turned him against his psychological self. Furthermore, Christianity has shown us that the possibilities of human culture were not exhausted by Paganism; nay, it has even done more, inasmuch as it has disclosed a path toward a new reality having facts and

laws, deeds and sanctions of its own. Such reality consists neither of mind nor matter, but of spirit. For this reason it becomes possible for us to consider metaphysics as though it related to the soul as well as to the world, and as though there were a philosophy of mind as well as one of matter. The program of Christian metaphysics consists chiefly in the idea of life, not as the subject of evolution, but of culture. The method of this culture is history; its culmination is humanity. All genuine metaphysics has as its source and goal the principle of life and the needs of humanity. With Plato, it is the good; with Kant, it is *Interesse;* Descartes develops the ego in its consciousness; Fichte investigates its activity. Not every system of metaphysics, however, follows a living method; not every one sees that the conception of reality which is involved is one which has no meaning unless it be interpreted in terms of the spirit. If being is unity, if reality consists of relation, the criteria involved are such as can be drawn only from a soul which has, or is, this unity; from a mind to which things are related. The result is more than ontological; it is spiritual.

History is to Christian metaphysics what nature was to the ancient systems; the world exists not for the display of the course of nature, but for the history of humanity. It is at this

point that positivism appears; it relates to the metaphysics of life in the same way that phenomenalism adjusts itself to the metaphysics of the world. Our problem is not the problem of being and becoming, the impress of which marks almost all ancient philosophy, but the positive problem of reality and history, wherein eternity and time are so strangely blended. Historical reality is the principle which Christian thought aspires to realize; but by its very nature such an idea involves a paradox. It is for this reason that historical thought tends to abandon the metaphysical side of the question and to lapse into positivism. The necessity of historical reality may be felt in connection with the idea of humanity, for the soul which can not live in nature endeavors to find a home in history.

In the last resort, philosophy is looking for some conception of the world which shall satisfy the understanding and guide the will. Christianity is inimical to the world in the ordinary sense of the term, yet it is not without its own view of reality. Indeed, it is to Christianity that our culture is indebted for its idea of the world-whole. Many are the objections which may be brought to bear upon the conceptions of the world which have been advanced in modern times, and which have usually been expressed under the title "Nature," whether in the sense of Spinoza or of Newton, of Hegel or of Darwin. Christianity does not further or

abide by this conception of nature, but thus far Christian theology has not advanced a metaphysics which is able to supply a more acceptable view; hence, the spirit of the modern is held in abeyance, or it is sharply divided against itself. After the manner of modern theology, it may be urged that metaphysics tends only to render valid the reality of the world, while it does not establish its value, while science ignores the ethical in establishing the physical. That which Christian thought demands for its system is the historical world of humanity.

The world of things must give way before the world of persons; nature must yield to humanity,—such is the general demand which Christian thought makes upon our modern culture. So long as the modern has pursued the idea of the "thing" as the ultimate principle in the world, just so long has he found it necessary to confess how unsatisfactory such an idea is. The criterion of reality as opposed to the phenomenal does not offend the mind, but the idea of things which comes from this is unwelcome, inasmuch as it tends to oppose itself to thought; and, after all, our interest is in spirits rather than things. It was not until Christianity had appeared in the world that the criterion of reality was applied to metaphysics; now it is seen that the doctrine of things is by no means in keeping with the idea of reality as established

by mediævalism. The means of correcting this false view of reality, which makes the latter to consist in thinghood, is to be found in the idea of self-consciousness which makes the inner nature of reality apparent.

To Christianity we are further indebted for the ontological principle which is now the desire and the despair of metaphysics. Ancient philosophy supplied the term, and, to some extent, the form of the idea; but it was when the mediæval theologian endeavored to express the nature of God that the ontological argument arose. Arising in Augustine and Anselm, this form of reasoning appears again in Descartes and Kant, although both of the latter approach it in a skeptical manner. Christianity is in harmony with the ontological principle, not because the latter is capable of syllogistic demonstration, but because it indicates the existence of a spiritual principle dependent simply upon mind; and such a principle is the one thing needful in the religious consciousness of man, when once this has been Christianized. For this reason our modern theories of Divine immanence can never be in accordance with the religious consciousness; since the latter ever turns away from the world of nature and seeks some transcendent principle which shall satisfy the demands of the soul in its endeavor to affirm itself as a spiritual being.

Chapter VII.

CHRISTIANITY THE CULMINATION OF RELIGION.

In what sense are we still Christians? We can not adhere to our religion by inheritance, nor secure it by succession. Custom, which serves as a sort of guide in morality, fails to support what is so organic and internal as religion. For the new century, renewed beliefs become a demand; when the critical spirit of the day is once felt, Christianity itself becomes a distinct problem. What is Christianity? The ideas of development and differentiation among the phenomena of religion, by virtue of which the principle of progress and the method of comparative study are made current, make the above question momentous. Ethnic religions in general manifest salient tendencies; universal religions give rise to concrete concepts; in the light of such ideas, what does Christianity seem to be? Surely it can be nothing commonplace; its mild maxims and gentle judgments arouse, in the mind of man, vigorous affirmations and vehement negations. Nowhere else in the history

of human thinking is there set up such a sharp "either—or;" "He that is not for Me is against Me," says Christ, and we feel that His saying is true. Thus it comes about that the affirmation of Christianity becomes imperative. The philosophy of religion is possessed of a method which may avail in identifying the nature of Christianity, if not in developing its doctrines. At once there is made a distinction from theology. As in certain other philosophical sciences, a twofold method of treatment may here be applied. Religion may be differentiated from theology, in somewhat the same way that the philosophy of rights is different from the science of law; as, in æsthetics, the theory of beauty is not identical with the philosophy of art. In present thought, various popular writers have indirectly felt this distinction, and as a result have opposed religion to theology. This is not profound; it were better to devote philosophical effort to showing how the dual forms of philosophy of religion may be represented. Perhaps it may be expressed by saying, Here is religion, there is revelation. At any rate, there is possible another and more general treatment of the Christian religion than that which is to be found in current theology. By means of the other method we are able to present a great interrogation: What is the Christian religion? Within the limits of distinctly Christian thought,

particular doctrines have been distinguished and various relations set up. But what are the limits of the subject itself? When it is asked whether we moderns are Christians; when it is urged that the religion of Christ should prevail, it must be asked, What, then, is Christianity?

1. The characteristic quality of the Christian religion is best seen when the light of history is cast upon the problem; where this religion has struggled to express itself, its inner meaning is most thoroughly appreciated. Already in the mediæval period there had not been wanting attempts to isolate and analyze the strikingly Christian element in the faith. Witness the much-disputed "Eternal Gospel" of the thirteenth century! In this work was for the first time brought out a philosophic view of Christianity, and its author anticipated that notion of progress in religion which was later to appear in Lessing and Schelling. At the same time this independent view of Christianity appears to have broached the modern question, "Are we still Christians?" As moderns, we to-day are sometimes tempted to feel that Christianity is mediæval, and that the progress of culture and civilization is urging us on to something unknown beyond. But the passage from the mediæval to the modern world represents no such culmination. Christianity persists, triumphing over the ruins of systems and em-

pires. Man is still Christian. During the troubled period of the Renaissance what was more significant than the words of Petrarch, "I am sometimes a Platonist, sometimes a Peripatetic, sometimes neither one nor the other, but at all times I am a Christian?"

A study of modern speculation, or what is sometimes called rationalism, should make manifest the fact that, even with scientific investigator, freethinker, and philosopher, essential Christianity still persists. Witness the testimony of a Descartes, of Deism, of a Kant! Secular and scientific thinking prevails in the Cartesian system; yet the latter is not without its religious significance. A skeptico-rationalist system turns out to be an apologetic. Eight years in the Jesuit College of La Flèche were sufficient to set a peculiar impression upon this young mind. In a similar fashion Descartes was influenced by the Jansenists of Port Royal. The larger and more independent training of this early thinker of modern times was carried on by the aid of the patristic thought of Augustine and the scholasticism of Anselm. Under such auspices, is it strange that this apostle of modern science and modern speculation should betray the essential principles of Christian thinking? Cartesianism is thus Christian. Some fervor may be lacking, but the Christian idea is there. In a new and unwonted form the inner

nature of the Christian religion is presented. So far as Descartes's first principles are concerned, the starting point and method are Augustinian, while the essential result is akin to Anselm's ontology. Furthermore, the Cartesian method of treatment is more characteristically Christian than that peculiar mixture of Platonic and patristic thought which dominated in Augustine; is more consistent, in its discussion of Christian theism, than was the scholastic Aristotelianism of the "second Augustine." In becoming modern, Descartes becomes more and more Christian. Now, this is probably because he based his ontology upon the principle of spirit, an idea alike Christian and modern. Spiritual life was Descartes's fundamental principle; in discussing the former he excels even Augustine. Moved by religious impulses, Augustine attempted a proof of the soul's existence and its independence of the world. The soul, with its obviously spiritual nature and with its manifest destiny, can not find satisfaction in the natural world. Such was the method of proceeding from the religious consciousness. Now, with a somewhat different spirit, Descartes reached the same conclusion. A clear analysis of the soul's life and an equally distinct conception of the world's essence led Descartes sharply to distinguish between the two, and whereas the dualism of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* fails to do justice alike

to philosophy of religion and metaphysics, yet it clearly expresses that definite distinction of the New Testament in the light of which spirit and matter can not be united, nor anything in the world given in exchange for the soul. It was just this distinction which separated Christianity from the antique world, and modern thought from mediævalism; when such a distinction became organic to modern thought, there set in a return to Christianity. In a similar manner Descartes follows Anselm in the latter's attempted proof of a universal soul's existence. Setting up the idea of being in general, Anselm's ontology proceeded at once to the principle of existence; we have the idea of a most perfect being, and such being must possess the attribute of existence, otherwise the former would not be perfect. Hence this most perfect being exists. Now, the Cartesian ontology is less scholastic and more Christian; it is but a continuation of the personal principle worked out in the psychology. But Descartes does not aim to evince the reality of the *ens realisimum,* as such; he rather seeks to show the validity of the idea in man. To the personal, self-conscious soul the idea of God becomes as living and real as the feeling of personal existence; God, as an idea, becomes a demand of the soul in its speculative activity; and in spite of the coolness of such logic the essential spirit and method of Christian

thought does not fail to appear. Without directly taking up the religious problem Descartes placed the stamp of Christianity upon modern speculation.

But the Enlightenment did not share the mediævalism of Descartes, nor did it hesitate to take hold of the religious principle itself, and that with an earnestness which became overzealous in its warfare. Traditionalism and authorized religion were set at naught, and in their stead appeared rationalism and naturalism. Where the system of natural religion served to emancipate religious thought in general, Deism, as a practical, political movement, aimed at separating Christianity from an established Church. When Deism sought both free thought and toleration, it found it necessary to construct such a view of Christianity as should be in keeping with these principles. This it did by interpreting the New Testament according to rationalistic methods and by regarding theology from the standpoint of intellectualism. In the case of such systematic thinkers as Hobbes and Locke, with such popular Deists as Tindal and Toland, such a tendency may easily be discerned. Here arose such ideas as, "the reasonableness of Christianity;" "the true Gospel of Jesus Christ;" "Christianity not mysterious;" "Christianity as old as the creation." With the vehement denial of established religion, there arose

a forcible, though blind, affirmation of what Deism esteemed pure and original Christianity to be. As a simple form of worship, a copy of the religion of nature, was Christianity regarded. According to Hobbes, Christianity consisted in regarding Jesus as the Messiah. Thus arose one of Deism's leading principles: the mere Messiahship of Jesus. Locke entertained similar ideas; he sought to limit the scope of Christian tradition to the four Gospels; as a result, he succeeded in making a breach between the teaching of Christ and the theology of the apostles. Thus was the essentially double form of Christianity brought out. Toland sought to naturalize Christianity by regarding its history as "not mysterious." By regarding Christianity "as old as the creation," Tindal shows how inimical was the Enlightenment to history. Toleration and rationalism were thus the guiding stone of Deism's view of Christianity; as a result of such a method, essential religion was emancipated. With all the vigor of Deistic logic and law the kernel of Christianity remained unharmed, and when the State said the subject must ever be a believer in the Christian religion, Deism fiercely rejoined, "What, then, is Christianity?" Deism had its own answer. Emancipating Christianity from ecclesiasticism, Deism had set up principles which could not long endure. Valuable as had been the philosophy of toleration,

suggestive as rationalism had appeared, the essence of Christianity could not be expressed by the ideas of right and reason. Toward the close of the Enlightenment, these limitations were perceived; an obscure and a correspondingly brilliant thinker checked the development of rational Christianity. Henry Dodwell, Jr., and Lessing felt the spirit of Deism, but were wise enough to transcend its shallow method. In his little pamphlet, "Christianity Not Founded on Argument" (1741), Dodwell set all rationalistic interpretation at naught. Perceiving the inner nature of religion, and appreciating the peculiar character of Christianity, Dodwell showed how independent is religion of even free speculation itself. A distinctly religious, or inner, standard was demanded and an independent method set up. For historical religion Lessing performed an equally valuable service; his "Education of the Human Race" was a consistent apology for revelation. History, as a method of expressing the development of spiritual life, was vindicated, and Christianity, as a particular form of the religious life and having its peculiar doctrines, was justified. Universal history became spiritual, and Christianity divine. As correcting an earnest effort which led men astray, these tiny tomes were of marvelous historical value.

As the result of Deism and of Deism's downfall, the conditions of Christianity were in the

days of Immanuel Kant somewhat different from the atmosphere of Cartesianism. But here is a remarkable fact: Kant, in his "Philosophy of Christianity," creates a spirit which, as in the more natural case of Descartes, was distinctly mediæval! Here arises a question: Was Kant scholastic? No; he certainly was modern. Was Kant of the Enlightenment? No; his thought was more advanced. What, then, is the attitude of Königsberg's sage? Like Descartes, he was mediæval enough to adhere to essential Christianity; he was sufficiently modern to treat his problem philosophically. Kant's treatise on Christianity was entitled *"Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft;"* but the limits set are those of the practical reason; the treatment is not speculative, but ethical. Yet Kant does not fail to make at least one fundamental distinction between religion and the ethical. Ethics proceeds from the good will (*der gute Wille*); religion starts out from radical evil in human nature (*das radikale Böse*). Thus Kant's treatment presses the realism to pessimism. Where human reason, in the speculative and practical critiques, is regarded as imposing laws upon both the natural cosmos and the moral world-order, man is here represented as standing in need of redemption! Thus does the modern pride of life and intellect take on a mediæval gloom. Christianity asserts itself; the religious

life bespeaks its inner need. Human nature is the battle-ground of the evil and the good; by virtue of the latter's victory over evil the kingdom of God is founded. Kant even goes so far as to clothe this ideal kingdom in the garments of ecclesiasticism, regarding the Church as the earthly representative of this realm of redeemed spirits. Thus, where the notions of depravity and redemption centralize in the speculative form of Christianity, the latter's essential nature does not fail to appear. Reaffirming Christianity in general, Kant has had the fate of emphasizing, for current theology, the particular idea of the kingdom of God as peculiar to this form of religion. Modern philosophic thought has thus borne a peculiar fruit. The rationalism of Descartes culminates in the idea of the soul's relation to God; the criticism of Kant, which turned modern thought upside down, settles the individual in the kingdom of God. Now, these ideas, modern as they are, do not fail to be Christian, and it was for the independent treatment of the problem of Christianity that the Enlightenment contended. Thus the present manifests a remarkable condition of things; prominent among its questions stands out this one: What is Christianity? The opening year of the new century finds a Tolstoi saying, Christianity is that which should be affirmed; finds a Nietzsche proclaiming it is that which should be denied with an ever-

lasting nay! But what is this idea which modern thought has made of our Occidental religion? Christianity is indeed a problem.

2. Before there can be any thoroughgoing discussion of essential Christianity, it must be observed that, formally viewed, the latter is peculiar to itself. Such was the indirect confession of Deism as well as of Deism's opponent. How shall we to-day express the unique character of the Christian religion? Historically viewed, Christianity occupies a commanding position in the world. Christianity has conquered history and has adapted it to its own ends; its theory of the world and life are startling. Therein nothing natural or commonplace may be found. Let Christianity be denied, but let it not be said that Christianity is humdrum. All is new; nothing is usual; history repudiates itself. As De Quincey said, a half century ago, "Christian ethics is absolutely untranslatable in a pagan language." To express Christianity, its apostles demand gift of tongues! Where the antique world sought and found comfort in unbelief, Christianity believed that blessedness was to be found in faith alone. Christianity denied the world and affirmed the soul; with this new view and with this new relation a new life arose; that life was Christian. The ancient view became a vice; of the antique bad Christianity made a good. These were the auspices

under which this religion arose; by adhering to it, its followers felt that they were obtaining eternal life. This life was a spiritual one. By means of the principle of spirit, Christianity became what it was destined to be. It was just this idea which Descartes and Kant pursued in projecting their prospective systems; in the case of the one there was set up an opposition of spirit and matter and a certain inclination for pure thought; in that of the other there was a sharp distinction between freedom and law, and an appropriate fondness for imperative duty. Even Deism, in the midst of its blind negations and with its demand for a pure Christianity, was affected by the force of the spiritual principle. In the world and in the soul, with Christian thought and Christian life, the notion of spirit predominates. Because it was not spiritual, the world was denied validity and value; because it was spiritual, the soul outvalued the universe. Faith became the one method of life because it represented the spiritual substance of things hoped for. Infused with spirit, life was transformed; thus it presented new aspirations and new duties; indeed, duty toward the ideal and the desire for the spiritual were hereby created. Universal became the idea and influence of the spirit. Negatively, the idea had challenged ancient speculation; now, in a more positive manner, it became the leading thought of Christianity.

Man became a living spirit; there existed a spiritual realm in which he lived and moved and had his being; even the idea of God, transcendent as the latter was esteemed to be, was defined in terms of spiritual truth.

Characteristic Christianity has ever had its definite doctrines; those branch out from the general idea of spirit. Whether or not we may say that Christianity is the only Theistic religion, it is the only one which *realizes* the idea of God. Valid as may have been the ancient notion of God, it never became the sentiment of worship. Worshipful as the Oriental deities may have been in the heart of man, they could never represent the object of unifying thought. God is Spirit! Here worship and speculation unite, for God is apprehended in spirit and in truth. Such a doctrine may thus be styled theology. Unity, universality, and ideality unite in this overarching principle. But Christianity, as represented by the teaching of its Founder, does not stop with this general notion. The Spirit is a person, a Father. He has a spiritual realm, the kingdom of heaven. Thus Christ's teaching seems to centralize in the idea of God, His kingdom and His Fatherhood; we have a Father in heaven, and He has a kingdom on earth.

The kingdom of God is an idea as spiritual and Christian as the notion of God Himself. Within this realm, within the very precinct of

religion, God is revealed and man is realized. Thus the kingdom represents Divine design and human destiny. At the same time this idea represents the ideal relation of God to man. Not as a covenant-making Deity, who has His peculiar people, nor yet as a national Jahveh, but as a Father of Spirits is God represented. Such a relation is made possible by the idea of the kingdom. In the same, no violence is done to the absoluteness of God nor to the freedom of man as an ethical subject. The kingdom is the goal of life, when that life is regarded from the spiritual standpoint; blessedness is attained by those who, poor in spirit and pursuing righteousness even unto persecution, enter the kingdom of heaven. At the same time this kingdom stands for the end of creation and the ultimate aim of God. Aiming to make manifest the very mind of God, and anxious to content the spiritual aspirations of the soul, Christ had no better thought than that which He expressed by the heavenly kingdom. He turned away from the world, denying its value; and this was because He trusted in a spiritual realm which was not of this world. The believer in Christianity was exhorted to lose this earthly life and to find it elsewhere; where could that life be attained if not in the kingdom of God? For Christ and His teaching the kingdom was equal to, was more than, the

ancient idea of the cosmos or the modern idea of nature.

In discussing the other idea which goes to make up the essence of Christianity some caution must be exercised. The idea must be limited, and must be subordinated to the general idea of God and related to the companion idea of the kingdom. Fatherhood must not stand for a sentiment, but rather for an idea. Popular thought, in striving to identify the principles of Christianity, has made this idea vapid and invertebrate. Certainly the Fatherhood of God is a teaching of Christianity; to understand it, however, we must subsume it to the idea of God as Spirit, just as we must parallel it to the notion of the kingdom. Hereby the idea of Fatherhood becomes spiritualized and rendered universal; on the other hand, the idea of Fatherhood contributes the principles of personality, and thus God and His kingdom, as ideas, are made more tenable philosophically and more valuable for the religious consciousness. Because it is the Father's, the kingdom is come nigh us; we worship the Spirit because it is not abstract, but personal and paternal. Outlining His doctrine, Christ ever kept in the shadow of this great idea; but He did not denominate it a religion; He simply called it life. This He idealized by making it divine. Because it is thus life, Christianity is not a theory; in history the Spirit,

alive in God and awakening in humanity, makes its presence felt, and hereby is Christianity realized.

With its principle of spiritual life, Christianity is clearly historical; by virtue of such a method it solves its own problem, but at the same time it gives rise to a searching question: How may religion, spiritual, universal, and eternal as it must be, become a part of history, which deals with the contingent, the temporal, the definite? When we aim to regard historical Christianity *sub specie religionis* we feel that, to be a religion, it must likewise be surveyed *sub specie æternitatis*. Herein arises a problem; herein is concealed a conflict. Present-day thought seems more favorably disposed toward the historical view than was the Enlightenment, which looked upon true Christianity as being as old as the creation. But current evolutionary science, as well as historical philosophy, is not within its antipathies. Where, for its part, the Enlightenment was inimical to historical progress, because it seemed to suggest incompleteness, our thought, infused with the general idea of development, can find no room for the definite and positive. What, then, becomes of a Christianity which is, above all things, a thoroughly historical form of religion? In answering this penetrating question we can not remain content with an ancient formalism, which viewed all

things as at rest, or with modern dynamism, which sets all things in motion. Such views discount all spiritual values and do violence to even history itself. Thus the problem becomes twofold: we must validate and evaluate history; with its principles, religion must be described. When we seek to conserve the abiding character of Christianity we do not make void the works of history; nay, we establish history! Christianity has created history. To work out its leading ideas—the Divine Father, the heavenly kingdom—and to make these vital and vivid, Christianity originated the historical method. Of this latter, pagan speculation and Oriental worship were wholly unaware. But Christianity, by a direct appeal to universal history, relates the Heavenly Father to those subjects which make up His kingdom. In its endeavor to do justice to the nature and character of the eternal God, Christianity had recourse to that which, in pagan and Oriental thought, had been neglected and despised. Spiritual life, which can not reside in the world, abides in history. Hereby historical Christianity has been justified and religion realized. Double is the victory which has been won. Religion in general, with its ideas of the spiritual and the absolute, becomes united with a Christianity which has grown out of temporal conditions. The Eternal appears arrayed in the garments of the passing years. In the tran-

scendent principle of spirit, both abstract speculation and contingent experience are excelled, and thereby has Christianity been made what it is: the religion of universal spiritual life. Achieving an historical method, Christianity has not failed to deal magisterially with actual historical conditions. It has set up a dualism in the course of universal history, and has exalted a single period above all historical progress. To exist as the religion of spirit it became necessary for original Christianity to differentiate itself from the past. Such a breach was as rough as it was inevitable. Past and present were at variance; then and now were forever divided, for a catastrophe had taken place. All who had come before were thieves and robbers. But such a chasm was only the work of a new beginning; the negation of the past was only for the affirmation of the present; Christ is best represented as the second Adam, who, awakening in the kingdom of heaven, becomes as God, knowing good and evil. But Christian life and Christian thought confess this; everywhere the impression of newness and originality was made, and it was this which caused the tragedy of Christianity.

Christianity does not pause with the dualism of historical occurrence, but culminates in a single period. In this sense it may be said that this religion breaks away from what followed it

in the same way as it broke with the past. Thus Christianity represents not merely a cataclysm, but a culmination. Such a view is necessary to spiritual religion, and at the same time is worthy of history. We see that we are not dealing with a purely prosaic becoming, but with a movement which is characteristic and rich in events. Christianity is thus classic in the history of religion; subsequent ages must take their point of departure from this one sublime event. If chronology and evolution are not satisfied thereby, the religious consciousness, which is free in its movements and is more anxious to find spiritual value than it is to work out any abstract scheme of natural development, remains content. And religion pursues such a peculiar method of concentration because thereby it encounters a personality which gives evidence of spiritual reality and communicates religious influence. Concentration is thus for the sake, not of a period, but a person.

3. The spiritual becomes personal. In the general analysis of Christianity, as well as in the latter's peculiar relation to history, such a direct view could not be established. Christianity refers to its Christ, and so intimate is the principle of spirit in the religious consciousness that the appeal to the person of Jesus causes only gratification. It is thus that this form of religion becomes twofold: Christian thought centers in

the idea of God's kingdom and Fatherhood; Christian life clings to Christ, His person and work. Thus he who will philosophize about Christianity must prepare himself for its two-fold tendency. There is a belief *of* Christ, which He exercised and bade His disciples share with Him, and there is a belief *on* Christ, which arose from the infinite attractiveness of His personality. The one is the Christianity of the evangelists; the other belongs to the Epistles. Christ anticipated, and even created, this double moment, when he counseled, "Ye believe in God, believe also in Me." As a result of His teaching and His career there arose a written life of Jesus, and a life which was hid in Christ. By His teaching, religion in general was affected; through His person there was made possible a doctrine of theology. Christian thought is directed toward God, His Fatherhood and kingdom. Christian life is inclined toward the person and work of Christ. The thought of Christendom has never overcome this breach. Herein has arisen, in modern times, many a controversy. Within the Church, the apostolic belief on Christ has predominated; within the Church, much has been said about the principles of Christ's own belief and teachings. Secular thought has exhorted, "Back to the Gospel." Sacerdotal faith has viewed these writings from the indirect standpoint of apostolic teaching. This distinc-

tion has become a dispute. Lessing turned away from the "Christian religion" to the "religion of Christ." Deism set up the latter, to which its orthodox opponents, as Butler, opposed the former. But the works which such a conflict made then, and makes now, are only skin-deep. When the principles of Christian thought, as this was aroused by Jesus, are composed with the features of the life with Him, there results a harmony and an unlookedfor completeness. Christ's heart was in His teaching, so that He and His doctrine are one. Analyze His ideas; compare with them the impressions which He made, and therein may be found the essence of Christianity. The dualism of Gospel and Epistle, the opposition of evangelist to apostle, is a view which the philosophy of Christianity can not abide. A complete view of this peculiar form of religion must adjust these; the natural unfolding of Christianity shows how this may be done. Christ, as a teacher, originated spiritual principles; believing in this double form of Divine truth, Christ worked and suffered. Christ's own belief made Him what He was, caused Him to carry out His plan in history. His belief in His Father made His personality characteristic; His belief in His Father's will led Him to establish the kingdom. He and the Father, whom He believed and revealed, were one. Now, when apostolic Christianity developed its belief in

Christ it was a faith in a Person who had, in history, led a spiritual life guided by the idea of the Father's kingdom. Such belief, while it was not the same as Christ's own faith as proclaimed by Him, was not empty, but characteristic of Christianity as it then was—the Father's kingdom. Thus there is an inherent connection between the belief communicated by Christ and the faith inspired by Him. Apostolic Christianity must proceed from the evangel.

Epistolary Christianity believes in Christ's person and work, but does not see that these represent ideas and impulses which are to be found and understood in the evangelists' account of Christ's life and work. Christ, let it never be forgotten, believed in God's Fatherhood and kingdom; Christ's apostles believed in His person and work. Now, here is a natural connection. The person of Christ, not merely as a belief in the minds of His followers, but as a fact in the life of Christ Himself, resulted from Christ's belief in God as His Father. When the apostles, advancing beyond the belief in Jesus as the Messiah, reverently regarded Him as the Son of God, they expressed an idea which was, and is, meaningless, unless it be united with that of the Fatherhood of God. Obedient unto God, He would not drink of the blood of the grape till He drank it anew, with His disciples, in the kingdom of His Father. Trusting in God's king-

dom, Christ became obedient unto the death of of a cross. Why was the crucifixion inflicted? "My kingdom is not of this world." The accusation, written in a threefold tongue, was, "The King of the Jews." When apostolic Christianity theorizes about the value of Christ's death it refers to a tragic event which resulted from the promulgation of the kingdom-doctrine. Like the personal life of Christ, the death was characteristic, being in harmony with His teaching. To believe in Christ, His person and His work, is to believe in God, His kingdom and His Fatherhood.

Christianity represents a unity; it sets up an ideal and a goal: this is what it should do. Thus far in its history Christianity has ministered unto life, individual and social; it has given man a form of worship, and has bestowed upon society a Church. This is, indeed, a part of its mission; but is it all? Why should not the Christian religion give birth to a living philosophy? It has been a method of thinking, and has thus contributed the most salient elements of many an Occidental system of thought. At the same time Christianity has expressed, though indirectly, certain definite speculative principles, spirit being perhaps the most inclusive of them. But spirit in general may be somewhat further defined as signifying, in its nature, inwardness; in its character, value.

Christianity has distinguished from the natural, the supernatural; from the bad, the good. The soul has been emancipated and related to a new realm and having a new and true form of life. Though indistinctly, the kingdom of spirit has been made as systematic as the ancient cosmos or modern nature. Such achievements as these deserve logical treatment. The concepts of Christianity may be concrete and organic, but they do not suffer thereby; they demand serious consideration, and the future of Christianity as a life seems to depend upon the possibilities of Christianity as a method of thought and a form of culture.

Chapter VIII.

THE CRISIS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

No general study of ethical method, no particular inquiry into Christian ethics, as a theological discipline, can present the crisis which has been reached. Slow as the history of ethical speculation has been, it has at last produced a situation which is intense. To appreciate this, no study of the problem can be more significant than that which history proposes. When the historical idea is applied to the ethical problem, the result will be only another phase of that general conclusion which a study of human culture forces upon us; namely, at its inception, Christian ethics set up a sharp contrast to the practical ideals of Paganism, and that to-day we are feeling the force of this dualism in the form of conflicting ethical theories. Apart from any psychological analysis of ethical principles, the study of the latters' origin and development will suffice to show that the method of Christianity has ever been so vigorous and uncompromising that only by departing from classical and traditional ideals, and aligning a new moral

principle, are we able to set ourselves aright in the eyes of our modern thought, where the crisis is now felt.

1. Christianity wrought out its enormous contrast to Paganism by making certain deadly distinctions and changing common views. The distinction made was that between mind and body, or the spiritual and material, as also that between good and bad. As a result, mankind began to look in another direction for its happiness, just as it began to seek another end as the goal of human life. That which was calculated to follow was a complete reversal of moral ideas and ethical standards. Dark became light, pleasure turned to pain, virtue seemed to be vice, and value was altogether vanity. Mediæval and modern writers have not been wanting in fit expressions to characterize this gigantic change. Tertullian styled the virtues of the ancient splendid vices—*virtutes veterum vitia splendida*—and the Antinomians put the paradox of Christian virtue to a practical test. On the other hand, when the Renaissance endeavored to rehabilitate Pagan morality, the contrast with Christianity appeared in a most shocking form. To-day, Nietzsche has concentrated the whole spirit of Christianity's struggle for a new morality by calling the latter "*Die Umwertung aller Werthe*" —"The transvaluation of all values." Since we are now so conscious of Christianity, its ethical

problem assumes a tremendous importance, and we are beginning to look for a new morality.

All this has come about by virtue of certain distinctions which in the mind of Christ seem obvious. Chief among these was the antagonism which He set up between mind and body, and in pursuing this, as He did habitually, He presented the peculiar spectacle of the soul repudiating itself. The manner in which this was brought about receives its immortal expression in the startling question, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" When once this was uttered, the unity of the world received its first statement, and an epoch in spiritual life was created; at the same time the positive side of the declaration affirmed the inner unity of the personal world-order, while the matter was made more serious by reason of the fact that these two realms were represented as a kingdom divided against itself. So far as the person of Jesus is here involved, it may further be noted that the Author of this great value-judgment did not hesitate to place Himself in the same critical position in which the disciple would soon find himself; for He concluded His mission among men with the cheerful announcement, "I have overcome the world."

This principle of Jesus was startling, not only by reason of its novelty—for that might

wear off—but on account of its fundamental character. No consistent follower of the ancient Academy could have considered the proposition for a moment; because this Syrian idealism did not end until it had sundered man from the world, and set up an abiding contrast within his own soul. Christ's principle further deepened into a plan in the light of which the strong ethical trend of His message began to appear. With the soul rendered independent of the life of the world, it is now said by way of practical conclusion, "Whosoever will save his life, shall lose it." This life, or soul, is the one which is man's by reason of his being in the natural order, and, since Christ has repudiated the world, He can only conclude that life therein is a vain and fruitless pursuit. "Whosoever will lose His life for My sake, shall find it,"—such is the restoration of the soul in its other and truer habitat. It was in this connection that Christ effected the transvaluation of love and hate, of profit and loss, of losing and saving, and hereby He makes practical use of His fundamental distinction between the world and the soul.

Upon the psychological side, this program of spiritual life led to the identification of an inner standard of validity and value, and this inwardness at once became the symbol of spiritual life. It was not so much subjectivity as it was personality; it was the furtherance of

that spiritual motive which inspired the Founder of Christianity to emancipate the soul from the world. Subsequent speculation did not grasp the whole meaning of this principle, but it did not fail to discover the idea of liberty which we have had for a long time in the form of a puzzling problem; the freedom of the will. To be a spirit is to be free; to be a soul means to exercise a free will,—such was the immediate conclusion at which patristic thought arrived. But there was behind this an ethical motive which made of freedom, not only a conclusion, but a demand. Since man has a spiritual destiny and his present life represents a crisis, there is no meaning in the obligation to choose the good unless it is assumed that the will is free. And when the awful weight of responsibility rests upon the soul of man, his nature cries out for freedom to fulfill his destiny.

To express this series of ideas—the principle and the plan, spirituality and freedom—Christ made use of this thought: the kingdom of God. If man must renounce his life in the world, he may come to himself and realize his destiny in the kingdom, which is not of this world. Furthermore, the kingdom is the means by which the apparent paradoxes of Christ's teaching are explained, and its problems solved. Freedom of the will, which is no mere possibility of fitful choice on the part of man, but a consistent at-

titude of his nature, is the corollary of spiritual life and a postulate of the kingdom. By employing this vast idea, the difficulty which concerns Divine sovereignty and human freedom is dispelled; to such an end is it used by Ritschl and Lipsius. Man is free, not that he may be arbitrary, but that he may be ethical; and his destiny, when sufficiently conceived, is related to that order of spiritual life called the kingdom. But so it is, likewise with the sovereignty of God, whose will is urged, not by the absolutism of a mere monarch, but in the light of righteousness; such righteousness is realized in the kingdom of heaven. In this way, Divine design and human destiny, when interpreted by Christ, are explained in the form of the kingdom, by virtue of which thought they are further justified. Separated from the kingdom of this world, man in all his freedom is reconciled to God in the kingdom of heaven.

The weighty part which the idea of the kingdom plays in the Gospel may further be expressed by drawing away from the political suggestion contained in the term and regarding the matter in a more psychological light. It is the motive of the kingdom which Christ employs when He negates the world's value, and counsels the soul to effect his spiritual existence by a process of renunciation; and it is this very hope which He has in mind, when He is speaking of

the Father. Current thought, imbued with the spirit of natural science, loves to dwell upon the idea that God is the "World-Ground," as if religion were at all interested in the existence of the natural order. By pursuing the idea of the kingdom, we see that it can not be made to assume the rôle of such immanent causation, but is more consistently regarded as an ethical or spiritual world-order. The universality of God and His absolute character are not expressed in the impersonal conception of a world-ground, nor yet in the merely personal manner of the individual consciousness, but best of all in that richer thought of spirit which in its historical interpretation makes man's mind a kingdom to himself and considers the Divine Spirit in the form of a kingdom of God. In such an ideal realm of personal and spiritual life, man is free while God is absolute.

Upon the practical side, Christ made another fatal distinction in the realm of human life,—that of good and bad. This He presented in a manner so novel and fundamental that it finds no counterpart in the history of religion, not even in the case of Persian dualism. Whether the latter had any more profound source than that of a social rupture between Indian and Iranian branches of the Aryan family, as a result of which the deity of the one became the demon of the other, we can not now inquire. It is suffi-

cient to point out that with Zarathustra, the dualism was not such as to rend the heart of man and place him in a spiritually critical position, but was so imaginary that it was regarded as a dualism of deity—Ahura Mazda and Ahrimian. Christ's distinction, which is never thus vainly applied to God, is a veritable diremption which seizes the ethical consciousness of man, producing a misery which can not be relieved until the Divine Being redeems him. To speak of a Divine dualism was far from the thought of Christ, who employed this divisive concept only to indicate that opposition of sense and spirit which man's finiteness imposes upon him.

The essential antinomy of human life was thus represented by Christ in connection with His distinction of inner and outer, and the surprising manner in which this appears can be seen when we recall some of His unrelenting characterizations. What literature can match the startling, if not strident, descriptions of the Pharisees which the words of Jesus here afford? Without, they are whitened sepulchers, fair to behold; within, they are full of dead men's bones and all uncleanness. Formally and organically, man is wrong; yet it is not that which entereth into man that defileth him, but that which comes forth from him, and out of the heart proceedeth the evil. So uncompromising is the fashion in which Christ pursues this pessimistic interpreta-

tion that it becomes impossible to consider the bad in any but a positive sense. No mere limitation of the good, no temporary mishap on the part of man, but organic to him and native to his will, must the bad be regarded. The higher the ideal, which is couched in the thought of the kingdom, the lower is the actual condition of man who is all-too-human; situated between the good and the bad, man's life presents a sharp "either—or," and an endless conflict, which can terminate only when God Himself intervenes.

Such a method of ethical reasoning could not fail to produce astonishing results within the realm of actual morality, Christ having condemned the Pharisee for his formal righteousness, St. Paul evinces the paradoxical condition of those who directly and outwardly pursue the good. The Gentiles which followed not after righteousness have attained to righteousness; but Israel, which followed the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Such an extraordinary conclusion could follow only after one has adopted a new standard, which in St. Paul was the standard of faith, with Christ the general principle of spiritual life. Christ Himself, in His parable of the vineyard, was the author of the extreme conclusion of this theory. Of the two sons, one who said, "I go, sir," and went not; and the other who said, "I will not," but went, the second was the

better. By parity of reasoning, it is concluded that publicans and harlots enter the kingdom of God before scribes and Pharisees, and thus it comes about that, in the spiritual world, the highest unites with the lowest, and the slums of the earth are fit for the kingdom of heaven.

To justify this antinomian logic, there is now introduced the principle of repentance, *metanoia,* which makes it necessary for man to repudiate himself. In *metanoia* may be found a means of that transvaluation which everywhere marks the ethical side of Christianity. Man has tried to gain the whole world, but he has lost his own soul; he has sought to save his life, but has lost it; he has lived the outward life, and has lost the inner one; therefore, he must repent. The attitude in which man finds himself is more extraordinary than that of a categorical imperative which says, "Act as if the maxim of thy conduct were to become a universal law." For, the subject of *metanoia* must negate world and self, and then create a new order of life; beneath nature and above man, there must take place a movement which shall completely reverse the given order. No counsel of Rousseau to return to nature could compare with the intrepidity of this new ethical command of *metanoia,* which was calculated to bring about the destruction of the existing order and the creation of a new one.

Upon the virtues and values of the Judean and Roman world was this destined to bring about infinite reaction.

2. The destruction of current morality was brought about by Christianity which, as a movement, seemed to be serene while yet it was seismic. Before particular virtues could be invaded, the general attitude of man toward humanity must be examined, and Christ have renounced resentment in favor of love. The essential grounds of non-resentment appear only when we remember the vigorous distinctions which Christ made between the spiritually good and the materially bad; but even then the problem is not wholly solved. How does it come about that the Church has ever found it necessary to contend for the miracles wrought by Christ, but has never been anxious about the ethical ideals which He sought to inculcate? In both cases, the physical and the moral, His deeds are seemingly at variance with our laws of physics and ethics, and the commands given to the disciples are no less a stumbling block than the miracles of Galilee; for this reason it must be seen that we have indeed reached a crisis in Christian ethics, no less imminent than the crisis of Christian metaphysics. The ethical violation of law projected in the Sermon on the Mount can not easily be explained away; for our sense of right, like our idea of order, is wounded by

these imperatives which set at naught, not only the *lex talionis,* but even justice itself.

No ethical theory did or could Jesus give to justify His marvelous maxims, yet these seem to follow from the spiritual principles which Christianity lays down. Man must not lose his soul, though thereby he gain the world; now, to save life, or soul, is to lose it. According to St. John, who of all the evangelists was the most psychological, this central maxim is expressed in terms of love and hate, as follows: He that loveth his life shall lose it, but he that hateth his life shall keep it. Under such serious auspices as these does Jesus proceed to lay down the laws of non-resentment. Man is to love the other and hate the self, and he that loveth self and hateth the other must lose his soul. Furthermore, Christ, in His dual commandment to love, includes, under the head of the *alter,* both God and the neighbor, so that the *alter ego* assumes an unwonted importance before the conscience of man. Clearly Christ was not giving advice, but was revealing a law which was based upon the very foundations of the spiritual order whose presence filled His mind, and when He surveyed humanity under the form of the kingdom He could only conclude that hate should turn toward self and love toward the non-self.

Without the wall of Christianity we do not fail to find parallel maxims; indeed, all exalted forms

of human religion seem to press on toward a realm of love within and peace without. Laotze adorns his Tâoism with this high principle, and, as a result, he not only approaches Christ, but distinguishes himself from Confucius. The Tâo-Teh King evinces the ideal of non-resentment when, in the sixty-third chapter, it says: "It is the way of Tâo to recompense injury with kindness." Here the mind of Confucius took exception, and the thirty-sixth chapter of the Analects files the following protest: "Some one said, 'What do you say concerning the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness?' The Master said, 'Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness.' "

In the same way Buddhism transcends the code of Manu, and the first chapter of the Dhammapada makes the serene announcement, "Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by love, this is an *old rule.*" Christianity, however, has more than the ideal of Tâo and Dhamma, since the love of enemies is an attribute of God and a characteristic of Christ who was full of grace and truth.

How fundamental, then, does the love of enemies seem to be! Tolstoi celebrates it as an attractive program for a new social order, and, with that peculiar mingling of pessimism and optimism which almost every disciple of Schopenhauer experiences, he declares that the principle

of non-resentment is not only a vastly superior ideal to that which we now entertain, but a scheme more serviceable than the one which we are now following. To Tolstoi, the world of non-resentment is a genuine metapolitical order of things, and as a *vox clamantis in deserto* he proclaims that the kingdom of heaven is at hand. That which ever prevents it is not the presence of evil but the fact of a false social system which leads us to distrust the ethical system of Christ.

Such a conception of a new order of life, where non-resentment dominates, is discussed by Rudolph Eucken in his "*Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion.*" The whole trend of Eucken's philosophy, which consists of a new idealism, is in the direction of *Geistesleben,* apprehended in the form of culture. This culture is the very expression of humanity's being and the essential principle of its development; on this account it does not consist in the imparting of form as with the ancients, or the development of faculty as is the case of the modern, but in the unfolding of spiritual culture (*Wesensbildung*). Hereby a new world will be revealed, which in all its profundity is indicated by the principle of non-resentment (*Feindesliebe*). This is an empty phrase unless its meaning be expressed in a genuine fashion, as the principle of a new order. "The longing after a new order of things, which lies beyond conflict and which dispels confusion and hate

from the community of peace, is one which forcefully seizes humanity. Here the love of enemies is able to burst forth, but it can do this only under the presentation and appropriation of a new order of things; it demands a new world." Not as a mere possibility or ideal, but as the moving principle of the world of reality, is the kingdom of love to be portrayed. To bring this about, a revaluation of life was made necessary.

The point of resistance for such a new view of life was found in the ethical realm; here a new principle of spiritual life had its effect upon the cardinal virtues of the ancients. In the case of Plato, these virtues were regarded as though they constituted a metapolitical order in an aristocratic State, formed by the artistic reflection of the Grecian; at the same time, their root was to be found in the depths of a nature at once cosmic and microcosmic. From the bodily principle, manifest in desire and marked by the virtue of temperance, there was developed the class of artisans; from the soul-principle in the world and the will in man came courage as the warrior's virtue; while from mind and reason sprang wisdom as a virtue and the philosopher as statesman. Striking, indeed, is the position of justice, which has no root in nature or man, and can find no class capable of administering it; and it is here that the ideal Republic is shattered. From the standpoint of the kingdom these virtues were

inimical to the spiritual life of humanity, and the New Testament, which never goes out of its way to comment upon alien systems of life, still does not fail to propound a view of conduct which is in direct opposition to the fourfold system of virtue made so glorious by Plato.

For the Greek, with his plastic instincts, his gymnastic practices, and his general love of life, all important was the virtue of temperance. By practicing it man was rendered capable of using and enjoying his body to the highest possible degree, in the most feasible fashion. In general, the Gentile was known to the Jew of Christ's day as one who was prone to ask: What shall we eat? What shall we drink? Wherewithal shall we be clothed? How surprising, then, the stern admonitions of Him who counseled to take no thought of the day, but to seek first the kingdom of God! How destructive the commandments to cut off the hand, or pluck out the eye, and cast both into the fire, while man, maimed and blind, enters into life! The Republic of Plato would have as little use for the imprudent torsos as the kingdom of Christ for the fine but soulless pagans; and if both aim at the perfection of man, they do so in accordance with methods which are strictly in discord. Subjective, romantic Christianity, bent upon the ideal and pursuing the remote interest, could not

dally with a system which is all form and outward measure.

Ancient militarism, with its code of courage, fares no better with the Christian system founded by Him who advocated peace on earth and goodwill to men. Christianity does not decry courage as a virtue; it simply has no more room for it than a Republic has for the title of royalty or the political prowess of monarchy. Christendom has ever played with the Sermon on the Mount, which is so set against the *lex talionis*. Resist not evil; smitten on the one cheek, turn the other also; robbed of the cloak, give the coat; compelled to walk a mile, go twain. These are matchless methods of transcending courage, which has no more place in the system of Christ than the virtue of temperance. In the case of courage, it is not a matter of suffering wrong so much as it is an affair of outdoing the ill by a contrary act. A blow for a blow, like an eye for an eye, but the second blow falls upon him who received the first. A coat for a cloak, indeed, but the coat of him who has already lost his outer garment. A mile for a mile, but he who has just gone one goes twain. Such was the spiritual irony of Christ.

Wisdom was another virtue upon which the Grecian prides himself, and here was another place where Christ brought about transvaluation. Socrates himself was wont to suggest something

of this sort in his assumption of an ignorance which finally turned out to be wiser than the knowledge of his interlocutor; but Socrates is outdone by St. Paul. This apostle makes an unfavorable comparison of wisdom and foolishness, with the result of showing that a worldly wisdom which knows not God is inferior to foolishness. In place of σωφία we now find μωρία. With respect to Christianity as a system, it may perhaps be said that the discountenancing of the intellect was due to the fact that Athenian speculation had been unable to evince the idea of unity with respect to the world, the soul, or the world-soul; at the same time it may be urged that the practical character of this religion was such as to render it cold to the claims of the understanding. These, however, are thoughts which did not arise in the mind of Him whose conception of the kingdom was arrived at by no process of speculation, whether negative or positive. The mind of Christ was directed toward the world of realms transcending the cosmic order; hence, any virtue of wisdom which must have its relation to human experience would be set aside.

Finally, justice goes down in the general defeat of pagan morality, while love secures itself in the kingdom of God, whose sun and rain bless both just and unjust. Christ's attitude toward historical law is indicative of His superior con-

ception of human life and its relations, and His treatment of murder and adultery, wherein He shows that the inner attitude as well as the overt act is sinful, reveals the perfect consistency of His idealism. It is very easy for the legalist to say that man shall not do wrong, but how magisterial must be the mind which counsels him to suffer wrong! Such an extraordinary view is seen in the Sermon on the Mount, where both courage, which is the heart of militancy, and justice, which is the soul of statehood, are annihilated. Christ passes over the case of wrong-doers taken in sin, for they are their own condemnation, and hastens to criticise people who justify self and proclaim self-righteousness; He counsels man to judge not, and blames him for not judging self. Such reasoning, in total variance with the Roman law with which subsequently it was to be associated, is yet in harmony with the principle and plan of the kingdom not of this world, where man is to hate himself and love the other. Having counseled man to love his enemies, Christ brings all to a fitting climax when He tells man to be perfect, even as God is perfect.

3. The general, or formal, result of the Christian system was to change the apprehending of the ethical from virtue to value. Such a change was not of word only, but of essential significance; for virtue is a plastic ideal formed

from without, while value is an inner principle which man finds as the leading feature of his life as humanity. The kingdom is as seed sown in the ground, as a treasure hidden in the field, and it is for man to act the part of a finder, and thus, out of the depths of reality, bring to light the hidden meaning of spiritual life. As a world of value must the kingdom be understood; these values come from God, but are realized only as they are discovered by man. Modern ethical theories have ever been as dynamic as the ancient ones were plastic. Our ethical problem consists in doing rather than in knowing, in pursuing rather than in possessing, and our moralists spur man onward by applying to him either rationalistic duty or hedonic desire. The imperfection of such a system of moral counsel consists in the ever-present tendency to consider life as though it had no attainable goal, and man as though he had no destiny. What is needed is the introduction of the Christian principle of valuation, which, however, can only reverse many of our most cardinal ideas.

Our thought to-day bristles with these ideas and terms of revaluation: *Umkehrung der Werte —Umwertung aller Werte.* If these have any force and meaning, it is because we are awakening to the change which Christianity has made in the world. Its fundamental distinction between soul and world, as well as its uncompromis-

ing separation of good and bad, have led to the thought of a new valuation; it is this form which has impressed itself upon our current ethics, where the difference between value and vanity is beginning to be realized. On the one hand, Christ, like the preacher, declares: Vanity of vanities, all of the world is vanity. On the other, like the prophet, He announces: Value of values, all in the spiritual order is of value. The true valuation relates to the facts and relations of inner personal life, and the transvaluation which Christ brought about, instead of consisting in an indefinite and incalculable change of ideals, was made up of a complete and consistent reversal, which made man's life to consist, not in the abundance of things, but in the fullness of spirit; not in the entirety of the world, but in the integrity of the soul.

Current value-theories have made much progress in the realms of economics and psychology, perhaps also in certain phases of theology. But, for the most part, these formulations of the value-problems are partial and inadequate. They engage themselves in inquiring whether the form of value consists in an act of valuation or in a value-judgment, whether the content is made up of pleasure or desire. In quarters where theological rather than economic interests prevail, the dispute, instead of being psychological, relates to the logical and ethical

side of the question; here value-judgments enter in to fill the gap caused by the skeptical withdrawing of metaphysical judgments of validity. But the security of the value-judgment can not be found in a psychology which depends upon the fleeting facts of empirical consciousness, or in a theology which is wholly negative in its attitude toward metaphysics. For the value-judgment to exist, it must accept the truth of the soul which expresses such judgment, while it must further go on to postulate the conservation of value in a supramundane order of spiritual life. Then, and then only, can we appreciate the vast principle of Jesus which so universalizes the soul of man that the latter is able to transcend the world in its entirety. Then, ethical skepticism may be set aside by the declaration, a man may be profitable unto God, and it is pleasure to the Almighty that he is righteous.

Upon the darker side there appears the idea of vanity, which serves to express in a traditional fashion that which to-day would be called nihilism. Such nihilism, instead of assuming the rough form of a vicious political doctrine, may appear in the finer phase of an ethical skepticism, where the causality and consequence of virtue seem to be null and impotent. Unhappy the condition of a people, perilous the position of an individual, when ethical skepticism seizes the mind and reduces its motives and principles

to nothing. Such nihilism threatens the ethical order to-day, when traditional ethical schools are lapsing and new forms of actual unrighteousness inflict themselves upon the heart of humanity. The ethics of Christ, itself in a critical position, is calculated to meet this situation and to deal with it in sufficient manner. It is now a problem, not of a speculative being or non-being, but of value and nihilism, and the very essence of the Gospel contains the heart of the inquiry. In the mind of Christ there was the idea of a supreme valuation in his comparison of the advantages of soul and world, and there was somewhat of nihilism in the intrepid declaration that the world profits nothing to the soul. The future of Christianity may be determined in part in connection with ethics; here world-values and soul-values will have to be determined and adjusted.

Chapter IX.

CHRISTIANITY AND EGOISM.

The emphasis which Christianity lays upon the soul tends to separate humanity from nature, and does not fail to distinguish the individual from society. For this reason, something like egoism seems to be advocated in the New Testament, although the latter is never found wanting in maxims of benevolence. As a problem, egoism belongs to Christianity rather than to the pagan or Oriental worlds, where the individual has not been emancipated; and, as a conscious question, it makes up one of the most significant phases of our modern philosophy. While Descartes was drawing his line of distinction between the realms of mind and matter, Hobbes was showing how great is the gulf between the individual and the State; so that, from the early seventeenth century to the present, it has been a problem for ethics to determine how man may be dislodged from his egoistic position. The offset to egoism is altruism, which seeks to make of the ego an alter; just as the counterbalance to dualism is monism, which tries to identify mind and body.

Christianity, however, is no more altruistic than it is egoistic, and the cure of egoism which Christianity proposes is a form of spiritual life quite distinct from altruism.

1. Among modern ethical systems, nothing can be more striking than the respective claims of egoism and altruism as put forth by Butler and Adam Smith. In contending for the moral rights of self-love, Butler makes his claim more substantial by considering the latter in the form of "reasonable self-love," which, as he goes on to declare, is just as likely to be neglected as the love for others. It is because man neglects self that Butler regards self-love as a virtue, and puts it upon almost the same level as conscience. Smith considers sympathy, which he regards as though it were capable of producing in man the sense of duty. Such sympathy, while of a natural order, is limited by the idea of propriety, so that we weep or rejoice with those who are sad or gay in proportion to the propriety of their own sentiments. Propriety thus indicates merit, and, when this standard is applied to one's own self, the result is the sense of duty. It is in this way that Smith, starting with mere sympathy, ends with duty, just as Butler departs from conscience to attain reasonable self-love. That which each postulates is the rational nature of man; and thus, by comparing egoism and altruism, not with each other, but with man's

essential nature, their arguments are not wholly inconsequent.

As the doctrine of autonomy or heteronomy, the question of egoism and altruism assumes a different form. The "autos" is not the ego, the "heteros" is not the other in the sense of being an alter. Still it is generally true that the heteronomist, who believs that morality is based upon some extra-moral principle, believes in altruism in a manner unknown to the autonomist. The case of Hume and Kant is in this connection almost as instructive as in the theoretical question concerning the principle of causality. Hume urged that an act could not be moral unless performed from some other than a moral motive, by which "other" he meant a hedonistic one. Such a contention leads to the thought that we love, not for the sake of a virtue of benevolence, but because of the value of the act in itself; we are temperate for the sake of the benefits of this virtue rather than for the virtue itself. Kant's view was antipodal; for he declared that unless an act of love is performed for the sake of its formal ethical character, it is not moral, but pathological. With Hume, love must be blind to the moral faults of the favored person; with Kant, justice must be blindfolded to the personal claims of the purely ethical alter.

Man's relation to his alter and the individual's position in humanity have been discussed

too casually by our modern ethical schools. Intuitionism has been too careless of the real significance of the morality whose form it has been so anxious to defend, and as a result it has considered the ethical relation of man as an abstract one, and his moral deed as though it affected no one but himself. In this way autonomy has fostered egoism. On the other hand, altruism has been exaggerated by the utilitarian, who has endeavored to serve man while not being able to contribute any essential benefit, and for this reason altruism is as fruitless as egoism. Inasmuch as each fails to postulate humanity, but regards man as a being affected by pleasure and pain only, egoism and altruism do not even state the problem which they assume to solve. Man's relation to his fellow is a relation of reason to reason, wherein the ideal of each is involved, and his duty is not to please the arbitrary will of the individual, but rather to satisfy the demands of the latter's human nature.

The physical reconciliation of the two opposed doctrines has the value of canceling a crude egoism and an insufficient altruism, but does not point out the way to a consistent philosophy of life. It may be said that the form of human life is necessarily egoistic, and the man must be himself before he can give himself or contribute his services. Nature, which is intent upon the species, forces the individual to pursue his own

physical needs in order that he may play his organic part in the world. On the other hand, since the individual belongs to the species and the man is a member of the tribe, the content of life is social, and, that, apart from any consciously altruistic endeavor that the individual may put forth. It is for the man's interest to live in society, and his very being finds its pleasures in connection with others like himself; so that by comparing the individual with society and society with the individual, the first appearance of opposition is removed. Egoism defeats altruism, and altruism defeats egoism at the same time, and such will ever be the result of a conflict carried on upon the purely physical level; it can only end in a truce. Evolutionary philosophy promises that such a truce will eventually assume the form of perpetual peace. Apart from the insecurity of such a method, it may be questioned whether this "reconciliation," which seems to overcome egoism, really advances man beyond himself. So far as the argument goes, it appears to lapse into an ipsesism which falls short of the humanity of the individual.

It was the idea of Mill that when each sought his own happiness, all would be seeking the common happiness; but the obvious fallacy of composition is such as to vitiate in theory what is so false to common experience. When, however, we conceive of each ego as aiming at the moral

world-order as his goal, egoism is more easily reconciled to altruism; for the ethical goal of the individual is then identified with the same good of humanity. We do not ask that others love us unless their love is so universal as to include God; and we are satisfied that they can never do us harm, but only confer benefit, when they love the ethical law. That which makes up the true altruism is not so much a regard for the other, but the humanity which, in the form of the ethical ideal, is contained in him. So far as pure egoism is concerned, altruism affords no solution of the problem; in relation to autonomy, heteronomy plays no essential part.

Sheer altruism is as insufficient as mere egoism; every altruist creates in the alter only another egoist, and he who is himself unselfish makes it possible for another to gratify self-love. The practical inadequacy of altruism is not the only argument which may be urged against this theory. Theoretically viewed, altruism is guilty of disguising the real relation between ego and alter, which is one of ethical equality. Altruism, however, regards the other man as though he occupied a lower plane than the ego, and when one is advised to forego self-love and exercise benevolence, it is suggested that the alter is in a position upon which the benevolent individual looks down. The claims of mercy toward lower animals are not such as can constitute man's

attitude toward his fellow, and the moralist who thinks to realize the ethical ideal in a theory of universalistic hedonism, overlooks the fact that man has a destiny, and that the ethical problem of the alter is the same as that of the ego. More consistent is to say, with Kant, "Treat humanity, whether in the person of thyself or that of another, always as an end, never as a means."

Who is the alter? Altruism treats him as though he were only another ego, waiting to receive what the other has to give. Startling indeed is the thought that, after all, there is very little that one can do for another. "Fear not those who harm the body," said Christ, and He also suggested that we need not bless those who merely minister unto bodily wants. An essential conception of humanity is necessary before thought can adjust the relation of ego and alter, individual and society; and when man is related to his fellow-men he should not lose, but rather gain, in attributes and functions. For this reason the benevolent ego should note that his genuine alter is not a mere recipient of hedonistic benefits, but is himself a personality having his own moral calling. Benefactors are not, like Jupiter and Mercury, looking down benignly upon their devotees, but are only Paul and Barnabas of like passions with the rest of mankind. It is only when such ethical parallelism is maintained that man can be adjusted to his

fellows and the problem of egoism receive adequate treatment. The individual's relation to society is through humanity, for ego and alter are each individuals who can be appreciated only when their being is correlated with an overarching humanity. When each in his own individual capacity seeks not his own nor yet the things of the other, but the ethical destiny which his relation to mankind involves, then egoism and altruism can be reconciled.

That which man is to regard in the other is not individuality so much as it is the humanity of mankind represented by this particular form; and, however empty such an ideal may appear, it is largely in accordance with that affection which is of a natural and inferior order. Bonds of consanguinity show that one loves another as representative of a family. In the same way, while upon a broader plane, sex loves sex, so that instead of dealing with the affection of this man for that woman, we have the relation of manhood to womanhood. Love of country and countrymen further reveals the crude catholicity of human affection, which can not rest in the individual until the latter stands for some higher idea. Such expanding affection finds it possible to love some particular quality in the esteemed person; as, courage, which leads to hero-worship; or loveliness of soul, which made of Madame Recamier an idol. Passing from

such general phases of universality, human affection centers itself in the type, whence it expands to the universal humanity of man.

2. It is in such connection that the ideal appears to reduce egoism to most limited proportions. Christ, who commands love toward neighbor and toward God, further asks how there can be love of the unseen without love of the seen. But the converse is equally true and with similar sanction enforced; and, thus, it can be set up as a Christian ideal that in loving man we should regard that which in him is dear to God, and in loving God we should conceive of Him as vividly as the seen neighbor. The alter thus assumes a more than human guise before our minds, and in Him we regard not only the visible but the invisible. Much of the unsatisfactory result of our modern ethics may be found to consist in the easy-going interpretation of the alter, who, after all, contains all humanity. For the ego, he stands in representative relation to humanity of which he is the example.

When the ego receives a social interpretation, the meaning of human life more clearly appears. Our philosophy makes use of judgments which declare that man is rational or man is moral, and these judgments assume the form of the individual. Their content, however, is a social one, and only in this way may they be

considered valid. The ego is the result of what the race has been and the prophecy of what it is to become; as a modern, the individual to-day possesses an intellectual life which has its roots in a remote past, but which is peculiar to its own. Hence, the rationality or the morality ascribed to man is a spirit of speculative and practical thinking which now pervades our philosophy, and can not be described in purely abstract, non-historical terms. Furthermore, when the individual receives that social interpretation which is of the order of Christianity, the content of his life is of such a character as to make a man in an entirely new sense of the term. He is now conscious of himself, aware of his humanity, and alive to his destiny; and, while still an ego, his historical consciousness is such as to relate him anew to humanity, of which he is but part and parcel.

Christianity is at home in the problem of egoism, because Christianity, while not endeavoring to relate man to the world of things, perpetually seeks to adjust the individual to the world of spirits. The true non-ego, against which the ego is placed, is not the world of phenomena, but the alter, or realm of humanity. To approximate to this, we can not rest content by declaring that society is an organism possessed of a social consciousness, although this more advanced conception is of value in negating

the mechanical view of utilitarianism. In the metapolitical view of mankind, we find that world, in the light of which man's life is lived. A poet like Shelley, tossed by storm and stress, may seek his alter in nature, and, communing with the west wind, seek to lose painful personality in a sympathetic phenomenon of nature:—

> "Be thou, spirit fierce,
> My spirit! Be thou me, impetuous one!
> Drive me, dead thoughts, over the universe,
> Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth!"

A similar projection of the Self appears in the Upanishads, as will be seen from a reading of the Khandogya. "That which is that subtle essence in all that exists has its self. It is true. It is the Self, and thou art it." The objectification of self, however, when this is to have value, is to be found in the alter-ego of humanity rather than in the realm of nature.

Christ discovered humanity; the idea of the kingdom was the popular form in which this new thought was expressed. It is true that among the decadent Hellenic thinkers the idea of world-citizenship and the maxim of philanthropy were enunciated; indeed, the beginnings of such usage in the way of terms may be seen in Aristotle. But these conceptions were not living ideas so much as they were negative conclusions incident upon the decay of Athenian culture and civilization; and it was reserved for Christ

to evince in a vital fashion the idea of mankind. It was upon this basis that St. Paul, not disobedient to his heavenly vision, achieved the passage of the Church to the Gentiles—a movement of most stupendous moment in the history of humanity, and one which brought about the Indo-Semitic fusion of human culture. Humanity, as we to-day understand it, is made up of the ideals which come from Aryana and Mesopotamia, from Egypt and the Mediterranean. Such historical and meta-social view of man is necessary to cure us of the socialism which Nietzsche despises because it is centered in the herd. The herd is no Christian idea, because the herd is only an aggregate of egos; it is humanity, one and spiritual, which was founded by Christ.

Christ's commandments were not aimed at the production of altruism, but something higher. The injuctions, which were carefully selected from the complex legalism of the Pentateuch, were two in number, but one in spirit. From Deuteronomy He chose the commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God;" from Leviticus, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." We need not here raise the casuistical question whether one should love self as much as neighbor, because it is more important to consider whether Christ did not mean that the love toward neighbor was on the same level

as the love toward God. The common law is the law of love; the alter is at first Divine, then human; and so far as we know, from Christ's discourses, the quality of the love is the same in each case.

So far from aiming at mere altruism, Christianity proposes to take the individual as he is, and bring about within his soul a complete transformation, which shall consist, not simply in admitting his neighbor, but the whole kingdom of God, which, as Christ said, is within. The culmination of man's relation to the world of spirits is to be found in the idea of a Utopia; a Nowhere, or No-Man's Land; a realm of ideal relations. Commenting upon the ancient maxim, "Let justice be done though the heavens fall," an orator once said, "If justice were done, the heavens would not fall, but would stoop and kiss the earth." The vision of humanity's unity is afforded only when God lets down a sheet from the skies. Since the overcoming of egoism can not take place by means of altruism, it must be confessed that to-day we are far from realizing the principles of universal love postulated in the New Testament. That which stands in the way is not only the love of self but the hatred of others, the sense of malice and resentment. Human nature is too froward for purely abstract schemes which make man's relation to his fellow a matter of easy academic solution. The Span-

ish duke who, upon his deathbed, was exhorted to forgive his enemies, proudly said, "I have no enemies, for I have killed them all." Mirabeau was so constituted that he could not retain the memory of an injury received. Yet such methods, which are wholly unnatural and purely eliminative, do not suffice to bring about a peaceful solution of the practical problem.

By way of prophecy, it may be said that history, which is the very life of Christianity, is calculated to produce a Utopian condition of mankind, when the latter's pure humanity shall be attained. The ideal of humanity is a new one, and we find it difficult to shake off our habits of enmity. At the same time it may be said that, however tardy historical forces may be in bringing about a condition of good-will, they are just as rapid in their movements as are science and speculation; and if thought is confident that it is solving its theoretical problems, life may be just as hopeful of its practical ones. Life is swifter and surer than thought, and the practice of non-egoistic morality is just as secure as the theory of absolute benevolence.

3. In the idea of humanity's culture, the claims of egoism are forgotten while the benefits of altruism are superseded. Man liveth not unto himself, nor unto that assembly of selves which make up society, and his essential being consists in the humanity which is within him. Such

humanity can not be found upon the first stage of man's development, but upon the last only; as an idea it is not primitive, but rather is deduced only after perpetual effort. The part which the ego plays in the culture of humanity is fundamental; humanity without the individual and his needs is vain; the ego apart from humanity is unintelligible. Such an attempt to overcome human egoism does not consist in changing the conditions of life to those of altruism; let man be man in all his humanity, and when he has thus realized his destiny he will have transcended both egoism and altruism. It is conceivable that the affirmation of the alter may necessitate the negation of the ego; but the end of man's existence is not reached until he has reconciled this opposition within himself, and has found the true calling of his life to consist in its spiritual integrity. Altruism is no cure for egoism; this must be found, not in the man's neighbor, but in himself.

In this way it becomes clear that the more complete expression of man's life is to be found in humanity rather than in society; the former includes the latter. In the vastness of the idea of humanity may be found the ground of society, which is generally assumed as a physical fact which needs no justification. So great is reality that its nature can not be expressed without an infinite variety of forms, wherein the

one becomes reconciled to the many; and so wonderful is the character of humanity that it exhausts all the possibilities of the individual, and compels the mind to consider society as the only proper and sufficient criterion of humanity. In this way the plurality of individuals may represent the unlimited range of humanity, while various types may reveal the manifold character of spiritual life. Furthermore, the achievement of humanity could never be brought about by the labor of an individual, but must be effected by a common effort on the part of a multitude, in the way that a cathedral represents a vast social work. Likewise, varieties of endeavor which exhaust the genius of one and employ the talents of many are fitted to express the variegated work of humanity and to employ different gifts. There may be many members in one body, and not all have the same office; yet being many, they are one body in Christ, and every one members of another. The social phase of man's nature adjusts ego to alter, and relates both to universal humanity.

Society involves something more than sociology; its mission is not to be or to do work, but to evince humanity; and, in considering it, must pay attention to something more than the actuality of the subject at hand. The reason for society is something more than a *raison d' être*. This may be seen when we consider

the way in which logical and æsthetical forms of philosophy perform their work. Logic avoids a solipsism by turning to the social side of the human understanding and saying, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.* To obtain truth, there must be not merely individual assent, but common assent, *consensus gentium.* Moreover, the more compact principle of experience realizes the social ideal in human thinking. Experience is wrought out only by the combined efforts of many investigators, and by the collection of innumerable data. Practical knowledge as expressed in human jurisprudence is a further testimony to the existence of a social mind; for law is the enunciation of the will of the race. Æsthetical judgment, which finds taste to consist in that which is aproved by all, is another feature of the social consciousness of man; and when we see how active the latter has been in the development of language, we can regard its function here, as in the case of law, as a real one impossible apart from society.

Among cultural movements, nothing has been more deeply indebted to humanity than Christianity, which appeared in the full of the times. In the Oriental world, whence Christianity came, there had long prevailed two great types of culture: Aryan and Semitic, species of human consciousness which complement each other. Both agree in the emphasis laid upon the in-

finite, of which they are dimly conscious, and which they represented in forms of myth and mystery. The peculiarity of the Aryan, however, consists in his tendency toward contemplation; that of the Semite in his aptitude for conduct. One gives us poetry and philosophy, the other religion and ethics; the Hindu is by nature speculative, the Hebrew practical. Between plays the Persian, whose dualism scarcely suffices to sunder him from the Aryan stock, much less to unite him with the Semites with whom he intermingled. Christianity in Europe thus became Indo-Semitic.

Upon the vertical plane of progress may the idea of humanity further be considered, for it is of the nature of man to develop. For this reason we can not discuss phases of humanity as though they constituted so many species merely, but must see in these a range of stages through which the spirit of man passes in his culture. To achieve humanity, several stages of existence are necessary that man may make use of successive efforts to realize himself. Upon the plane of nature he has a life peculiar to this kind of existence; a language which is masked by imagery; a religion of nature-worship. A member of a nation, his life is that of citizenship; his language more philosophical; his religion more utilitarian. When humanity itself is conceived of, nature appears as a mere

symbol and nationality as a means of the genuine spiritual life which it is man's to realize. Approximation to the ideal makes necessary these stages of advancement, and the goal of life is reached only after a cumulative effort. Such an act is a social one in which the ages of mankind participate; but instead of merely contributing their outward works in the form of civilization, they give their thoughts in the form of culture.

In philosophy of religion, the social element is manifest in a significant fashion, since the vast considerations of the religious life demand for their support something more essential and worthy than the consciousness of the individual. Consider some of the ideas which characterize the Divine Being, and at once the social side of theological speculation appears. God is called the Lord of Hosts, and to express His majesty what can be more striking than this reference to the multitude of His creatures? In the New Treatment, God is regarded as One who is a Father and who possesses a kingdom. The idea of Fatherhood is one which arises only in connection with the idea of the human family, while the further conception of the kingdom has in it still more of the social element. To speak of God in terms of the power or thought of the world would not be as forceful as to describe Him in terms suggestive of the world of hu-

manity. Only world-religions are monotheistic, for the unity of God is an idea which depends upon the unity of man; Christ, who first considers man in the form of humanity, was the first consistent Teacher of the unity of the Godhead. The Infinite can not reveal Himself to the finite as individual, but must avail Himself of multitudes in age upon age. And for man to represent God, it is necessary for him to employ multitudes of individuals arranged in several stages.

In the grand development of humanity, both egoism and altruism are absorbed, for we are not dealing with an isolated one or another, but with an all-inclusive realm of mankind. Humanity, culture, religion, are terms which have no meaning, and ideas which have no force as long as they receive no meta-social interpretation; if man is to be, if culture is to clarify his mind and religion purify his heart, there must intervene such a vast conception of humanity and such a graduated view of his development that the destiny which belongs to him may appear and achieve its result. The claim of Christianity is not, therefore, the contention of mere unselfishness, however necessary that may be from time to time; the essential demand is that the individual shall realize himself in the world of humanity which it is his to advance. And the ground of Christian sympathy thus consists, not in the perception that the other has a like body

susceptible to similar pain, but it is found in the recognition that there is another spirit confronted by the same and universal sense of life and death—the same destiny.

Within the precinct of the Christian religion, sympathy possesses a reactionary power which sets at naught the poor ipsesism of human life. When a man considers that spiritual life is a unity, that destiny is universal so that each life has the same goal, the pains of finitude are made more bearable, while the inherent despair of life and fear of death lose somewhat of their shudder. What I am, that is the other also; what puzzles me confuses his will; where death is the king of terrors, he has more than one subject. Internal and essential is the quality of sympathy instilled and inspired by Christ, who reveals one eternal life to all who are in the same finite condition. The temptation that befalls is common to all, while all experience the same unskillfulness in handling reason, the same imperfection in dealing with the moral law. It all comes about from our common terrestrialism; man is fitted for an earthly life, while he has ambitions toward a spiritual career; he is saturated with immediate interests, yet these can not exclude the remote and ultimate desire of his soul. The extreme solemnity of life which tends to pervade all men makes them friends and neighbors indeed, and sorrow fulfills its mission when its tears bathe humanity in sympathy.

Chapter X.

CHRISTIANITY AND PESSIMISM.

In discussing the historical position of Christianity as well as its positive form, it was necessary to institute comparison with ancient and modern methods of philosophy; these afforded sufficient range for presenting the life-content of the kingdom of God. But in the case of pessimism, while the problem as such is a modern one intensified by present thought, the field is as broad as the life-history of humanity. At the same time, Christianity, by being a religion of world-values, is pre-eminently fitted to state this question, just as it is conspicuously adapted to present a possible solution. Bounded before and after by a double millennium, Jesus Christ's career affords a means of retrospect and prospect over the whole life of mankind, and Christianity becomes the last stage in the Oriental world, and the first stage in the Occidental one. Striking indeed is that view of life which we call pessimism, yet it contains nothing extraordinary. This question concerns the possibility of our having ideal pains and ideal pleas-

ures, which detach themselves from our immediate consciousness and assume a magisterial position in the life of man. Perception produces data of experience upon whose basis we form great world-theories; affection, which seems to confine itself to the personal life of the individual, in reality furnishes materials to serve for a view in whose light we pass judgment upon the universe. Pessimism certainly reveals the independence and world-power of man's spiritual life.

1. Among Orientals we may obtain instruction from the Chinese, Hindus, and Persians, who pursue pluralism, monism, and dualism respectively, and produce a common pessimism. Among the sacred writings of the Chinese, or the "King" literature, nothing could be more significant than the "Yi-king," or "Book of Changes," a work which so captured the mind of Confucius that, had he fifty years longer to live, so said he at his death, he would devote that time to the study of the Yi. When this work is styled the Book of Changes, it must be observed that the change is rather changelessness, so that, instead of evincing development, it rather convinces the reader of an inevitable recurrence. The sixty-four hexagrams of which it is composed, and which give it its mysterious character, instill a monotony whose effect can only be dismal. Dwelling upon the sad truth

that change is inevitable, without showing how such change might lead to progress, the book anticipates that modern pessimism which abides by the thought of the "eternal recurrence." It is thus that the eleventh hexagram declares, "There is no state of peace which is not likely to be disturbed, and no departure of evil men so that they shall not return." Such is the "*Wiederherstellung des Gleichen*" glorified by Nietzsche, as coming, not from Confucius, but rather from Zarathustra.

The Aryan pessimism of Indian and Iranian stands out in rough contrast to the Aryan optimism of Greece, but the return to that gloomy view which ever characterizes the Indo-German may be noted in connection with the European thought of the nineteenth century, where Schopenhauer endeavors to rehabilitate the pessimism of India. Among the Indo-Aryan thinkers, pessimism was a growth. Vedism is serene in its naturism, while Brahmanism is self-centered in its caste-system; it is in the form of Buddhism that the despair of life finally receives full treatment. The pessimism of Gautama, like that of Confucius, is riveted to the principle of causality; all is due to the reign of inexorable law, and hence man in his freedom is thwarted, if not defeated. It was in connection with such a view that Schopenhauer felt the oppression of the law of sufficient reason, from whose oppression

the spirit of man, following the methods of art and ethics, would fain release himself. Of the Buddhist scriptures, or Tripitakas, let one read the Vinaya and he will see that it is causality which afflicts the soul. Combating causality and baffled by it is desire, desire for existence; such desire is due to ignorance of causality. Once destroy this desire, and there comes about the cessation of the whole mass of suffering, and it is the fact of sorrow which gives to Buddhism its inalienable mark. The "Noble Truth" concerns the fact and the cause of suffering, as well as its removal and the means thereof; the method of Buddhism is designed solely to redeem man from sorrow.

It is not from these meager data, although many more might be added to them, but from the very genius of religion, that one may extract the serious truth that religion is pessimistic. This may be due to the tendency on the part of religion to lay hold of man when, as yet, his lower nature has not felt the softening influences of civilization and culture, and thus, dealing with rough and fragmentary humanity, religion is forced to dwell upon the distressing facts of human existence. Too intimate acquaintance with the human heart has led religion to formulate pessimistic impressions, so that the most significant truths which the highest form of spiritual culture has to offer are those which cen-

ter in the ideas of misery and sin. The case of ethics is very different; for the moralist has only to align the ideal in the pursuit of which he may easily indulge in optimistic thoughts concerning the good and virtue, happiness and good-will. Every ethical standard is an optimistic one; every religion has its possible pessimistic phase. It is for religion to prescribe a cure for the ills of humanity, and, in doing this, pathological conceptions can not fail to gain an entrance.

On the other hand, the pessimistic tendency in religion may further be explained by noting that this less pleasing view of the world has the good office of safeguarding the ideal. Pessimism is ever a protest against any inferior theory of the world, or any ignominious estimate of life; and when it dwells upon the fact that man is not satisfied with the world or himself, it further suggests that this is because his ideal is too lofty to be contented with such fulfillments as may come in the ordinary course of experience. It is here that the genuine nature of pessimism appears, just as it is in this sense of the doctrine that Christianity makes manifest a pessimistic tendency. If Christ had been optimistic He would have expressed Himself as satisfied with mankind in its actual condition; but such an attitude was far from Him, and the pure spiritualism which pervades the Gospel could only lead its Author to feel pain in His contemplation of

the actual world. Christianity, as the culmination of religion, assumes a pessimistic character, inasmuch as it aspires to consider man as human and to cultivate him as an ideal creature.

The kind of pessimism manifest in the Christian religion is such as to encounter ideal pain rather than that species of dissatisfaction which result from a hedonistic calculation of life's benefits. In this way, it is not so much the felt quality of the feeling as it is the judgment which the mind is prone to form when it experiences these unpleasant sensations; for it is the soul, not the body, which is pessimistic. When, therefore, sad experience makes its dread appeal to reason, the latter detaches itself from the details of the actual pain and reflects upon human life, until at last it evolves the stupendous thought of *Weltschmerz,* wherein the whole creation travaileth in pain. No such pain as this could find its counterpart in living consciousness, much less have its seat in the body; it is an idealistic form of sorrow, experienced only when the spirit of humanity is quickened within the soul, wherein the pain is only an indication, and not a criterion, of the view entertained. Feeling is employed to form judgments, and, in the form of judgments of pain, Christianity measures the universe.

Pains of the ideal are ideal pains; he who can not grasp what he desires suffers, but his

suffering is of an ideal nature. Christianity is unlike Buddhism in that it does not emphasize the "fact of suffering;" it is like Paganism because it treats the actual pains as of no essential consequence. The peculiarity of Christian pessimism consists in the tendency to idealize and to suffer because experience can not realize these fair dreams; the ideal of spiritual life is so high that human life does not attain to it; hence, surprise and despair. Being of a subjective nature, this suffering assumes the form of irony. In modern æsthetics and criticism, that is with the Germans, "*Ironie*" contains the innermost essence of Romanticism, and Romanticism is a cultural movement whose source may be found only in the heart of Christ. "*Ironie*" is a sense which invades the consciousness when the pure subjectivity of thought is disclosed. It may be found in various forms, but ever with the same painful result. Kant feels it when he declares that the understanding gives laws unto nature; Schiller expresses it when he says that art is play-activity, and man is only completely man when he plays; Fichte affirms it when he says that the ego posits itself simply for the sake of developing character. With Schlegel who gives the term "*Ironie,*" and Novalis whose career realizes it, the doctrine flowers in the form of a most painful sentiment.

Christ may hardly be styled *le grand maitre*

en ironie, unless we understand by that term, not the rhetorical irony of Socrates, but the metaphysical *Ironie* of Schlegel. The ironical pessimism of Christianity is the outcome of its idealism, just as this springs from its separation of soul and world and its diremption of good and bad within the soul. It arises in a twofold manner; dissatisfaction with the actual world-order and its utilitarian life, and a desire for an ideal existence in a world of the soul's own making. With Schlegel, the irony was conceived of in relation to the soul of man which is lost in its own subjectivity, wherein it creates images which must suffer destruction; with Novalis, whose genius leads him out into nature, the personal ego sets itself about creating worlds which experience reduces to nothing. "*Der Traum wird Welt; die Welt wird Traum.*" The intuition of Christ, while quite different from these romantic ideals, is more like the irony of Schlegel than the pessimism of Schopenhauer. It is a disappointment which results when the ideal of spirit is compared with the fact of sense.

2. Christ discovered joy and sorrow. With respect to the former, His attitude was so sublime that He pronounced man blessed, and created experiences which science finds it difficult to express and art to portray. He who said, "With desire have I desired to eat the Pass-

over," evidently had faith in the possibilities of the human heart to find satisfaction somewhere, although perhaps in itself alone, and it was the work of Christ to liberate joy from the narrow limits of personal experience. Naïve conceptions of life and dogmatic principles of ethics would lead us to believe that the idea of happiness is as clear as the feeling of happiness is direct; but more serious reflection brings us to see that happiness, both in conception and acquisition, is itself a problem, and pessimism may find an additional argument in the fact that the nature of happines is a question which human thought has not yet solved. The kingdom of God consists not in meat and drink, but in joy and peace, and it is in relation to this realm that the problem of happiness is to be solved. Life in the world, which is not the true dwelling of humanity, can not afford the desired satisfaction which can come only from life in the kingdom. Wherein the nature of that life consists can not be discovered without some psychological analysis.

What, then, shall be said concerning the ultimate nature of happiness? At once it may be urged that happiness does not consist in any extraneous thing which one may possess, or in any contingent event which may happen, so that wealth and good fortune are excluded from the charmed circle. Modern economics here agrees

with the view which, for centuries, reflective thought has advanced; with the former, value is so subjective in its nature that it is said we do not desire things because they have value, but they have value because we desire them. More consistent views than those which uphold the purely objective may be found in connection with ethical conduct and culture, where it is said man is happy when he acts rightly and thinks correctly. Concerning these, it may be said that they indicate some of the conditions of happiness, but do not make up its final cause. Perfect happiness can not exist apart from some view of the world of humanity in which man lives, much less without a right attitude toward the universe; but such a desirable condition of spiritual life can not be found in a study of causes and an obedience to them. To be happy, man must be himself; and to be himself, he must be free; now, culture and conduct are not capable of emancipating him.

We can not justly speak of the metaphysics of happiness, and yet some such idea must be entertained when we endeavor to sound the depths of human nature. Our conception must be metapsychological at any rate. Among pagan and Christian thinkers, two may be selected to act as attorneys for their respective realms: Aristotle and Augustine, each with his problem of happiness. The ancient defines the nature of

happiness, while the Christian, seeing the untenability of the ideal, departs from it in a manner so serious that we have not yet recovered from it. In every respect, the ancient conception of the world was as formal and static as its view of life was naïve and optimistic, and such a method of speculation could only result in producing a similar ideal of happiness. On the other hand, the modern has exchanged these ideas for such as suggest force and motion, feeling and pessimism; hence his ideal of the best possible condition of existence is framed in a different spirit. Accordingly, Aristotle conceives of happiness as a possession which belongs directly to the soul, while Augustine believes that such happiness, which must be obtained, consists partly, if not largely, in the very seeking. The Augustinian conception, which is not without its tinge of pessimism, removes happiness as an idea from the realm of immediate experience, and places it before us as a remote object. Happiness thus does not consist in a resting and a having, but in a seeking and hoping.

"Inner experience" is a principle of philosophy whose discovery we usually attribute to Augustine, and the testimony of such intimate consciousness would seem to confirm the Augustinian ideal that happiness, while real, is not at hand, but afar off. The religious unrest of the soul Augustine has expressed in a sentence

more familiar even than his conception of consciousness; it is this: "Thou, O God! hast created us, and our hearts can not find rest until they rest at last in Thee." We need not remind ourselves of the pessimistic career of Augustine to find the ground of this *sursam corda;* it is necessary only to isolate the words, "our hearts can not find rest," to see how fleeting and romantic was the eudæmonism of this patristic speculator. Augustine more than suggests that happiness consists, not in the immediate, but in the remote; that is, a search rather than a possession. So far as the intellectualistic side of the problem is concerned, it may be added that Butler, with whom Oxford often compares Aristotle, has put this very idea into serviceable words, which run as follows: "Knowledge is not our proper happiness; it is the gaining, not the having of it, which is the entertainment of the mind." Aristotle's conclusion is the very opposite of this; for, in speaking of the pursuit of wisdom, he says: "It is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more pleasant to those who have mastered than to those who are yet seeking for it." Such a divergence in sentiment is of advantage in bringing out the meaning of the Christian problem, wherein joy and sorrow find searching treatment.

The intuition of sorrow which Christ possessed was almost as far removed from Oriental

pessimism as from pagan optimism; it was a view which resulted from His separation of world and soul and the division of the spirit within itself. With the Hindu, world and soul were one, while the world was uppermost; with the Greek, man was made the measure of all things. It is on this account that Christianity stands out in contrast to the forms of life which had anticipated it, and for the same reason it possesses a joy unknown to the one and a sorrow unknown to the other. Christianity affords such a unified view of human nature that it tends to reconcile the ancient doctrines of pessimism and optimism, and to state the problem in new terms, which are terms of value. This peculiar, yet consistent, attitude may appear in a fragment which is valuable only in that it expresses the manifest paradox of human affection:

> "Die Engeln nennen es Himmelsfreude;
> Die Teufeln nennen es Höllensqual;
> Die Menschen nennen es die Liebe."

With a Divine love in the balances, the acceptance produces indeed a heavenly joy; the rejection, on the other hand, is as the sorrows of hell. Such are the heights and depths of Christianity which were unknown to its predecessors.

While pain is better known than pleasure, the significance of sorrow appears first in the

thought of Christ. Here, in the eudæmonistic realm, as well as in connection with purely ethical ideals, He brought about a transmutation of values, wherein sorrow and joy tended to change places, and the disciple who would love his life chose rather to hate it. "My Savior," said George Herbert, in a sentence which Matthew Arnold loves to cite, "My Savior banished joy." The life intuition of Christ was so profound as to deepen into something more intense than sorrow, or an ecstasy which only a Divine soul could feel. No pagan ever felt this fine quality of pain; he could not appreciate its inwardness and ideality. "Some god," said Goethe, "gave me power to paint what I suffer," and it was the Eternal who instructed the Man of Sorrows in this divine art.

Before the coming of Christ the mind of humanity did not sense its suffering, and man did not know that he was stabbed. Socrates, with the cup of hemlock in his hand, does not know how to taste death; for he merely says, if men are so unjust as to put an innocent man to death, it is better to die than to live. Vastly different is such a conclusion from the pathetic utterance of Him who trod the *via dolorosa,* saying, "If they do this thing in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" Greek art was not thoroughly tragic. Plato disapproves of the drama because it consists in revealing the emo-

tions; while Aristotle believed that the function of the play consisted chiefly in purging the soul of its emotions of pity and fear.

Greek tragedy is the tragedy of Œdipus; herein appear the power and the problem of fate in a manner most intense. Yet the modern is sure of disappointment when he seeks to discover the psychological moment and ethical purpose in the woeful career of Œdipus. On the divine side, there is no apparent purpose in his sorrows, while the prevailing attitude of the gods is one of mystery in both the means and the motive of their fateful work. On the human side, nothing in the nature of Œdipus is calculated to call forth these wrongs and woes. Being ignorant, he is blameless; his sorrow has no sense of contrition, no ideal significance. Thus he says, according to Sophocles: *τάγ' ἔργα μου πεπονθότ' ἐστὶ μαλλον ἢ δεδρακότα . . .* "My acts have been in suffering rather than in doing." From the moral point of view, he asks: *καίτοι πῶς ἐγὼ κακὸς φύσιν*—"And how am I by nature evil?" In Greek tragedy, the "Antigone" of Sophocles is as significant as it is beautiful. Yet note the strange appreciation of death which Antigone expresses. "Die I must, but if I am to die before my time, I count that a gain; for when any one lives as I do, compassed about with evils, can such an one find aught but gain in

death? So for me to meet this doom is trifling grief"—παρ' οὐδὲν ἄλγος. In the passion play of Christianity, the Man of Sorrows plays His part sublimely. He dies the genuine death, whose pangs He feels with infinite intensity as He exclaims, Eli! Eli! lama Sabachthani?

3. It is in the adjustment of optimism and pessimism that Christianity has here rendered its important service; and this has been done through the strategic position of this religion and the unique work which it has had to perform. Taking the pessimism of the Orient and the optimism of the Occident, Christianity has produced a conception of life which can not be defined in terms of either, but must be found in some tertiary stratum beneath them. The general form of this consists in progress, and the method is that of history. When Vico divided the history of man into periods of the poetic, the heroic, and the human, he was the first one to call attention to the fact that, in Christianity, humanity is an ideal not primitive but acquired only after prolonged culture. From this point of view, the traditional ideas of human fall and total depravity may play their sad part in the interpretation of the human spirit; and if current thought can not adjust these ideas to its own data and deductions, it need not cast them off entirely, for they are attempts to express the perplexity and pain of the reason when it

discovers the pessimistic trend of human existence.

The commingling of optimism and pessimism can not escape the attention of one who inquires into their respective claims. This common ground may be found in Leibnitz and Hartmann, in Nietzsche and Tolstoi, and it is this very element of community which makes pessimism or optimism the problem. Christianity it is which has brought about this climax, and that in a manner of its own. With the Hindu it was merely an adverse valuation passed upon the facts of the world and the experiences of human life, while with the Greek the same materials served to bring out a more favorable view. Christianity transvaluates by styling good bad, and bad good; by turning pleasure to pain, and pain to pleasure. Leibnitz says that this is not really the best world, but the best *possible* one; while Hartmann agrees with him, in the midst of difference; for he claims that no world would be better than any, yet the one which we do have is the best possible one. Tolstoi is pessimistic in his interpretations, while he is hopeful for the future; Nietzsche pursues the bitterest kind of pessimistic thought, but casts an optimistic glance behind him toward the past. There is nothing extraordinary in these unconscious agreements; their ground is to be found in Christianity, which gives to the pagan world

a new orientation, and places the good where it may be compared with the bad. In this way it results that it is not the indifferent fact which receives either a pessimistic or an optimistic interpretation, but the good itself becomes bad, so that there arises the expression, *corruptio optimi pessima,* which shows that it is the corruption of the best which makes the worst. This is the only kind of pessimism to be found in Christianity.

The impossibility of either a perfect optimism or a perfect pessimism is further evinced by the Christian conception of the problem. To claim that all is bad is to assume that there is a good, which exists as an ideal, if no further; and here is some reason for optimism. From a similar process of reasoning it appears that optimism can not stand alone; for it ever assumes some form or appearance of the bad which it endeavors to set aside. Furthermore, the æsthetical side of man's nature finds material for judgment in pain as well as pleasure, so that there can be no poetry without pessimism. Suffering is one of the conditions of sublimity, and the triumphs of religion are such as could never be felt in connection with an optimistic view of the universe. Tragedy is more likely to be artistic than comedy, and satire reveals a form of spiritual independence which triumphs over the world. Great artists, they say, come from vol-

canic regions; genius is so abnormal as to be comparable to insanity. Amos, the prophet of Tekoa, dates his vision from the earthquake. Such tendencies may be evinced, not to justify optimism, but to show that human life contains a balance of pleasure and pain. It is the tendency of Christianity to reconcile optimistic and pessimistic views by indicating an all-inclusive life problem. Furthermore, Christianity, while not assuming a free optimism, seeks to cure pessimism.

4. The conditions which favor pessimism are such as have arisen in the development of Christianity; they appear more distinctly in the course of our modern culture. Expressed in terms of the latter, these conditions may be stated as follows: the separation of mind and matter and the corresponding dualism of spirit and sense; the emphasis laid upon experience and the emancipation of the affectional process in human consciousness. Such a double moment reveals the modern spirit as one which looks askance at nature and tends to turn against itself.

In order to realize humanity, Christianity finds it necessary to separate man from nature; the result is painful and the estimate which man then places upon things is a pessimistic one. Modern thought, in its speculative conceptions, has dwelt very thoroughly upon this separation

between mind and matter, and the result has been that our thought is skeptical concerning the relation existing between the two. If we say that a causal relation maintains, we then justify that difficult view by declaring that the idea of all necessary connection is undemonstrable; and if we fall back upon a monism which asserts that mind and body are but phases of some third principle, we are agnostic concerning the nature of this *tertium quid.* Man is unhappy in the face of unsolved and insoluble problems, and he can not become reconciled to a universe divided against itself. Much more strained does this situation become when the same dualism appears in the form of sense and spirit; such a distinction rends the very nature of human reason and sets man at variance with himself.

Hereby, it may be said, the quickening nature of humanity is reached; it is in the realm of inner experience. Modern thought, accepting vague hints of decadent Hellenism and carrying out obscure ideas of mediævalism, has discovered consciousness. In this way *modernité* realizes itself, and fulfills the prophecy of Christianity. Significant is it that, when Descartes was looking for inner experience, self-consciousness, and the "passions of the soul," Harvey was discovering the circulation of the blood, the diastole and systole of the heart. Now, consciousness and blood reveal feeling, and feeling

can not conceal pain. A century and a half later, with Rousseau and the French Revolution, with Kant and German transcendentalism, modern psychology discovered the third process in consciousness, the process of affection. Then the path to pessimism was direct. The soul has broken with the world, man is at variance with himself, consciousness has arisen, and pain has been emancipated.

The form in which the problem of pessimism expresses itself concerns the world and the soul. So far as the first is involved, the doctrine relates to the course of nature and the history of humanity, so that we have a cosmic pessimism which judges the world, and an historical pessimism which prophesies woe to mankind. The world is not fit for man; and the crust of the earth is not ready for the appearance of life, so that the volcano buries the city beneath its lava, while the earthquake brings down the edifices of man and swallows him up with his work. When once the mind of man apprehends such lamentable ideas, it is easy to see how the matter will end; for such a philosophy of the planet can only lead to eudæmonistic pessimism. But from the standpoint of Christianity, these insecurities are not ultimate; it is sufficient that the earth should afford some kind of a habitation for man, who, after all, is an alien to any terrestrial environment. As

Martineau has suggested, God's decision in calling forth life while the planet was unstable, is only like the action of a general who, intent upon some great enterprise, marches his army across land partially mined, rather than miss a possible campaign. From the imminence and importance of human destiny we may not conclude an optimism, but may find some consideration which shall dwarf the pessimistic arguments, and the adverse testimony of nature may give way before the promise of history.

Inwardly viewed, Christian pessimism concerns both the fortune and character of man; here is involved an eudæmonistic, there an ethical pessimism; but both refer to humanity rather than to nature. Man is no better prepared for the ethical than for the physical world-order; in one case he suffers wrong, in the other he does wrong. To apologize for human nature and claim that, after all, sin and crime are not as universal as censorious judgment assumes, may be the method of an easy and rapid optimism, but is no satisfactory conclusion of a problem not in human nature. Yet the Christian conception of destiny may be followed in spite of inauspicious surroundings; and it is this idea of an ultimate goal which is the one thing worth while. In Lessing's "Education of the Human Race," there is a remark which graces that most worthy work, just as it fits the present argu-

ment. It is this: "The Creator chose to give man moral laws, even though He knew he would break them; and so He plans a scheme of redemption."

Whether or not Christianity projects pessimism upon our modern thought, it certainly is prepared to deal with a distressing condition of affairs where man and his environment evince maladroitness and maladaptation. In facing the problem, Christianity realizes that the same is profound and ontological in itself. So far as its features are concerned, it views the question chiefly from the point of view which involves pessimism as an internal condition of humanity by virtue of which the ethically bad becomes the choice and condition of the human heart. Furthermore, Christianity solves the problem, not theoretically, but practically. The grievous situation is not to be explained away, but put away by the creation of a new order of things. Little may be expected from nature, which at best is alien to man; help must come from within the soul, and here Christianity does its work.

Chapter XI.

JESUS CHRIST AND ETERNAL LIFE.

A theory of Jesus Christ based upon His life represents a new phase of religious thinking. Even the biography of Christ may be regarded as a recent product of modern thought, belonging practically to the nineteenth century. Before this time, during the modern Enlightenment, when many a philosophic problem was for the first time broached, the question of Christ's history was not taken up, although Deist writers like Collins and Woolston criticised various phases of the same. To Woolston especially Strauss again and again confesses his indebtedness. From its peculiar point of view, the system of natural religion could hardly find any value in such a subject as Christ's personal history; inimical to all forms of process, and to all phases of the positive in religion, this theory considered all things in the light of reason. Because the nineteenth century has been pervaded with the historical spirit, it has evinced an interest in the actual career of Jesus; and in independence of traditional Christology there has

arisen the question as to Christ's character and career. How shall the study of this question be pursued?

The philosophy of religion, which surveys the religious sentiment in its independence, also provides a means of studying the idea of Christ. His personality is surveyed, not in the light of an abstraction, but as a concrete element in the actual history of religion. Christ is a religious personality; He is also a historical factor. In Himself uniting the ideas of religion and history, Christ became a revelation. Religion in general has ever been affected by its priest or prophet; world-religions are closely associated with great names. Apart from Christ, Christianity is nothing; and where religion is studied, not as an abstraction, but as a living and a qualitative fact, the question as to the nature of a personality like Christ's becomes as vital as the problem of the world, of the soul, or of God. The discussion as to Christ's nature must thus be carried on in the sphere of religion, where it is appreciated. Here it is asked: Who was Jesus? What can He be to us to-day? To answer such questions, it is imperative to discover the conditions under which our thought apprehends its problems. As a result, it is hoped that we may be able to place the problem of Christ in its proper light.

Like the essence of Christianity, the idea

of Christ is twofold; it consists in the belief of Jesus Himself and in the disciples' faith in Him. The belief and doctrine of Jesus have changed man's impression of the world and human life. As a result, man believes in Christ Himself. The importance of this belief for religion can not be overestimated; at the same time there must be noted the tendency to press on to the source of the Christian doctrine in the person of Christ. In the history of this religion, the believer has been affected first by its Founder; then, by His teaching. Christ is esteemed as something more than a Teacher; He is presently regarded as the object of religious veneration.

This is not to say anything about the metaphysics of Jesus; too long has Christendom delayed in its anxiety to deduce a rationale of why and how the historical Christ should be. May it not be more consistent with the principles of actual faith to begin with the life as given in history? Then we can proceed with the aim of satisfying religious need, rather than by trying to produce a logic of theology. Christ has appeared; what can He become to us? We see that there is in man a religious life, and that in the light of this a new goal is presented to his activities. This life with its goal can not well remain indifferent to the personality of one like Christ. Forthwith there arises the question: Of what value is the idea of Christ to us?

1. In its development Christian thought was originally affected by the Christ idea of the Epistles rather than by the Gospel descriptions. In this way the progress of Christianity seems to have been from the epistolary to the evangelical form of expression. The apostolic conception of Christ is an essentially twofold one, appealing to thought and to life. Christ represents an idea worthy of most profound speculation; in addition to this, He is related to the believer's most intimate experience. Through Christ, God was conceived of as creating the world; and by this same Christ man is redeemed from the world. By means of Christ's death man is reconciled to God; through His life man is saved. Such conceptions predominate in apostolic thought. In the particular case of Paul, who is the leader in this style of reasoning, Christ's life and death are viewed in a second way—as practically related to the religious life of the believer. The believer dies with Christ to all sin or taint of the world; he lives in Christ, being risen with Him from the dead. The Christian's thought of God is thus bounded by the idea of Christ, while his estimate of human life is based upon Christ's character and career.

Where the soul felt itself saved from the world and living in Christ, the awakened religious consciousness became anxious to know what the actual life of the Redeemer had been. In

response to some such sentiment the Gospels were written. The question, "What think ye of Christ?" arose in connection with rabbinism; the answer to it, which is found in the Book of Acts, tends to return to the Old Testament. Christ is the Son of David; at the same time He is Lord, for He is risen from the dead while David's sepulcher is still present. Like the apostles, the evangelists were of a twofold mind; Christ is the national Messiah; He is also the Son of God. In the popular mind Jesus was Judah's Deliverer from Rome; He was also considered to be the Divine Logos, redeeming man from the world. The further term, "Son of man," was applied in a way calculated to suggest conceptions either political or theological. The evangelists may not have appreciated the subject which they undertook, but they did not fail to point out the extraordinary character of their Lord: "These [things] are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in His name." (John xx, 31.) In this way they summed up their own writings and adjusted them to the demands of a faith in Christ. Yet Christ was to them more than their accounts of Him. Once write all that Jesus did, and the world itself could not contain the books which should be written. The Gospels are not a biography of Christ. or a treatise on His teach-

ing; written to serve a religious purpose in various Christian communities, they make up a direct appeal to the religious consciousness, where they evoke worship.

Leading thinkers in modern philosophy have not hesitated to take up the problem of Christ. They have done this in a manner which was at once free from traditionalism and characteristic of their own methods. During the Enlightenment the markedly political tendency was everywhere present. In the system of Hobbes modern political and theological theory finds an inception. According to this thinker, belief in Christ consists in the recognition that He was the Messiah. All other determinations fall below the standard of rational religion and evangelical faith. Similar to this is the thought of Locke. By him the essence of Christianity was found in the idea that Jesus was the Christ. Now, both Hobbes and Locke urged such views for the benefit of a politically free religion; so devoid is the idea of Christ of metaphysical determinations that the absence of such in any theory should not prevent the latter from receiving full toleration. The value of such views must not be passed over lightly; for hereby was it pointed out that the true idea of Christ was the New Testament one, and that this was reconcilable with modern thought.

Modern idealism has likewise included within

its field the fundamental ideas of the Christian religion. In the cases of Kant and Hegel this is clearly seen. The one has shown how closely connected with positive religion is human character; the other has made possible a historical view of religion. As a result, there has been witnessed a Kantian and a Hegelian form of Christianity. But neither of these thinkers was able to bring out the religious character of Christ or the historical view of His career. To Kant, Christ exemplified the Son of God viewed as an ideal; as a human copy of a Divine Being was He to be regarded. In Hegel's mind, Christ signified the synthesis of the Divine and the human; He was the God-man. To the Northern moralist our thought is indebted for the discovery of the kingdom of God, while the Southern idealist emphasizes anew the Sonship of Christ. What is lacking in their views is the reality which comes from history alone. To satisfy the religious instinct in man somewhat more than an ideal or a speculative principle is demanded.

2. Present-day thought must assume a very different point of view. In its most general form, the life of Christ is to be considered as an event which, taking place in the world's history, has had the effect of changing the latter's course. As a result, we may survey the life of Christ as though something most significant had come to pass. Apart from any *a priori* considera-

tions, the history of Christ lies before the mind to be judged according to its merits. This historical happening must further be considered as making up a peculiar career. Christ conceived of His life as a mission; this was carried out, not in response to any earthly call, but with a motive which was supernatural. Christ felt Himself to be carrying on a work which God might perform. The ordinary springs of human activity, like praise and fame, utility and power, were absent from His mind. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." Christ's career thus has about it the character of a singular performance, wholly unparalleled in the history of humanity. His work was likewise a service wrought for the good of man. He who reads the history of Christ's life will feel that for Him a singular advantage has been achieved; and this, applying as it does to all mankind, is further seen to consist in the highest possible benefit.

The force of Christ's career will be felt when His teaching is examined. In such a connection it becomes possible to develop a determination of the problem which shall in some wise take the place vacated by traditional metaphysics. To-day we are anxious to know what kind of an impression Christ makes upon the consciousness of mankind. Having seen this, we hope to judge of His character. The pathway to all

this is indicated by His teaching. It is by no means a light task to concentrate the doctrine of Christ in a word or even a proposition; but, by observing the language of the Gospels, something like this may be done. Christ's own thought was affected by ideas of God's Fatherhood and kingdom. In a certain sense, this double doctrine was the foundation of His teaching. Branching out from it were various precepts, centering in the twofold commandment of love toward God and toward man. Anxious to express the nature of God, as well as to content the aspirations of man's spiritual nature, Christ employed the idea of eternal life. In all this teaching the mind of Christ was itself expressed; He personally sanctions His doctrine, just as He exemplifies it.

A nearer view of Christ is obtained when the doctrine of eternal life is further examined. The conception of God as the Father with His kingdom may hereby be made more complete. Eternal life belongs to God, who bestows it upon the members of the kingdom. The kingdom of God is a realm of life eternal; to enter it, a new life must be possessed. In a similar way, life eternal consists in knowing God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent. God is life eternal; Christ is the One who dispenses the gift. "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." In itself, and as the mean be-

tween the principles of the Father and of the kingdom, the notion of eternal life is an important one in interpreting Christianity. In the same way it becomes essential to a comprehension of Christ's personality. We may apply it to God, whereby He is no longer regarded as a substance, but as a life absolute and everlasting. Christ's character is to be studied in the same light. He is not a thought to be surveyed by the mind; nor is He a center of moral activity, appealing to man's will. He is a life, whose value is an abiding one. Possessing eternal life, He is at the same time an historical character. To find the eternal in the form of time is a religious problem by no means easy. When this assumes the personal form, as it does in the question before us, the solution is made more satisfactory.

Christ, as the Author of eternal life, is best understood when that very idea is applied to Him. Said He: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." By means of His person, religion becomes organic. By virtue of His character, the religious life is made intrinsic. "Whoso loseth his life for My sake and the Gospel's, the same shall find it." In the same way, the personality of Christ exemplifies the imperative character of that which He announced. The young man, desirous of following Him, yet anxious to fulfill his filial obligation, was

exhorted to let the dead bury the dead and go and follow Christ. The whole range of the Christian life is circumscribed by the character of Christ. His doctrine lives because He lives; it has force because of His personal power. Embodying eternal life, Christ becomes a definite object in the religious consciousness of the believer. For the believer to live is Christ, and to die is victory. When such effects as these are noted, the immense importance of Christ's person may in some sense be felt. Eternal life, instead of signifying that which is purely negative or abstract, becomes characteristic and personal.

But, it is asked, how stands such a view of Christ under the conditions which present life and culture impose upon us? In a twofold way this use of Christ's person has been made; here, by a rigid scientist, anxious to pass from the painful conditions of the natural world to that which is more in harmony with spiritual life; there by an advanced theologian, who abandons the concepts of traditional metaphysics, hoping to find in the idea of Christ the kernel of true religion. This is the case with Darwin and Herrmann. Darwin's feeling in this matter is revealed in his correspondence, especially in a letter to Asa Gray, in answer to whose question, "What would convince you of design?" he wrote the following: "If I saw an angel come

down to teach us good, and I was convinced from others' seeing him that I was not mad, I should believe in design.''* The organic world following laws of natural evolution seemed to Darwin to make the question of design a hopeless one; so much so that he spoke of himself as being perhaps convinced, ''If man were made of brass or iron, and in no way connected with any organism which had ever lived.''† The person of Jesus, which is not infra-organic, but supra-organic, seems well calculated to take the place of this desired angel, which, coming down to man, should teach him good. Relief from the limitation of the purely natural is thus found, it may be, in the idea of Christ.

The case of Herrmann is not so striking, perhaps, as the singular experience just recounted; but it is none the less instructive. According to Herrmann, religion finds its center in the fact of man's salvation from the world; religion is thus the belief in a supra-mundane destiny for man. But where man is perplexed by the apparently natural and historical character of his life, his belief in God leads him to see that his historical life is not thus empty, but rather that through such life he becomes a partaker of the eternal and unchangeable. But where arises this belief in man's religious destiny? It arises in connection with the idea of Christ. His ap-

* See SCHURMAN "*Belief in God*," p. 193. † *Ibid.*

pearance in the form of an historical phenomenon shows what the destiny of man may be. Jesus manifestly belongs to a superior order of life; at the same time He appears in history. When we perceive His career, we are in a better position to see the true end of human life. Such is the peculiar evolution of Christ's historical life; with the incident of Darwin, it constitutes a new style of thinking.

The relation of Christ's person to His doctrine of eternal life is an organic one; He is the true representative of this realm. As for man, he finds himself fixed apparently in the world about him; his life is wrapped up in nature and history. For that which is eternal no room is made. Divine design and human destiny seem to be entirely absent; and nothing in the series of events which we call the world and its history is calculated to make up for that which is thus wanting. Lessing, who despaired of finding eternal truth among the phenomena of history, yet regarded the latter as producing the knowledge of God and immortality. This was in connection with the history of the Jews. But the personal history of Christ brings out the same truth in a manner more definite and valuable. We are able to believe in God's design and presence in the world, for in the light of these the life of Christ was manifestly ordered. In the same way it becomes possible to believe

in man's destiny, inasmuch as the career of Christ shows how a human and historical life may yet belong to an order of things which is beyond space and time. In man these same principles may likewise be found; but here they are presented as problems, not as solutions; as desires which are unsatisfied. The solving and completing of these questions are to be found in Christ alone.

In this way it comes about that eternal life relates itself to human history. Although an historical character having a human career in the world, Christ embodies eternal life in Himself. We can not regard Him as the Child of His day and generation, but must go on to consider Him as a Master of the ages. It is easy to see that Christ has made an impression upon the world; to Him history has become subject. When the character of Christ is related to that religious life which has developed by means of an historical process, we begin to see what He meant by the words, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Without His influence the history of Occidental thought would have been infinitely different. Since this is so, the problem of "evidences of Christianity" assumes to-day a form very different from the traditional one. Christianity is here, for Christ has appeared; evidences need not be evoked to show this. The truer problem arises when, feeling the influence

of Christianity and Christ, we endeavor to determine the essence of this religion and seek properly to interpret the character of its Founder. By emphasizing the idea of eternal life, we may thus see the true bearing of Christ's person. If the doctrines of the Father and the kingdom elucidate the idea of God, the idea of eternal life magnifies the historical character of Christ.

It remains to be observed how the teaching of Christ, in the shadow of which we are keeping, had its peculiar influence upon the Master Himself. True, it influenced men and society, human life and human history; but the truest appreciation of these wonderful ideas was found in Christ who had learned them from God. In the Father He most thoroughly believed; to the will of God, as portrayed in the kingdom, He was completely subservient. Faith and obedience were thus perfect in Him. These two attributes of His life may be more clearly seen in their completeness when their development is observed. In the New Testament Christ is represented as increasing in wisdom, as well as learning obedience. Finally, He knew God so perfectly that it was said, and by Himself: "No man knoweth the Father save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him." At the same time His will was in perfect harmony with the Father's. So direct was Christ's attitude toward

God, both in thought and in life, that His character was marvelously affected. It could not be otherwise. The ideas of the Father and His kingdom, of the Son and eternal life, were no longer mere ideas in Christ's mind as a Teacher. They had become living realities. He and His Father were one; the work of establishing the kingdom was finished; Christ's career became life eternal.

3. What Christ may become in human experience may now be seen by connecting the idea of His person with the thought of religion. Here the character of Christ assumes its proper perspective, while the problem and task which the religious consciousness presents are more perfectly handled. Traditional thought has not seen this with any degree of clearness; current theories of Christ's person vibrate between speculative notions and purely ethical ideals. Christ is either metaphysical or moral. It is as an example that Christ is to-day esteemed; but such an idea falls far below the religious estimate of His person. He is rather to be looked upon as the evidence of a new life. The conception of example is limited and fragmentary, just as it is far inferior to the idea which represents Christ as the manifestation of a life supernatural and eternal. We look to Christ, not merely as One who may aid us in arranging the details of our every-day existence, but rather as the

Author of a new scene of things where religion indeed may be realized. The one view appeals only to scattered and superficial activities; the other makes its way to the very soul of man, as he endeavors to pass from the unsatisfactory conditions of immediate existence to that which is more satisfactory. Then Christ appears in all the power of His personality, and with His doctrine of eternal life He makes this possible.

But this evaluation of Christ's person, as well as the solution of the religious problem, depends upon the idea of religion which may be entertained. Where a profound conception of religion and a thoughtful view of Christ are brought out, nothing but gain can accrue to each when they are united in our thought. According to the seriousness with which the fact of religion is apprehended, and the difficulty which it presents is felt, will the person and performance of Christ be valued. In general, and with the briefest possible mode of expression, it may be said that religion denies the whole world, and man's immediate life is the same, to affirm a new realm where eternal life is manifest. Practically viewed, religion consists in an effort on the part of the soul to affirm itself over against the world with its unsatisfactory conditions. To accomplish such a task, help must come from without the pale of earthly existence; when the soul sees this, it is constrained to believe in God, who

is not only the Author of eternal life, but the One who makes possible the actual attainment of it by man.

In the history of religion the more definite solution of this question, theoretically and practically viewed, is to be found. Because this history comprises various stages, which represent different degrees of advancement from purely natural existence to eternal life, it affords a series of efforts by means of which the soul, inspired by a peculiar hope, may emancipate itself and live in its own true sphere. This progress of the religious spirit, as the latter slowly realizes itself, is accompanied by successive revelations on the part of God. As man's religious character becomes more and more perfect, his view of God assumes a correspondingly more worthy form. This twofold movement culminates in Christianity, which forms a peculiar unity of the human and Divine. Where man's religious life becomes an eternal one, God's character is seen to be absolute.

But the Christian religion is nothing apart from Christ. It may be religion, pure and undefiled, just as it may stand for the final stage in the development of human worship; but it is likewise saturated with the ideas and influence of its Founder. A searching view of His character can only show that He was possessed of the religious life, and that in the highest degree.

Who more completely than He turned away from the world, denying its power over Him? Who more fully than He asserted the reality of eternal life, and the presence of the Father's kingdom? Christ Himself was religious, and in a manner far different from the usual experience of mankind. So perfectly did Christ realize the religious principle that He was able to affirm of Himself, "I have overcome the world." To this He added the positive truth, "My Father and I are one." No longer was the religious life an ideal or hope; it had suddenly become a fact. As a result, Christ is an object of the most intense interest to the religious consciousness. After writing his "*Leben Jesu,*" Strauss spoke of Christ as "the highest Object we can possibly imagine with respect to religion; the Being without whose presence in the mind perfect piety is impossible." Such a conception is significant indeed. Religion without Christ would be as empty as the sense of beauty without art. When Christ is once seen, the danger of mere subjectivism passes away. No longer are we entertaining ideals; no longer are we content with hopes; Christ is come, and religion is realized. In comparison with such direct evidence, the results of metaphysical and moral theorizing about Christ's person and character are at once set aside as being insufficient. There is a more excellent way. Perceiving the gain

that accrues to our religious convictions when we look at the religious career of Christ, we willingly relinquish all attempts to demonstrate the essential nature of Christianity's Founder, just as we set aside all purely moral constructions of His character.

The religious view of Christ maintains a superiority to be found, neither in the method of speculating upon His being, nor in the more practical manner of estimating the activities of His will. By virtue of the religious method human feelings are more perfectly satisfied, just as the problem of Christ seems to be placed in a more satisfactory light. No longer is it necessary to speak of the "human" and the "Divine" in Christ; for these words, which find no place in the New Testament, suggest a dualism which it is no longer necessary to set up or to overcome. These notions are the product of a mediævalism which desired to canonize; as also of a modernism which goes to the other extreme, that of secularism. Neither of these expressions evokes the religious principle in man. The "Divine" in Christ does not afford us a means of attaining to eternal life; the "human" view does not measure up to the demands of the religious problem. Here is the final test. We would regard Christ as the Being who makes possible the highest religious life. For this, peculiar insight is demanded.

Both in the career which Christ pursued and in the character which He possessed, the religious consciousness in man finds an unwonted satisfaction. At once the aspirations of the human heart are realized. It is true that popular thinking loves to dwell upon the distinction between the ideal and the real. The ideal is felt in the mind, but never realized in experience; hence the pain of disappointment and defeat. But is this the true state of the case? Certain it is that the mind forms images and sets up trains of thought which are distinct from the actual conditions of life; and these floating ideas may seem to be more varied and wonderful than the given facts of experience. But here the reverse would seem to be true. Christ in His historical life surpasses all Messianic interpretations; His kingdom is not of this poor world. What is actually experienced in Him could not have been produced by the imagination of man. God is in human history and communes with human life. The plan and purpose of that Divine life are now seen to be in some sense parallel with our own strivings when these are interpreted after the manner of Christ. The perpetual fear which engrosses the heart when it asks, "What is the end of human existence?" is overcome by that assurance which is found in Christ that to man belongeth life eternal.

What sort of impression has Christ made

upon the soul? This is a question which our current psychological tendencies put forth. The answer to it must not be made in the spirit of an easy-going sociology, which goes on to speak of the ameliorating influences of Christ's teaching and example. Humanity has been helped in a more essential way. Nor is the effect of the idea of Christ upon the mind to be measured according to the subjectivism of psychology. We do not care to know how we feel when we think of Jesus, but would discover the manner in which His character appeals to a more profound religious consciousness. In such a connection as this, that vivid conception of eternal life which it has been His work to create appeals to us as the altogether desirable and the one thing needful.

Christ is, then, the Author and Finisher of our faith in eternal life; all this is due to the fact that He is the religious character *par excellence*. Hereby He becomes the direct object of human faith. Determined in this way, the person of Jesus is open to a new series of qualities; chief among these are faith, which makes of Christ an object of belief, and worship, which contributes sanctity to the idea of His person. When the religious consciousness is aroused within man, he can not content himself with thoughts about Christ, nor will he be satisfied with an exercise of activities which may be di-

rected toward His person. To fulfill the demands of the heart, Christ must be worshiped; but this adoration must be understood and undertaken in a worthy sense. How often and how vainly do we seek to portray the character of Christ, with the result that our words end in mere compliment or praise! "Good Master" was the term used by one of the earliest of these admirers; in rebuking him, Christ disdained the shallow flattery, and then showed him how serious was the search after eternal life. Worship as applied to Him shall not consist of any sacerdotal process; for such an attitude of mind is too subjective. Christ is a religious object, the highest which we know; our attitude toward Him is to be determined only after profound religious feeling. Then the religious consciousness is filled and eternal life made possible.

Chapter XII.

OPUS CHRISTI.

What did Jesus do? This is a question which is forced upon the religious thought of the day, and that from two distinct quarters. In itself, the present age is avowedly practical; perhaps too much so. It measures tendencies by their ability to produce results, and is thus in direct opposition to anything whose character is simply contemplative, or whose nature is merely a matter for thought. But this is not all; the spirit of the present, so far as its passing features are decipherable, is domineered by the conceptions of energy and progress.

What did Jesus really do? Did He, in the realization of His sublimely conceived mission, simply make the path of civilization somewhat smoother? Or did He rather, by an act, perfect a new life whose final principles extend beyond the range of human existence? The work of Jesus, conceived in the light of its actual performance, can not be kept upon the plane of the earthly; but it must not be so screened from

rational analysis that mankind, which sorely needs its fruits, shall lose sight of it. When Jesus said, "I have overcome the world," He announced His great achievement. The result was a positive fact. Jesus thus made possible, not a new view of life, but a new life itself. That which was produced was the result, not of mere teaching, but of positive labor. The deed of Christ is as real as His teaching.

The sphere of Christ's activity, as we must ever remember, was the sphere of universal religion. His work was carried on in keeping with an exalted view of human life; two thousand years of culture have only deepened this impression. In science and philosophy, quite different views of man's life are entertained, and the way in which these forms of human culture have served the world varies accordingly. Science regards life from the standpoint of the actually existent, and when it is asked, "What has science done for life?" the answer must be: It has contributed *utility*. Invention and discovery have promoted industry, and have made social intercourse feasible. Philosophy has acted otherwise, for it laid emphasis upon the ideal; it has evinced the *value* of life, and has shown the dignity of human existence. But religion, while not releasing its anchorage upon reality, has gone beyond this, and has imparted *blessedness*. The gift of Jesus was eternal life, and He must be

regarded not as a benefactor or an educator, but as a Savior.

When, therefore, the inner character of a deed is appreciated, the religious work of Christ can be more satisfactorily seen. The person of Christ, studied as it is to-day, is such as to appeal directly to man's religious consciousness, where it is seen that Jesus, in living His peculiar life, evinced the fact of man's spiritual destiny under God. In the same manner may the performance of Christ be esteemed, and His activity becomes a distinct factor in the life of mankind. What Jesus did no other has done nor could do, and His career is seen to be a service at once intrinsic and valuable. In it blessedness is to be found.

From the point of view of the New Testament, the work of Christ is to be regarded directly and for its own sake. This Book, which is not only the coronation of religious literature, but an isolated phenomenon in the history of humanity, contains chiefly an account of Christ's career in Palestine, and the effect which it had upon the world. The New Testament as a whole is engaged in representing the supreme act of Jesus Christ. The language which is employed by these plain writers is striking in its directness; a favorite form of expression is: "And it came to pass." Philosophy may have its universal ideas, appreciable by thought; and science

may deal in general principles of those things which appeal to sense; but Christianity falls back upon that which has come to pass. The one great thing which is portrayed in the New Testament is an event; the writers of that volume were plainly convinced that something had taken place. There were many things which Jesus did, and various impressions which He made upon the mind of the day; but these unify in one great deed.

Jesus' life may be viewed as constituting a career. His character was unique, but none the less so was that peculiar thing which He attempted to perform. For Christ the work of His career was a striking achievement; and here the value of that career may be found. Many were the things that Jesus did not do; and many the fields of activity into which He did not enter. Having a definitely spiritual work to accomplish, His achievement was a religious one. Christ made no scientific discovery; He did not directly contribute to philosophy; political power was, as an ambition, far removed from Him. Indeed, the moment any other than a purely religious performance is mentioned, we see how alien it was from the intention of Christ to accomplish. Now, what Christ thus achieved is of the greatest importance. His service was the highest, and it benefited all mankind. A statesman may

serve his nation; a scientist his generation; a poet may sing to multitudes for centuries. Each, however, has a limited field and an inevitably prescribed influence. But a religious view of Christ can only see that He benefits mankind forever; His gift was eternal life. The deed of Christ had none of the limits of human specialization; His was an endless work, made complete by His peculiar power.

Perhaps this estimation of the position of Christ in the world, where we lay emphasis upon the ideas of event and career, performance and service, is not the usual one which is given in theology. But theological reflection should be friendly to such a view as this, which endeavors to relate the life of Christ to those methods of thought which are employed in the philosophy of religion. Theology has ever had its doctrine of the work of Christ; but it has usually regarded this *opus* in its own peculiar manner. The work of Christ as thus viewed was the work of redemption. But it would seem as though this theological interpretation of the deed of Christ were of no value, unless the more realistic side of this is taken into account. The work of Jesus was, in part, what He did in His career; when this is once appreciated, in the spirit of positive religion, then the true point of departure is found and the projection of the actual work of Christ into the sphere of the ideal made pos-

sible. Thus the historic deed of Jesus is the anchorage of the *opus* of redemption.

The deed of Christ, then, becomes intelligible in the light of His career as a religious character; and we are able to state in fairly accurate language the meaning of the work which He performed. As a rule, the deed of Jesus is put in a peculiar form, and it is never an easy task to restate theology in the form of individual psychology and social history. Yet the religious consciousness can never forget that it was by a mighty deed that Jesus was approved among men; and it now desires to know just what it was that He did. In the Gospels is to be found a definite account of Christ's career; the Epistles show how the Christian community was affected by the idea of what Jesus had done for them. When the believer sees how vast a work has been wrought for him, he can not fail to find the features of this service outlined in the actual history of Jesus of Nazareth; and if faith does not at once become sight, the sense of dependence, which the soul feels as inspired by Christ, is measured by the perception that the actual Christ is worthy of this.

The historical side of Christ's *opus* is being appreciated in more than one way. In general, the philosophy of religion has emancipated the positive element in human faith, and has not failed to evince the importance of this. At the

same time, popular thought has begun to manifest an extraordinary interest in the actual performance of Christianity's Founder, and asks, in addition to this, "What would Jesus do now?" As long as this phase of Christian thought avoids the danger of superficiality, it can add much in the way of valuable content to the actual life of Christendom. The inner character of the positive in religion must be appreciated, and the worth of a deed clearly estimated. Religion as lived out in the race, and as reflected in history, is ever destined to lay emphasis upon certain events which have happened; these are fraught with enormous significance. In place of mere thoughts, there must be living ideas, wrought out by human experience; if logic fears lest it be losing, life certainly can feel that it is gaining. The history of religion contains many such vital conceptions. In the history of Judaism, what was more important than the variously repeated statement, "Israel came out of Egypt?" The New Testament has its own favorite ideas, and these manifestly guided the thought and inspired the life of those times. "Jesus was born in Bethlehem," "Christ is risen from the dead,"—such were the thoughts which the pioneer Christian fed upon.

For the Christian religion the various phenomena were made possible by the deed of Jesus. The teaching, peculiar as it was to Him, was

there as well; but the *onus* of Christianity, as given in the New Testament, is borne by the religious performance of Christ. This must be the starting-point of any theory of His personality. For both the theology and the philosophy of religion this is an important consideration. Before theology can go on to construct a theory of Christ's work of redemption, it must learn to appreciate what transpired in the historical career of the Man of Nazareth; then it may proceed to speculate concerning Christ's empirical activity. But the philosophy of religion, likewise, should not fail to observe such a striking example of what the religious spirit can accomplish; and, busied with the manifold phenomena of ethnic religion, it can not help responding to the incitement made upon it by one like Christ. What He did was, in its results to human existence, manifest in various phases of culture, especially religion. But how much discernment is requisite to bring out the import of this great deed!

The details of the work performed by Christ can not be put into so many words; yet some account of them must be taken. It may be shown how different was His mission from that of the average man. His *opus* was not found within the rubric of human activity. Man works in various ways and from more than one motive; among his springs of action may be necessity

and desire, law and custom. In response to these, works and days are determined. But over and above these rather mechanical impulses, we may note how manifold are the works which men perform; current civilization, with all its spheres of occupation, at once shows how vivid is the thought of the acts which make up the life of man. What control these? In general, talent and genius; these constitute the call to labor. Self-satisfaction and social approbation add an impetus to those things which man by sheer need produces; here arise great deeds of great men. But this outline of humanity's occupation does not for a moment suggest what Jesus really did. Nor do the more definitely ethical motives explain the marvelous character of His work. He obeyed the law, but His work was not the exemplification of current morality; He went about doing good, but no one can settle accounts with His character by merely styling Him a philanthropist.

It was native to Christ that He should transcend all such limits. His deed was a free contribution to the human spirit. In performing it He was disclosing a new realm of life, and was not readjusting old elements to one another. As a personality, bent upon doing a most benign work, Christ appealed to John as One "full of grace and truth;" in this spirit did He carry on His work. Now, a character filled with good-

ness and truth is that which the Old Testament ascribed to Jehovah; Christ, whose career in the world is strikingly represented in John's prologue, seems worthy of a similar description. The work of Jesus was Godlike, and in pursuing it He assumed a character of godliness.

In the consciousness of Christ Himself, the performance which He was undertaking was conceived of as being the work of God. "My Father worketh even until now, and I work." Elsewhere, among the golden sayings which again and again appear in the Gospels, Christ spoke of Himself as present with His disciples, even unto the end of the world; and as having power to overcome the world. In keeping with these expressions of infinite presence and power is the one which has been quoted, where Jesus stands as about to perform the work of God. We easily conceive of Christ as delivering a Divine message, and accordingly regard Him as a Teacher sent from God; but may we not also regard Him as acting in a Divine manner, as God might be conceived of as acting? Jesus in His career performed the work of God; this is the general import of the Gospels.

It was in response to a call that this deed was performed; Christ felt that it was for Him to do the will of God. In doing this, He was not simply obeying a heavenly law, but was producing a Divine result in the world; and Christ's

activity was ever accompanied by the idea that He was joining with the Heavenly Father in some vast enterprise. This He understood, though others may have misconstrued His meaning. He heard a voice from heaven saying, "I will glorify My name." Some said, "It thundered;" and a physical manifestation seemed to be present before them. Others said, "An angel spake to Him;" and these looked toward the realm of psychic phenomena. But Jesus knew that it was the voice of God. Apart from any theological conception, it can not be doubted that Jesus conducted His life as though He were acting for God. Such a fact stands out as one of the phenomena in the history of Christianity.

As a result of this motive on the part of Christ, His work assumed a peculiar character; this can be explained only as we carry out the assumption that He was performing the *opus* of God. Thus He went about as God *incognito;* and mankind experienced, though unconsciously, a dynamic epiphany. Such was the form this work assumed in the mind of Galileans and Judeans. We need not now inquire whether their logic was sound when they concluded that this Man was the Son of God; we need only note that with sanity and soberness of mind they expressed themselves as finding in Christ what they found elsewhere only in the mind of God.

The impression which Christ by His activity made was not only a profound one, but it was peculiar to Him, and could be understood only as it referred to God as its ultimate source.

Comparable to the motive and character of this work were the means which Christ employed. These He drew from His own resources. With men, more than one method is employed in producing results. Chief among them is force; yet this is probably the lowest form of operation which may engage a human will. Superior to force, in character and abiding result, is instruction, for this appeals to the intelligence. And better than instruction is example, whose subtle influence it is difficult for any one to withstand. Persuasion is, perhaps, the highest of those efforts which may be put forth by a human soul in its activity. But Christ's means of operation were beyond these devices of man; and, even though we can not accurately style or introspectively analyze His influence, we know that the same can be felt. It is here that the testimony of psychology must be evoked, and a direct appeal made to the religious consciousness. Jesus appealed to sources in the human soul hitherto unknown. Popular thought may call this means the method of love; apostolic testimony is to the effect that the love of Christ toward the disciple is of constraining power. But, apart from any set characterization, the fact may be

recorded that the work of Christ was appreciated by the most essential form of the soul's life.

The actual result of the great deed of Christ must be found in the field of history. That which was attempted was stupendous as a project; but the accomplished result was none the less remarkable. Paul adjusts Christ to the ages by calling Him the second Adam. Certainly a beginning was made in the career of humanity, and it was brought about by One who rediscovered good and bad. Ethical science can not fail to note the marked transmutation of values which was inaugurated by Christ. Art likewise does not fail to show what a new creation had been effected; the plastic of Praxiteles is one thing, that of Angelo another. Where philosophy felt the effect of Christ's appearance it was not as due to any metaphysics which He advocated, but by the deed which He performed. By virtue of this latter, genuine spiritual life was made possible. Human life did not fail to note what had come to pass; ancient resignation suddenly took on the form of aspiration.

But the religious character of Christ's career is the predominating trait; a general conception of human activity, a particular view of Christ's performance, and a detailed analysis of what He did, must all culminate in one great undertaking in religion. Here it must be emphasized that the effect which Christ produced

upon the religious consciousness was by virtue of His deed rather than His doctrine. The apostles, in writing about their Lord, barely emphasize His teaching about the kingdom of heaven; but they do not fail to evince the importance of His work. In this way, Christ made a direct appeal to men, saying, "Behold!" Then they saw what He had done. As a result of this method of activity on His part, Christ assumes the character of a vast personality. The history of human life and human culture makes this manifest. But how may this relation be expressed? Christ performed a Godlike deed for mankind; what, then, is He to the religious life? To this it may be answered: Christ is the supreme object of religion, when this is studied according to the psychologico-historical method. For science, the world is the one great subject; for philosophy, the mind; for theology, God; for religion, Jesus Christ. At any rate, the religious consciousness of Christendom keeps putting Jesus in some such position as this, regarding Him as the object of its thought.

Religion, in the purified form of Christianity, lays hold of its Lord in a very determined manner; the world, the mind, and God, are no more definite objects of human attention than is the person of Jesus. What, then, may be said of the position which He occupies in the mind of mankind? At once it may be said that Christ

is the *Weltgeist.* And just this word suggests the peculiar use which the speculative Hegel made for it. For him Bonaparte was the *Weltgeist,* brooding over the troubled waters of the early nineteenth century. Under the peculiar circumstances of Kantian criticism and Napoleonic politics, it was not really surprising that such a contemplative mind as Hegel's should fancy that the political activity of Napoleon might assume the form of a world-movement, not unlike the advent of a spiritual realm. And, by one of his admirers, Kant was considered as about to assume the place previously held by Jesus Christ.

Ascending by sure steps from such extravagant conclusions, we may begin to see how a vast soul, complete with resources, may fill the horizon of humanity; then we can go on to estimate the universal importance of the more likely *Weltgeist,* even Jesus the Founder of the heavenly kingdom. In the mind of the individual, and in the consciousness of the race, a supreme world-personality is a matter of expectation; the conception of one like Jesus as the Lord of human history is therefore by no means a fanciful one; and when His importance is estimated, only some such idea is fit to express what mankind feels concerning Him.

So far as the actual work of Jesus was concerned, the kingdom of God may be regarded as

the one great project which He took up. Abraham perfected the covenant; Moses, the law; Jesus, the heavenly kingdom. In the last case we have a distinct religious conception, as well as a spiritual reality apprehended by religious feeling. For Jesus the kingdom was a matter of labor, although the function of teaching was not unemployed; the kingdom was His work. From the standpoint of God, the kingdom was unveiled, but from the human point of view it was created. It was not thought out, but wrought out. On this account it assumes a very different form from that which is expressed in the scientific conception of "nature," or the philosophical idea of the "world;" these appeal to the perception and reason. The kingdom, however, made its appeal to actual life, and was not so much a ready form of reality as a spiritual possibility launched by Christ.

For its field, the kingdom of God as projected by Christ had human life and human history. The supreme work of Jesus is not, then, a matter of opinion, but a fact of perception. So much intellectual effort has been expended in theology upon proving things that there has been little chance for the religious mind to perceive; and so great has been the desire to justify, that no time has been left to explain. The direct view of Christ as performing a work is thus of service, not only in bringing out a distinct element in

Christian thought, but in calling attention to the fact that religion is given in psychology and history, rather than in logic and metaphysics. The work of Christ in founding the kingdom, by virtue of which He becomes the true *Weltgeist* manifest in history, is thus a part of Him, as also a phase of that study which is called Christology. When we look at the character of Christ, we naturally expect a great undertaking; and when we survey the history of the human spirit, we further see that He has not failed to perform the one great deed of the ages.

Chapter XIII.

CURRENT INTEREST IN THE CRUCIFIXION.

1. "The problem, which has recently been solved, concerning the 'sweat' of Jesus Christ, has troubled Paris profoundly, and with it France." These words are subjoined, by the editor of *La Revue,* to an article by Dr. Cabanes on the "Death of Jesus in the Light of Contemporary Science;"* and, with this article, they reflect some of the interest which has been aroused by the holy shroud discussions. From a physiological point of view, Dr. Cabanes raises the question whether crucifixion, as ordinarily inflicted, was calculated to cause death; and if so, how much time was usually necessary for this result to follow. In the particular case of Jesus Christ, it is further inquired whether death might have been due to exhaustion, to instantaneous rupture of the heart, or to a wound which may have penetrated to the pericardium. Dr. Cabanes's conclusion is that such wounds as Christ received (His legs were not broken like the

*Cabanes, "La mort de Jésus devant la science contemporaine," *La Revue*, May, 1902.

thieves') were not sufficient to kill; that the length of time involved in the crucifixion was not great enough to cause death, which was only an apparent expiration.

German interest has perhaps been evinced by a contribution from the pen of Richard Mansberg, who writes from the historical standpoint. This writer makes valuable researches among ancient methods of execution, and compares death at the stake with that on the cross. Among the various kinds of execution, crucifixion seems to have been the worst form possible. Mansberg raises various questions,—as to the form of the cross; whether the crucified one was naked or clothed; how the removal from the cross was effected. In commenting on the simplicity and universality of the crucifixion narrative in the Gospels, he expresses himself as desiring to fill in the details of "that frightful drama on Golgotha which forms the most significant chapter in the history of humanity."

As an evolutionary force, the crucifixion has further been regarded. W. W. Peyton* links the crucifixion of Christ with the discovery of a new religious force in the realm of the supernatural. In nature, death is a most significant feature; in the career of Christ it was the glorious transformation of the kernel of wheat. Thus viewed, the crucifixion becomes an essential part of an evolving nature. Christ's message was a gospel

* *Contemporary Review*, April, 1900.

of death as part of the natural order; His crucifixion became a life-force relating man to God. In this way English thought, which fifty years ago gave us evolution, now seeks to apply this to the phenomena of Golgotha.

Tolstoi's peculiar meditation on the crucifixion may also be cited: "The thief on the cross believed in the Christ, and was saved. Like the thief on the cross, I believe in the doctrine of Jesus, and this belief has made me whole. Like the thief, I knew that my past and present life was vile; I saw that the majority of men about me lived unworthy lives. I knew, like the thief, that I was wretched and suffering, and I saw before me nothing but death to save me from this condition. As the thief saw before him, after the suffering of a foolish life, the horrible shadows of death, so I beheld the same vista opening before me. In all this, I felt that I was like the thief. There was, however, a difference in our conditions: he was about to die, and I—I still lived. The dying thief thought perhaps to find his salvation beyond the grave, while I had before me life and its mystery this side the grave. I understood nothing of this life; it seemed to me a frightful thing, and then—I understood the words of Jesus, and life and death ceased to be evil; instead of despair, I tasted joy and happiness that death could not take away."*

*Tolstoi, "My Religion," Introd.

Thus in recent times interest in the death of Christ has been manifold; yet it remains to be shown how this most significant event relates itself to the course of positive religion. Art and common life, theology and Christian conduct, have not for a moment hesitated to draw inspiration from the cross; but the position which this object assumes in history has not been indicated. Here philosophy of religion must arouse itself. The death of Christ has, then, an historical significance, and this is seen more clearly when, narrowing the field of our attention to the New Testament period, we endeavor to discern the inner meaning of that which then came to pass. In itself, the historical point of view deserves recognition, and when once theology has adopted it, much light will gather upon the problem of the atonement.

Current theology, like current philosophy, suffers from subjectivism. The one falls back upon feeling; the other, upon psychology. Theology can certainly profit by consulting, to some extent, the principles which guide conscious life; but with the merely psychological interest it can not remain content. From such subjectivism the idea of the atonement may be saved by working well into the historical situation of the New Testament. Let the historical, then, be emphasized. Christ by dying saves mankind. Such is the obvious New Testament fact; how this sal-

vation is brought about theology must decide, if decide it can. But Christ, who is the Redeemer, and man, who is saved by His death, are historical creatures, having their position within the realm of time and space. It is thus that the historical consideration is forced upon theological thought. Ultimately it may be shown that Christ, like the ancient Melchizedek, was "without beginning or end of days;" and that man, being saved, inherits eternal life. But the point of living contact between the soul and its Savior is to be found in the historical process. Theology can only gain by the recognition of this fact; and then, in accepting its conditions of psychological religion, it can avoid the purely subjective, and can readjust itself to the problem at large. The objective point of view, in the case of the redemption of Christ, is to be found in history. In this way it must be shown what is the essential position which Jesus' death occupies in Christianity. The ethical point of view which sees in the cross a means of religious culture, and the theological method which construes the death of Christ in the form of an atonement, need both of them to return to the historical fact and survey, not an abstract death, but the actual crucifixion of Jesus Christ.

The value of the tragic event can not be overstated; yet the view of it may be distorted. At the outset it may be said that the death of

Christ can not gain by artificial isolation. To appreciate it, we must observe its connection with the total career of which it was, sadly enough, only the culmination. The life of Christ and His teaching can not be separated from His work and passion; taken together, they make up a distinct career, of definite religious benefit to mankind. Not as though Christ served the material interests of His day, or the bare intellectual welfare of history, but as completing a work of incomparable worth to all mankind, must He be esteemed. Such a career of service could have but one end, and that was the sacrifice of Him who took up this work. Accordingly, Christ's death was the completion of His deed and doctrine.

The crucifixion was the culmination of Christ's career. Herein the true perspective may be found; and to this Christian thought must adjust itself. Theology very naturally desires to appropriate this richest fact in all religious history, full as this fact is of beauty and moral power. But how can theology construct a system of redemption, if it does not survey the death of Christ in its own historical setting? In the records of humanity it is a fact that a great soul suffered death, and under most pathetic circumstances. What shall be thought of Him whose life was thus brought to a sad end? Thought must consider the crucifixion as such;

for it is upon this realistic fact that the issues of Christian life depend. Like Christian art, theology should find its point of departure in what mankind actually sees in the crucifixion. All this depends upon the appreciation of the historical moment.

History and historical religion bring out the career of Jesus Christ as given in the Gospels. When these documents are studied in the light of Christ's doctrine and the effect which this had upon the world, they bring out the fact that, from the outset, the teaching of Jesus was certain to bring about His death. Social conditions, as they then were, were such as to make theological and political teachers natural objects of suspicion; for the age was one of unrest, and very little was needed to arouse Roman and Judean opposition. If we say that the times were ripe for change in the affairs of human life and history, it must be concluded that any change which might occur could be only an abrupt one. The times were not prepared to receive a world-movement which should attack Jerusalem and threaten Rome; and the world in general, rooted and grounded in inertia, is ready to condemn Him who, in bringing out the new, sets at naught the old. It was to be expected that the enormous innovation of Jesus would bring speedy violence upon His head.

Jesus, therefore, was not simply a Teacher,

delivering a Divine message; He was by necessity a Person of activity, and He performed a definite deed. Yet this was not all; suffering would naturally follow in the wake of His career, and death would be the coronation of His mission. Thus it was that Luke, writing in the Acts of the Apostles, spoke of his Gospel as containing all that Jesus began both to do (ποιεῖν) and to teach (διδάσκειν) and to suffer (πάσχειν). Traditional theology has not succeeded in establishing the relation which holds among these three principles; it has similarly failed to evince the connection between the life and death of Jesus, emphasizing one of these to the exclusion of the other. Conservative theology has usually centered its attention upon the fact of Christ's death, and in so doing it has seized upon that which is the most intimate in the aroused and educated religious consciousness of humanity. But the impression which the believer receives is a direct one, whose source is in the New Testament itself; there it is shown how the crucifixion is one of several events in the career of the Redeemer. Christ "suffered under Pontius Pilate;" and it is this vivid historical fact which stands out in the Apostles' Creed. The explanation of Christ's death is to be found in connection with those words and deeds which were so obnoxious to Pilate. The consciousness of Christendom demands the living idea,

rather than the abstract conception of Christ's death; and in the feeling of the historical position of the crucifixion it finds a certain fellowship with the sufferings of Christ. Continuity is demanded in the various events which make up all that Jesus accomplished, and in the mind of the believer there must be a definite association of those ideas which reflect the deed, the doctrine, and the death of Christ.

From two distinct quarters there may be noticed the tendency to separate the life of Jesus from His death. On the one side, traditional theology has practically put all of its emphasis upon the death; on the other side, the claims of Christ's life have been urged. The result has been to break up the unity of His mission. The desire of the Church has ever been to exalt the crucifixion, because therein is to be found the atonement. On the part of rationalistic thought, the aim has generally been to magnify the life of Christ, His wise teaching and benignant work. Where orthodoxy has spoken of Christ's ministry, it has done so in a brief fashion, without attempting to relate His doctrine and His historical deed to systematic theology. Thus it has failed to measure up to the significance of Christ's life, while yet regarding His death as supreme. Others have begun with the historical career of Jesus, but have halted at the crucifixion. They have considered the

death of the Founder of Christianity as the noble end of a martyr. In this way theology has been abrupt in its beginning, starting at once with the Lord's death; rationalism has made an equally brusque termination, concluding as it does with Christ's life.

In addition to these half-views of the larger Christ, there has likewise been the marked tendency to warp the conception by bringing in considerations drawn from jurisprudence and ethics. From the legalistic point of view we can not measure the meaning of Christ's death, any more than by making use of ethical ideas we can circumscribe His life. The proper standard is to be found in religion, and when one reflects upon the terminology employed in the Gospels, he will at once see how difficult it is to invest the language there employed with any other than a religious meaning. A direct view is therefore more than desirable. Then it can be seen that, apart from Christ's life, His death is incomprehensible; without His death the life is incomplete. Such an inclusive view must be assumed in contemplating the objective Christ of history; just as a similar method must be employed when Christ is related to man's redemption. It was in this spirit that Paul said: "For if we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, we shall be saved by His life."

2. But, in addition to the general historical

setting of the crucifixion, and its particular relation to Christ's life, there must be noted in detail some of the immediate causes of His death. At once it may be said, Jesus was crucified for what He taught as well as for what He did. Both His doctrine and His deed were inimical to Judea and Rome. When, breathing forth His Divine message, He said, "My Father," the "Jews took up stones to stone Him," and they drove Him to the cross. When, breaking His stately silence, He announced to Pontius Pilate, "My kingdom is not of this world," the ruler gave sentence that He should die. Judean antipathy was aroused by the new doctrine of "God the Father," and here was made a breach with sacerdotalism. Roman supremacy was affected by the conception of the "kingdom." Judea hating Rome, and Rome oppressing Judea, joined hands that a mutual enemy might be removed. For Jesus Himself the doctrine of the kingdom was a fatal one, and His own cousin, John the Baptist, lost his life for crying out these very tidings.

In the development of Judaism the death of Christ was but the logical outcome of His preaching the message of the Fatherhood. This, in the eyes of ecclesiasticism, was an act of blasphemy. The ultimate cause of Christ's death was the theological position which He assumed. When Jesus found Himself in the palace of the

high priest, He was confronted by His own doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the Sonship of Christ. In the presence of Caiaphas He responded only to announce Himself as about to sit at the right hand of God. The sacerdotal party, headed by Annas and Caiaphas, was naturally opposed to that innovation which Jesus was projecting, as He taught concerning the Heavenly Father. Hereby the great question of religion was affected, and Jesus did not fail to produce unwonted results in this field. He gave a perfectly spiritual conception of God and of man, at once doing away with the vain accessories of sacerdotal worship. These ideas proved fatal to Him.

From Rome's point of view Christ's death seemed warranted by His seemingly seditious teaching of the kingdom of God. It sounded like anarchy, and Christ was spoken of as "a fellow who perverteth the people." Such ideas as Christ's, spread abroad in Galilee and Judea, were obnoxious to Herod and Pontius Pilate, who became easily reconciled to each other and friendly to the priesthood when it was seen how dangerous was the beatitude, "The poor in spirit shall inherit the kingdom of heaven." Religion and rights easily go hand in hand; such has been the testimony of history and reason. When, in the days of Locke and Spinoza, theology and politics were shown to be theoret-

ically separable, it was seen how firm was the actual connection between them; and it was not long afterward when Hume had shown the social and psychological phase of worship, that religion and sociology presented the same connection in a new form. When Jesus made His enormous innovation in religion, He did not leave human rights unaffected. The emancipation of spiritual life was felt likewise within the precinct of human government. Can we wonder, then, that Rome, devoid of a healthy sense of justice, and wanting in the appreciation of individual rights, at once responded to the request that Jesus should live no longer?

But these national antipathies were not all, for Jesus encountered various kinds of opposition from the politico-religious parties of His day. Palestine and its people were broken up into many parties of a political character, and as many religious classes. The relation which of necessity Jesus had to assume toward these brought Him into disfavor. His Galilean origin and associations embittered the Judeans; His mingling with publicans and Samaritans caused their own reproach in the eyes of the people to fall on Him. And what in the way of enmity was not produced by Christ's condemnation of the religious sects? Scribe and Pharisee hated Him; Sadducee and Zealot distorted His doctrine. Upon the general question of the re-

ligious life and its relation to the world there was more than dispute between Jesus and the parties. Christ's view of human life was unique, and gradually the populace became conscious that this man from the shores of Gennesaret was bringing about one great cataclysm. Some hailed with holy delight the entrance of an ethical system which at once set free the human spirit and gave it new aspiration. But the practical side of man's existence was too weighty for many of these disciples, and they could not endure persecution. Only the negative side of Christ's work was noted by those who criticised Him. It was because man was to worship neither in Gerizim nor in Jerusalem, because heaven's kingdom was not of this world, because the disciple must hate his life, that they looked askance upon Him. The positive, spiritual content, calculated to fill out these old ideas with new meanings, was neglected, and Jesus seemed to be only an iconoclast. Human nature may be dissatisfied, but it is not ready to hate life or reject the world; and man may be restless, but he does not care for catastrophes. Christ's attack upon the earthly life was not pleasant for the Palestinian to contemplate.

Finally, speculative views were set at naught by Jesus, and the results of human thinking seemed now about to be lost. Christ passed judgment upon the world, and His judgment was

a negative one. This aroused the opposition of man's æsthetical and philosophical nature. Great minds have at other times made a distinction between the soul and the world; this was certainly the case with Plato. But Plato never felt the sharp and burning antagonism which lies at the foundation of New Testament thought. No; ancient thought believed largely in matter, because it saw in it the symbol of beauty and found in it much satisfaction. Plato could never have said, it profits nothing when one gains the whole world. But Jesus did not hesitate even here, and no wonder that His contemporaries saw in His teaching a decided irony.

What Jesus was doing in establishing these ideas was a part of that work which He was destined to perform; but all the while He was making out the case against Himself. Judean and Roman, sacerdotal leader and secular partisan, man of the world and philosopher, were all arraying themselves against Him and His work. It was the peculiar fate of Jesus that He should die for His doctrine and His deed. Of course, martyrs have appeared in the world's history up to the dawn of modern times; but great religious characters are not persecuted by their immediate associates. Moses was esteemed a benefactor; Confucius was dear to his people; Gautama found favor in India; and Mohammed was welcomed by the Arabians. But Christ

aroused all that was inimical in His generation; and we can hardly wonder at this when we reflect upon His extraordinary doctrine.

3. Yet a more intimate view of Christ's death in ite relation to His life may be entertained. History in general, and New Testament history in particular, have felt the force of the crucifixion, but the biography of Jesus Himself evinces a more direct point of contact. It was Christ who suffered for His Gospel of the kingdom. At last, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mankind has awakened to the fact of pain; our biological science and philosophy of pessimism have aided us here. It was not until the days of Kant's philosophy and of Robespierre's politics that the process of feeling in consciousness received the recognition of its independence. Goethe proclaimed that in life there are thirty-six tragic situations. Hahnemann pointed out that there are seventy-three sources of bodily pain. Advanced surgery classifies injuries in the form of a "pentateuch:" wounds, tumors, fractures, luxations, and ulcers. The idea, then, which is expressed by the words, "Christ has suffered in the flesh," is a very vivid one, whose impressions can not be forgotten. In the career of Christ, as the Founder of God's kingdom, the crucifixion was the final event. To suffer death was a part of the vast work which He undertook.

The spirit of Jesus during His passion was in harmony with His conduct as the Founder of the kingdom. In the mind of Christ, His death was a dutiful act of suffering, inherently included in His plan; and during the twilight of the walk to Emmaus He asked, "Ought not Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into His glory?" Obedience was thus the guiding principle of Him who said to His disciples, "I will not henceforth drink of the blood of the grape, till I drink it anew with you in the kingdom of the Father." In His life, when He taught and wrought as though in the stead of God, He was obedient unto His Father's command; and in His dying the same consciousness was manifest. His crucifixion was climactic, and Christ was "obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."

Paul has mightily shown how the thought of Christ's death can affect the mind of the believer, who, in spirit crucifying the flesh, dies with His Lord. But in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is demonstrated how the passion of Jesus, in the anticipation as well as in the actual suffering, was of peculiar influence over Him. Through the crucifixion Christ was approved by God as His Son, made manifest to man as his Lord, and perfected in His own character as Redeemer. Such was the Divine education of Christ that "He learned obedience by the things

which He suffered." By such a process "the Captain of Salvation was made perfect through suffering." And the result was determined accordingly. "Jesus for the suffering of death was crowned with honor and glory." Thus educated, perfected, and glorified, Christ felt the power of His own death as none other could.

The internal effect of Christ's death can not be too highly emphasized, and by considering it we can see how important is the connection between the two facts of life and death. In general, theology has found the Sonship of Christ to consist in some metaphysical nature or spiritual character; and so far as these indirect methods emphasize the peculiar facts, the mind of Christendom can find value in them. But the direct method of the New Testament goes on to show how intimate was the connection between Christ's history and His character. And in special connection with the crucifixion does this appear; here was the means through which the Divine character of Jesus was perfected. For the believer, Jesus, although an historical personage, is yet the possessor of eternal life. But this eternal character becomes Christ's by virtue of His death. By His resurrection from the dead Jesus was declared to be the Son of God. The crucifixion, then, becomes the path from the historical to the eternal, and Jesus by His death becomes the Redeemer. Albrecht Dürer said that

it was the saddest moment of his life when, quitting Nüremberg for Venice to learn from Mantegna the secret of his art, he found the great Venetian dead. Yet Jesus by His death loses no power to help man, but rather gains by His cross; without this one element, His career and His doctrine might have been as obscure as that of Philo Judæus.

Accordingly, the person of Jesus as a doctrine can not be separated from His work. The two interact. In pursuing His peculiar career and unfolding His Gospel, Christ developed His Divine character. The teaching which He delivered to mankind was calculated by its heavenly character, to transfigure such a sensitive nature as His; for God's thoughts were being thought after Him. The work, performed in response to a Divine call, was similarly adapted to bring out the inner character of the Galilean. But greater in its influence than either of these was the passion, by which He learned obedience unto God. Through persecution Christ was brought to see all the more clearly the heavenly character of His message and the Divine nature of the kingdom. Rejected by man, He was approved by God; despised by the world, He was loved by the Father, because He laid down His life for the sheep. Christ and His crucifixion are one.

The interest which the crucifixion must have for the believer is likely to be a marked one.

No individual whose soul has been stirred by the awakening of his religious life can remain indifferent to this event in Christ's career, even though at first he may not know just what the crucifixion may signify. For religious faith which has been educated in the thought of the New Testament, nothing can be felt as having greater value than the death of Christ. The soul sees in this a fact, magical in the sentiments which it can arouse. Various may be the feelings created, and a warlike character like Clovis may exclaim, as he learns the tragic story, "O, that I had been there with my Franks!" Yet one constant impression abides. It is this perception on the part of religious consciousness that must be embraced in any theory of the atonement. First the fact, then the theory; first the human, then the Divine. The atonement, as a theory, must trace back finally to the consciousness of those who believe in the death of their Lord. As a rule, where metaphysics has been brought in, and jurisprudence as well, psychology has been overlooked. What is needed to explain the atonement is not a system of abstract ideas, which are the product of speculation, but living facts, which are the result of experience.

The psychological and historical may be consulted, and thereby theology will become a gainer. Theology has been friendly to other forms of philosophical culture, and has not hesitated at times

to make wide departures from its own field, in order to appropriate what had seemed so tempting in another one. Why, then, should it now hesitate to assume as its starting point, not the abstract intellectualism of a mediævalism which said, *Credo, ut intelligam,* but a living consciousness, wherein faith is an instinct? And the appeal which the philosophy of history makes can not be turned aside. In the case of a particular doctrine like the atonement, why should theology ignore the manifest fact that the crucifixion affects the religious consciousness and produces a peculiar result in history, and yet evince the desire to demonstrate man's redemption by appealing to jurisprudence and ethical theory? Within the field of religious experience and religious history all the advantages of these latter points of view may be found, and that without the ordinary embarrassments of the theories of "moral government" and "satisfaction."

Grotius, mighty in the realm of modern jurisprudence, is well known as a theologian. But, even when we are convinced that in the general idea of Divine government there is much value, why should theology embrace the abstract view of natural rights and overlook the kingdom of God? There may be found, first of all, a living, religious idea, having for theology all of the elements of Grotius's famous political theory, and many more besides. Certainly the reader of the

New Testament can not help seeing that in Jesus' mind His death was vitally connected with the idea of the kingdom. For this He died, while all of His disciples fled. Where Paul speaks of the Church as having been purchased by the blood of Christ, the same idea may apply, with similar force, to the principle of the kingdom. For, founding it in opposition to Rome, Christ was led to the cross; and for its sake, as a kingdom not of this world, He died. Why, then, can not theology find, in the conception of the kingdom, a theory equally as cogent as that of an abstract moral government?

"Satisfaction," as a theory, represents a different theological attitude in Protestant thought. If moral government, as a view, is vitalized by its contact with the idea of the kingdom of God, "satisfaction" will be enriched by being interpreted in connection with Christ's idea of the Fatherhood. Who may be conceived of as having been satisfied by Christ's death? It was He to whom Jesus in Gethsemane said, "Not My will, but Thine be done." All the weight of the contrary theory of moral government can not render unnecessary the idea expressed in the term "satisfaction." God was not indifferent to Christ's behavior, nor was His interest in the crucifixion a purely juristic one. It is plainly to be seen that Jesus desired by His obedience, and determined by the faithful completion of the work

assigned Him, to satisfy the Heavenly Father. Such is the thought of the Gospels, especially that of John. These writings, however, do not represent the satisfaction of God as the result of exacting cruelty on the part of a monarch; but rather as the Fatherly consideration of One who was well pleased by the obedience of His Son. And, in the larger sense, it may be said that the work of Christ, finished by His death, was a satisfactory one; satisfaction being the complete judgment of God pronounced upon the career of Christ. Perfect in His religious character, and faithful in His Divine call as a Teacher, Christ produced a complete work.

But, now, how does the crucifixion stand related to the Christian life, with its faith? The relation is there, for the believer clings to the cross; and at once it may be said, that to appropriate the Gospel, to believe in God and to live in His kingdom, one must assume a consistent attitude toward Christ, the Master of the whole system. The believer must take Him as He is, and must accept the principles of the Gospel as they were given. These religious concepts were costly; for them, the Son of man was sacrificed. The world is not Divine, but all too human; the power of the world is not heavenly, but of the earth. Hence it was that the principles of Christ were given to us only after a struggle, in which, however, He was more than conqueror.

Therefore, to have God, the believer must find Him in Christ, whose death was satisfactory to the Father; to enter the kingdom, the soul must come through Christ, who died that that kingdom might survive.

With especial reference to Christ Himself, it may be said that Christian faith can not rest until it rest at last in Him who was a crucified Master. To have Christ, one must in some wise accept His character and career; to believe in Him, one must regard Christ as the embodiment of eternal life. But all this comes about only when an individual sees in Christ's death the means whereby His personality became what it was, and the method according to which the work was completed. What is to be gained by such a method of reasoning from simple New Testament principles? Chiefly this: the fact of Christ's death, and the appreciation of this in the awakened and educated religious life; in these lies the point of departure for the doctrine of the atonement. No theory can supply the essential and positive element found in the historical crucifixion; nor can any view of His personality be found satisfactory if it does not finally consider Christ in the character of a Redeemer. Deed and doctrine, life and character, have as their vanishing-point the crucifixion. Not until then was Jesus able to say, "It is finished."